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
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
**Anglo-Saxon Superiority:**  
to what it is due.





THE map illustrates sufficiently the extraordinary power of expansion of that race which seems destined to succeed the Roman Empire in the government of the world. The parts occupied by the Anglo-Saxon race are shaded and the islands are underlined; the parts that are only threatened, as Egypt and the Argentine Republic, are dotted.

*Vide p. xxviii, Author's Preface.*





Translated from the Tenth French Edition.

A work dealing from a French  
point of view with the causes  
of the Superiority of the English-  
speaking Peoples.

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# Anglo-Saxon Superiority: to what it is due.

("A quoi tient la Supériorité des Anglo-Saxons.")

BY

EDMOND DEMOLINS.

TRANSLATED BY LOUIS BERT. LAVIGNE.



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## AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH EDITION.

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### THE THREE ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH SOCIETY.

I TRUST the English public will not misunderstand the meaning and import of this book, nor take my opinions as applying to all the inhabitants and all the institutions of Great Britain.

In this work, by the application of the methods of social analysis devised by F. Le Play and completed by H. de Tourville, I seek to carefully isolate and *exclusively* consider the phenomena which appear to be derived from Anglo-Saxon influence, because these phenomena alone ensure for England and the United States their social originality and superiority. Above all, I endeavour to make a clear distinction between these phenomena and the customs and institutions peculiar to the Celts and Normans.

The Celtic element, which predominates especially in Ireland, in the Scotch Highlands, in Wales, in the towns of Australia, in New Zealand, etc., contributes—and its tendency is to maintain—in a certain measure, the traditions peculiar to that social type.

Owing to their original mode of life, more pastoral than agricultural, the Celts have no liking for the absorbing pursuits of agriculture; they have more inclination for the liberal professions than for the commoner callings, and achieve more success in the former.

Owing to their traditional clan organization, they show more taste for public than for private life, for political than

for agricultural, industrial, or commercial struggles. In the Anglo-Saxon world, the Celtic populations mostly fill the ranks of the lower proletariat, or higher in the social scale—the liberal and political professions.

The Celtic race belongs to the “Communitic Clan formation,” which never attains social superiority: pure Celts ever were vanquished socially, and always will be, as long as they are not transformed by contact with a superior race.

The Norman element, more mixed and diluted in the social body, has yet left in England profound traces, which rigorous analysis could determine exactly. From this element (now expropriated to a large extent from the soil) has arisen, as part of its results, the enormous domains, and from it have also arisen the law of primogeniture, the hereditary nobility, and House of Lords. Norman tradition appears to me to be found again in the organization of the English Universities and the spirit of caste which animates them (the American Universities seem free from this influence). Moreover, the spirit of snobbery is another result of Norman influence.

Whilst the Celtic element weakens especially the lower classes, by dragging them into labouring pauperism, the Norman element weakens especially the upper classes by promoting Lordolatry, Patronage, and Snobbery.

Even as the Celts belong to the “Communitic Clan formation,” so did the Normans belong to the “Communitic State formation.”

In accordance with the qualities inherent in their origin, the Normans undertook to establish in England that type of great centralized and authoritative State which Spain was to know with Philip II., France with Louis XIV. and Napoleon, and Germany with Wilhelm. We all know that those vast political machines, smothering as they do all

individual initiative, never produced other than an apparent, factitious, and ephemeral prosperity; they are but the royal road to decadence.

It is precisely among these two elements—Celtic and Norman—that the socialistic doctrines have found any echo in the Anglo-Saxon world.\*

Socialism indeed is but a manifestation of the Communitistic formation which leads men to seek redress of social evils by the help of the group, the community, rather than by the activity of the individual.

If the Governments of Australia and New Zealand have attempted to mingle socialistic institutions with reforms that have nothing social about them but their outward appearance, that is because the Scotch or Irish element abounds among their politicians, owing to the tendency which I have shown to exist in men of the Celtic race, and which is thus verified. But these socialistic experiments will be brought to an end for the simple reason that they are signally unsuccessful, whereas private Anglo-Saxon enterprise obtains increasing success. It is but a matter of time.

Indeed, that which distinguishes England and sets her apart from Continental nations, and decidedly accounts for her social superiority at the present time, is the fact that she has gradually succeeded in freeing herself from the Celtic and Norman influences. She has been able to ac-

\* As M. Métin ascertained, the leaders of English Socialism "are, according to their own confessions, guided by the love of the Beautiful, and also by some impulse inherited from *Celtic ancestors*. Indeed, nearly all of them boast Irish, Scotch, or Welsh origins, and declare that they owe it to their Celtic forbears to be keener-witted and more free-minded than their Anglo-Saxon rivals. . . . The idea of Land Nationalisation was brought to England by Irish agitators returned from America."—"Le Socialisme en Angleterre," by Albert Métin, p. 84.

comply with this enfranchisement thanks to the preponderance which the Anglo-Saxon element has gradually assumed over the other two—a preponderance whose progress no human force can now stop.

It is precisely and solely this *Anglo-Saxon element* which I have in view; this will explain the title of this book, and should be kept in mind.

The Anglo-Saxon no longer belongs to the Communistic formation, but to the Particularistic formation, thus named because instead of causing the community to predominate over the individual, the individual is made to prevail over the community, private life over public life, and in consequence the useful professions over the liberal and administrative professions.

Such is indeed the real foundation of Anglo-Saxon superiority.

The whole of the history of England is affected and explained by the slow but constant evolution of the Saxon through the dense Celtic and Norman shell.

I will only sketch out the principal scenes in this great stirring drama, and for the details of demonstration refer the public to the Essays which M. de Tourville is shortly to publish in *La Science Sociale* on the subject of the “History of the Particularistic Formation” (*Histoire de la formation particulariste*); he is the first exponent of the curious evolution of this group of populations, and it will be seen that he has done the work in a masterly and definitive style.

#### FIRST SCENE.—*Predominance of the Saxons over the Celts.*

The Saxons settle in Great Britain in the fifth century, principally south of the Thames, where they spread their own name: Wessex, Sussex, Essex. They drive away from these parts the British Celts, whom a half-pastoral life at-



tached but imperfectly to the soil. The Celt—more of a dreamer than a worker—consoles himself by singing his defeat, which he deems glorious. Such is the epic legend of King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table.

The Saxon, unlike the Celt, is a born farmer, thanks to the geographical conditions of his previous abode. He settles firmly on the soil, which he proceeds to clear and till, and fixes his dwelling in the midst thereof. His ideal is the foundation of a rural estate on which the individual is perfectly independent of his neighbours and of the political chiefs. Alfred the Great himself cannot enrol in his army any but the Saxons who are willing, and who have an interest to serve, or who consider that the cause of war is worth fighting for. Besides, the authority of the Saxon chiefs is purely temporary and elective. Here we have the first and distant manifestation of self-government, and even an embryo Parliament in the reunions of the people (*Folk-mot*), and gatherings of the wise men (*Witenagemot*), where every one had a right to be present.

Such a society presents no military aristocracy, no aristocracy of birth; but only land-owners, all equal in rights, of independent estates, none of which is subordinate to the other—contrarily to the feudal practice.

The administration of the law, also, is quite independent of the public powers: it is organized spontaneously between neighbouring land-owners. This is the beginning of the essentially Saxon institution of the jury.

All this is very different from the system which the Frankish chiefs established on the Continent in collaboration with the Gallo-Romans.

SECOND SCENE.—*Predominance of the Saxons over the Angles.*

In the sixth century the Angles started from the eastern slope of Schleswig and landed in Northern Britain. They drove away the Britons in different directions and founded the large kingdom of Northumbria. They afterwards spread southwards as far as the Thames and formed another large state, Mercia.

Although they were better husbandmen than the Celts, the Angles were inferior to the Saxons in this respect. While the latter only invaded small territories, that is, only as much as they could well cultivate, the Angles spread over large areas, because they were more anxious to extend their dominion than to exercise agriculture.

This was one of the first causes of weakness. There was another: an *hereditary* nobility—Jarls, Ethels, and Ethelings. Social science explains nowadays this difference between the Angles and Saxons; I only note it down.

Round these nobles flocked a numerous suite of companions, *comites* and *milites*, a kind of patriarchal clan. This clan was a means of strength, but also a cause of weakness for the chiefs, as, in order to maintain obedience, they were compelled to extend unceasingly their conquests and dominion.

Finally, another cause of weakness was that implied by the vast area covered by the estates which this hereditary nobility was obliged to possess in order to maintain its adherents. So these men did not attach themselves to the soil, did not firmly establish their race in it in the fashion of the Saxon husbandman. The land was only valued in so far as it served to reward personal services and to keep their retainers in idleness.

There lies the explanation of the rapid decline of Northumbria: this kingdom lasted barely a century and a half.

We know how, under Egbert, the Heptarchy fell under the domination of the Saxons. But the latter did not give the Angles a Saxon government, nor did they foist Saxon officials upon them, for the good reason that their political development was most limited, their strength lying more in private than in public life. They never dreamt of administering conquered peoples in the fashion adopted by the Romans, and later by the Spaniards and the French. Their ideal was rather—and has remained—a Federation.

Thus were started by the Saxons those former United States of England. So little did they aim at constituting the model of a large empire, that their king continued to call himself simply "King of the Saxons of the West." And yet he was sovereign of the whole island.

However, if the Saxons did not impose their political sway upon the Angles, they exercised over them a profound social influence, by the very fact of the superiority of private life among them, and by their greater capacity for work and colonization. They gradually spread over the large tracts of land which the Angles had annexed without occupying them. They thus thoroughly Saxonized the Angles, as in our days their descendants in the United States are gradually assimilating and bringing to their own language and social organization the immigrants from old Continental Europe. The present explains the past.

The above process and its results are expressed by the word "Anglo-Saxon."

THIRD SCENE.—*Predominance of the Saxons over the Danes.*

The Saxons were not left long in peace: about 867 the first batch of Danes appeared on the scene. They occupied the territory of the Angles as far south as the Thames, and the Saxons kept them there for seven years.

It is not my task to explain the social genesis of these Danes. M. de Tourville shall do this in *La Science Sociale*. Let it be stated only that they were, above all, pirates, *Vikings*, little prepared or disposed to fix themselves firmly on the soil by agriculture. They organized a system of military occupation, and were content with assuring their subsistence by raising regular and arbitrary levies.

The Saxons were obliged to submit, like the rest of England, to the Danish armies, because no peasants can well resist warriors with the might of arms. But at any rate they did not do as the Britons had done, and never let go their hold of the land—which they held firmly indeed by the means of agriculture.

Thus they were able to await a favourable opportunity. It presented itself under Alfred. Then did the Saxons take the offensive; they first liberated their own territory, and then that of the Angles. The Danish pirates were turned out of England. Once more the Saxon race triumphed throughout the island. So great is the superiority which his hold of the land invariably gives the husbandman over the warrior's military or political domination.

But the Saxons were not at the end of their troubles. Fifty years later, in 994, another Danish host arrived. These were not mere pirates; they were better organized politically; they were the *Regular Danes*, whose origin and formation M. de Tourville will explain.

These Danes, however, had no other social idea than to



constitute themselves into a governing class and to live regularly at the expense and by the work of the conquered ones, somewhat in the fashion adopted by the Turks with the Christian populations.

This was therefore another political conquest in which no real possession of the land was taken, in which there was no implantation of the race into the soil.

As practical business men, which they already were, the Saxons immediately formed a simple treaty with the Danes. They offered to pay as a tribute the sum of money which they would have spent had they waged war: that is the well-known Danegelt tax. Quite a Saxon process: never to fight unless there is something well worth fighting for. Since they were in possession of the land, they preferred to pay. Moreover, the Saxon does not care to exercise political power.

They went on cultivating their estates, awaiting another favourable opportunity. It came so naturally, so fatally, it was so unavoidable, that history is silent as to the details of the event, and only records the issue. It is stated that the Saxons gathered round an obscure personage, named Howne, and rose in arms. "Speedily driven northwards and turned out from town after town, the Danes took to the sea and reached their native land in diminished numbers." \* And the historian adds: "Unfortunately the patriotic exploits of this Saxon army are nowadays as unknown as the name of its leader is obscure." This was exactly the character of obscurity which a revolt of peasants was bound to assume. Their rapid success clearly shows that their adversaries had no real hold of the country. To hold the soil by the means of agriculture, that is everything.

\* Augustin Thierry, "*Histoire de la Conquête de l'Angleterre*," tome 1, p. 163.

Once more England remained to the Saxons, from North to South. Those small peasants had been doing good work.

And what did they proceed to do when they found themselves masters of the situation?

They immediately and solemnly reasserted their favourite form of *self-government*, and defined it by drawing up the Saxon customs in all their purity: this was the famous Common Law. It affirmed the narrow limitation of the public powers by ensuring individual liberty and by the institution of the jury.

But the Saxons had not done yet with adversity: another squall was rising on the horizon. The Normans were coming!

FOURTH SCENE.—*Predominance of the Saxons over the Normans.*

The Normans were but improved Danes; they had been perfected by the feudal *régime*, whose military hierarchy they had adopted in Normandy.

They took advantage of the Dane's departure to invade England with William the Conqueror.

After a short resistance, the Saxons accepted the Norman monarchy, as they had accepted the Danish monarchy, asking but to be left to work in peace. They therefore went on acting as practical men of business. They were ever willing to renounce the exercise of power, provided they were guaranteed what they considered the greatest boon obtainable—independence in private life; provided, also, they had assurance of the public peace.

Thus in our own time, in the United States, the Anglo-Saxon is disposed to leave to the Irish and Germans the political offices and civic functions;\* they themselves prefer the commoner callings.

\* It is known that in New York the famous Tammany Hall is

Unfortunately, the Normans did not long respect the independence of the Saxons. The bands of adventurers recruited by William in different parts of France, most of them disreputable men (the composition of this army is sufficiently known to-day), had but one end in view: to have fiefs granted them, not in order to cultivate the land, but to exploit the populations. Domesday Book tells us with what care they surveyed and registered all landed property in England, shared it amongst themselves, and generally left the Saxons on the soil to pay them taxes and tithes.

Then began, between Normans and Saxons, a struggle which lasted several centuries; the former striving to obtain complete domination and a thorough command of Saxon resources, the latter endeavouring to secure independence in their private lives.

The Saxons claimed five fundamental rights: (1) that of bequeathing their property to their descendants without control; (2) to be taxed within the limit of their ability to pay; (3) to receive payment for any compulsory work they were made to do; (4) to be left to transact business amongst themselves according to their old Saxon customs; (5) that they should be left the exercise of justice even towards any of their fellows against whom a Norman preferred any complaint.

Far from recognizing these rights, the Norman kings aimed to establish in England an autocratic monarchy whose powerful authority should be obeyed by all in the land—Norman nobles as well as Saxon peasants.

This nobility was indeed very different from that of France. In France, the king had come out of the nobility; in England, the nobility had been made by the king. A mostly in Irish hands. In Australia the political leaders are nearly all Irish or Scotchmen.

French *seigneur* asked the founder of the Capetian Dynasty, "Who made you king?" whereas the king of England could well have asked one of his lords, "Who made an earl of you?" The latter—an upstart ennobled yesterday—could have found no answer.

At this period of history, England seemed therefore condemned, before Spain and before France, to a *régime à la Philip II.*, *à la Louis XIV.*

Once more England was saved by the Saxon farmer standing immovable over his furrows, and determined to preserve his Common Law. Then took place an extraordinary phenomenon. Seeing their privileges threatened, the Norman nobles found it necessary to ally themselves to the contemned and exploited Saxons.

From this alliance was evolved a hybrid, namely, *Magna Charta*.

*Magna Charta* recognized both the Saxon Common Law and the independence of the Norman nobles. This took place in 1215, and was signed by John Lackland.

The Saxons were at least thus rid of one danger: autocracy.

*Magna Charta* established a whole system of legal guarantees against the king. The nobility brought together its Council of twenty-five lords; Saxon tradition had its Parliament, and—what was more to the Saxons—the rural estates were made undistrainable, individuals were declared inviolable, justice was ordained to be rendered by peers, even in capital cases, which is the idea of the Saxon jury.

Such was the perseverance and tenacity with which these indomitable peasants remained faithful to their social principles and brought on their triumph.

They triumphed so well that the Norman lords were compelled to look to the Saxons for strength to act. The power of private life alone had made them once more con-

quer. The Saxon people had resumed their rank, and re-established self-government.

Moreover, they gradually absorbed the Norman nobility. The Normans, impoverished by continual civil wars, were but too happy to marry the daughters of Saxons made rich by agriculture.

Saxon predominance became so complete that there was soon but one language—the Saxon language, and one law—the Saxon Common Law.

The Saxon was triumphing all along the line, demonstrating, even at that epoch, *the undeniable superiority of social over political power.*

Since then, the Celtic and Norman elements are gradually being absorbed by the Anglo-Saxon element. Nowadays, owing to the same causes, the Anglo-Saxon not only predominates in England, but throughout the whole world.

This book has for its aim to explain this phenomenon, and to draw from it a great lesson.

EDMOND DEMOLINS.

P.S.—A difficulty has arisen as to the translation into English of certain terms of Social Classification, chiefly of the words *formation communautaire* and *formation particulariste*.

It was important to preserve unity in the scientific terminology employed by giving these words the same consonance in English as in French.

*Formation communautaire* has therefore been translated by “communistic formation,” and *formation particulariste* by “particularistic formation.”

These two fundamental terms, to which a special sense is here assigned, are explained in the footnote on p. 39. The reader is requested to refer to that note, so that there may be no confusion in his mind, and that these words may be understood in the sense there defined.—E. D.





## AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FRENCH EDITION.

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**A**NGLO-SAXON superiority! Although we do not all acknowledge it, we all have to bear it, and we all dread it; the apprehension, the suspicion, and sometimes the hatred provoked by *L'Anglais* proclaim the fact loudly enough.

We cannot go one step in the world without coming across *L'Anglais*. We cannot glance at any of our late possessions without seeing there the Union Jack.

The Anglo-Saxon has supplanted us in North America (which we occupied from Canada to Louisiana), in India, at Mauritius (the old *Ile de France*), in Egypt.

He rules America, by Canada and the United States; Africa, by Egypt and the Cape; Asia, by India and Burmah; Austral Asia, by Australia and New Zealand; Europe—and the whole world, by his trade and industries and by his policy.

The map printed with this book \* illustrates sufficiently the extraordinary power of expansion of that race which seems destined to succeed the Roman Empire in the government of the world.

Other nations, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, also have colonies; but these are mostly colonies of officials; they exercise a military dominion over some territories,

\* In this map, the parts occupied by the Anglo-Saxon race are shaded and the islands are underlined; the parts that are only threatened, as Egypt and the Argentine Republic, are dotted.

but they do not populate them, they do not transform them, they do not take root in them like the Anglo-Saxon colonists.

Two other Empires, Russia and China, occupy vast areas; but their territories are to a large extent deserted, and closed to civilization for a long time to come.

On the contrary, the Anglo-Saxon world is now at the head of the most active, the most progressive, the most overflowing civilization. Men of this race have no sooner established themselves on any spot in the world than they transform it by introducing, with marvellous rapidity, the latest progressive innovations of our European communities. And often these younger societies succeed in outstripping us. They already call us, with a certain disdain, the *Old World*. And indeed we must acknowledge that we do look somewhat old by the side of these our juniors.

See what we have made of New Caledonia and our other possessions of Austral Asia, and see what *they* have made of Australia and New Zealand.\*

See what has become of Southern America under Spanish and Portuguese rule, and behold the transformation of Northern America in the hands of the Anglo-Saxon. It is like night and day.

The following simple figures may form another illustration of that undeniable superiority.

From official statistics, we find that the following ships have passed through the Suez Canal in the course of one year:—

French ships	...	...	...	...	160.
German ships	...	...	...	...	260
British ships	...	...	...	...	2262!

\* Even in Algeria, which, however, is quite close to us, and which we have occupied for the last sixty years, there are as yet but 300,000 French people—as against 250,000 Europeans of different nationalities, who threaten to submerge us.

But it is not sufficient to point out this superiority, to “denounce” it in Parliament or in the press, or to shake our fists at *L’Anglais*, like angry old women.

We should examine the situation as men who will be equal to it, as scientists who will analyze it with exactness and most coolly, so as to become acquainted with its real properties.

The question indeed is to find out the secret of that prodigious power of expansion, of that extraordinary aptitude to civilize—and the means of doing it.

Such an investigation is the object of this series of Studies—for our sons and for ourselves, a question of life or death.\*

\* These Essays were first published separately in *La Science Sociale* Review. The reader will see that they form a closely connected whole.





## AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND FRENCH EDITION.

---

ON THE ALLEGED SUPERIORITY OF THE GERMANS.

I THANK the public and the press for the welcome extended to this book, of which the first edition was exhausted within a few days.

In this new edition I wish to anticipate some objections which might be made later on.

It is known that for the last fifteen years the exportation of German manufactured goods has shown such increase that French commerce has had to retreat almost generally, losing one after the other of its acquired positions.\*

In presence of such commercial development, any one may well wonder whether the position conquered in the world by the Anglo-Saxons is not itself more or less threatened.

It is important to let no confusion arise as to the causes and nature of Anglo-Saxon social power on the one hand, and that of the Germans on the other.

I will limit myself here to expounding the premises of that interesting problem, or, more exactly, to presenting a framework of the demonstration.†

\* On this subject, read two works full of facts: Mr. Williams' "Made in Germany," and "Le Danger Allemand," by Mr. Maurice Schwob.

† Some young people, after attending our Social Science classes, are to go to Germany next summer, in order to observe methodically, on the spot, the actual state of that country.

Covered with mountainous groups in the south, with sandy downs, moorlands, and marshes in its northern parts, Germany has ever been peopled by poor populations, accustomed to restricting their needs, leading simple lives, and being satisfied with small salaries. The far-famed German frugality is a virtue made necessary by nature—which perhaps somewhat detracts from its merit.

Owing to the low wages accepted by the workers and to the lack of fastidiousness of the clients, German industry was necessarily and at all times limited to the manufacture of common and cheap articles.

Now this is what is happening at the present time.

These conditions of labour, which really constituted an inferiority, have become—at least for the moment, and in consequence of exterior circumstances—an advantage.

The contemporary development of means of transport, by permitting easier access to new or backward countries, with their simple, half-civilized, or even half-savage consumers, has speedily increased the number of purchasers of common and cheap articles. Here was a fresh opening for German trade and industry, for the most part in articles of this class.

They took advantage of it in the way habitual nowadays to tradesmen and manufacturers who command but limited capital and equally limited resources of action or initiative: by appealing to the principle of association for means of commercial expansion and propagation.

These Associations gathered funds and organized exhibitions, in order to make known their wares and to acquire a knowledge of the demands of the market.

From a purely scientific point of view, this example is interesting, as showing how association can partly extenuate an inferiority resulting from conditions of locality, labour, and from a social formation which is more favourable to

the development of collective than of individual enterprise, as will be shown in this book.

Association may indeed extenuate, but it does not suppress that inferiority. It does provide the German manufacturers and brokers with means of activity which they otherwise would lack, but it does not provide each of them with the individual power in which they are deficient, and which would enable them to extend abroad (and separately) their sphere of action. An Essay on German commerce in the Transvaal, lately communicated to the French Board of Trade by our ambassador at Berlin, the Marquis de Noailles, points out clearly the personal inferiority of the German merchant as compared with his Anglo-Saxon *confrère*.\* The author first makes sure that German merchants are in dire need of "*their government helping them with its light and protection,*" to avoid the "*deceptions*" suffered "*whenever they undertook to struggle against English competition.*"

"Often," our author adds, "business was started with *too little capital*; then, the German, so bold in undertaking, at times lacks patience" (the author ought to have written "*resources*"; for your German *is* patient) "*to await success, and withdraws from the struggle after the first check to his attempts, contrarily to the course taken by the Englishman, who knows that nothing succeeds without perseverance*"—and who has the means of waiting.

"Another fault, peculiar to the Germans, and which often served them ill in the Transvaal, is their ignorance of the conditions of the market: they import useless or undemanded articles. We can point out also as faults the insufficient packing" (here is German economy with a vengeance!), "ignorance of the modes of conveyance, and forgetfulness of the peculiarly cosmopolitan character of

\* *Moniteur Officiel du Commerce*, May 12, 1897.

the Transvaal market. Another cause of failure is the choice of agents, to whom besides too little freedom of action is allowed, and who are insufficiently posted up in the local trading requirements. . . . These different reasons have up to the present stopped the progress of German trade."

Such a confession from a German source shows that, even if the Germans have been able, by uniting their efforts, to develop the exportation of their goods, and if they thus threaten the enormous industrial and commercial power of the Anglo-Saxons, it cannot be said that the latter has been, as yet, seriously damaged.

If now we observe the Anglo-Saxon, we shall see that his process of industrial and commercial expansion is very different.

It was indeed exclusively by individual efforts, and by personal initiative, without any support from private association or from that great public association, the State, that the Anglo-Saxon manufacturer and merchant took possession of the market of the world; and they did so, thanks to those social conditions which it is the aim of this book to explain. Men who could do by themselves, without any outside help, what others could only do (and this much more imperfectly) by combining, give thus the measure of their undeniable superiority.

And this superiority will be maintained in spite of the Germans' efforts to invade the markets of the world. It will be maintained in virtue of the very superiority which the personal action of a great manufacturer or merchant has over the collective action exercised by associated manufacturers or merchants.

Industry and commerce are bound to follow a constant process of evolution, in order to keep adapted to the many ever-changing conditions of the market. Now, it is evi-

dent that those combinations of manufacturers and tradesmen—more or less solidly bound together and actuated by more or less opposed interests (considering that they compete amongst themselves), will find it difficult to follow the evolution of the market. It is difficult enough as it is, to make those partly divergent interests march together! Indeed, this is a vice inherent in all associations; it is this inability to “evolve” which causes their repeated failures; here is the weak spot where practice ever belies the finest theories.

How can these very artificial groups fight for any length of time those Anglo-Saxon firms strongly concentrated in the hands of one man, or at most of a few partners tied by identical interests, who are backed by considerable capital, and gifted, moreover, with the extraordinary capacity of their race for rapidly turning round as soon as any line of business no longer pays and instantly changing their bearings?

As soon as the English made out the first symptoms of encroachment on the part of German industry, their newspapers sounded a note of warning, as they were bound to do, being more vigilant sentinels than our own: *Made in Germany!* This cry only proves how wide-awake they are, how jealously sensible of everything that may threaten, even distantly, their formidable commercial and industrial superiority. Our deep error lay in mistaking this warning cry for a cry of alarm and dismay. There could not be a greater mistake. There is, besides, a pretty margin between those 260 German and 2262 British ships which yearly pass through the Suez Canal!

I repeat that German industry and trade are at some advantage only so far as the cheaper and commoner articles are concerned. If the English cannot succeed in producing those articles at the same prices in their own country,



where wages are higher, they will turn round rapidly—in-  
deed they *have* turned round—and will produce them else-  
where, in poorer countries, where the installation of English  
firms is announced to have taken place. We know, be-  
sides, with what facility they settle abroad. I wish I felt  
as easy in my mind as to the suppleness of French industry  
and trade.

But the Germans, as compared to the Anglo-Saxons,  
labour under a double inferiority, which is bound, in the  
near future, to fatally compromise their expansion.

With the exception of the inhabitants of Hanover and  
Westphalia, who partake of the peculiar Anglo-Saxon (and  
individualistic) temperament, the Germans, in general, are  
little inclined naturally towards agricultural colonization.  
They are town-dwellers, who more willingly emigrate as  
clerks than as farmers. They therefore do not establish  
their race upon the soil in the fashion of the Anglo-Saxon.  
So whenever they find themselves in contact with him, they  
are absorbed by him. Thus German emigrants in North-  
ern America become Saxonized with extraordinary rapid-  
ity; the second generation speaks only English and  
speedily adopts American habits and tastes. In their  
haste to operate through that evolution, a certain number  
of them even go so far as to give their names an English  
signification. As a consequence, American newspapers  
edited in German find it hard to maintain a circulation;  
their readers are recruited solely amongst newly-arrived  
emigrants.

Thus, whilst the English body of consumers—that which  
always and everywhere looks for English goods—is con-  
stantly increasing, through the settling of fresh colonists  
all over the globe, and the ceaseless extension of the Anglo-  
Saxon world, the body of German consumers tends to di-  
minish in number, through the absence of agricultural col-

onization, and the rapid absorption of the German element by the more resisting and more absorbing Anglo-Saxon race.

The second inferiority on the part of the Germans proceeds from the political *régime* recently established in Germany, after the proclamation of the Empire.

I have shown above how Old Germany, poor, industrious, and saving, was the real point of departure of the actual industrial and commercial expansion, through the lowly but solid, qualities accumulated by the race. Centuries of a slow and obscure germination were needed to produce that plant which fortuitous circumstances (the development of the means of transport) suddenly caused to sprout and blossom.

I intentionally insist on this point. *The present expansion of the German race is the product of Old Germany—not of New.*

What the new imperial Germany will produce (if the system lasts) is quite different.

It will produce—it is even already producing, and daily extending—Militarism, Officialism, and Socialism, which never yet brought in their wake social or economic prosperity.

Louis XIV. and Napoleon gave to France the first two only of those evils, and note to what fix they have brought us. Note also what has become of the Spain of Charles V. and Philip II.

At first those enormous machineries impart to a society all the outward appearances of political and social power, because they centralize, suddenly and brutally, in one hand, all the live forces of a nation slowly constituted by the preceding *régimes*. It is such a brilliant period that Prussia has known recently; such as Spain, such as we ourselves knew formerly. But precisely because this *régime* central-

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izes all the live forces, it ends by stunting them, exhausting them, and sterilizing them; and then comes deep-set and sometimes irremediable decay.

The German Empire, if it persist—as is likely—in its present policy, will not escape that fatal law. Let the Germans therefore hasten to utilize the ancient social virtues of their race in behalf of their commercial expansion, and cease railing at our decadence. We are only preceding them; that is all.

And whilst the Anglo-Saxon race will become greater and greater by the fruitful and ever renewed words of private initiative and self-government, Old Germany will lose gradually the strong qualities which went to form and still make up its social power.

In this Preface I make a point of clearly establishing an essential distinction between Old and New Germany, because in the second chapter of this book I have only the latter in view; the reader should be guarded against any confusion. It will be seen in that chapter how, according to his own confession, the German Emperor manages to destroy the Old Germany in order to fashion *à la Prussienne*, and through the instrumentality of the School, the New Germany.

EDMOND DEMOLINS.

# Anglo - Saxon Superiority:

to what it is due.

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## BOOK I.

### THE FRENCHMAN AND THE ANGLO-SAXON AT SCHOOL.

**E**VEN from the School does the contrast between England and the other Western nations begin to show vividly. This contrast is striking, and enables us to perceive, from its birth, the fundamental causes of Anglo-Saxon superiority.

Every nation organizes Education in its own image, in view of its customs and habits; Education in its turn reacting on the social state.

Our first three studies of Education in France, in Germany, and in England will help us to realize this.

The fourth study determines the nature of the actual social evolution, and points how we ought to bring up our children in order to raise them to the level of the new conditions of the world.

## CHAPTER I.

### DOES THE FRENCH SCHOOL SYSTEM FORM MEN ?

#### I.

ASK a hundred young Frenchmen, just out of school, to what careers they are inclined; three-quarters of them will answer you that they are candidates for Government offices.

The ambition of most of them is to enter the army, the magistrature, the *Ministères*, the Civil Service, the Finances, the Consulate, the *Ponts et Chaussées*, the Mines, the Tobacco Department, the *Eaux et Forêts*, the University, the public libraries, archives, etc.

Independent callings, as a rule, only find their recruits amongst young men who have been unsuccessful in entering those careers.

Of course the State cannot accept all these candidates for public functions; a certain number only must be picked, and a selection organized.

Now, this selection can only be exercised through the means of examinations, influence, or birth.

Selection through birth and influence is only exceptional and accessory; examination is the great entrance door to those different careers.

To be successful at the examination is, therefore, the young Frenchman's chief preoccupation, since all his future hangs on this first success; so that families will employ those means that are best calculated to ensure that success.

Hence the influence which Frenchmen attribute to the



School—for it is the School which alone can open the most desired careers. The School it is which controls the social classifying.

Moreover, the School itself will be constituted in those conditions which will be most favourable to the preparation for examinations. It could not be otherwise, for families estimate the value of educational establishments in proportion to the number of pupils passed yearly at the different competitions. A School unsuccessful in this kind of sport would soon have no pupils at all. That is therefore for the School a question of life or death.

Now, the surest way of preparing successfully for examinations is *le chauffage* (cramming), since we must call it by its name. This process, as barbarous as the term which serves to express it, is made so imperiously necessary that the *Université* and the free Schools vie with each other in practising it.

What is *chauffage*?

*It consists in imparting, in as little time as possible, a superficial, but temporarily sufficient, knowledge of the programme of an examination.*

This knowledge must be imparted “in as little time as possible,” for two reasons.

First, people are hurried by the limit of age fixed for entrance into most careers. This limit is imposed in order to restrict the increasing number of candidates and to make the tests more crucial.

Even if it was not for the limit of age, candidates find an advantage in passing their examinations early, so as to have ample time for promotion before the age fixed for superannuation.

In these conditions, studies are necessarily superficial. The excessive extension of the programmes alone would make them so. The greater the increase in the number of

candidates, the more is added to the programmes, in order to increase the difficulties. Thus we have come to encyclopædic programmes which no human intelligence could possibly master thoroughly. They can therefore be touched but slightly.

No doubt the professors who preside over the examinations would be greatly at a loss to answer many of the questions. If they were to enter the lists themselves, they might run a good risk of being "plucked." We can realize now why cramming only imparts an evanescent knowledge of the matters of an examination. If this system of teaching had for aim to inculcate real and thorough knowledge and to train the superior faculties of the mind, its results might be durable. But as it consists principally of mnemotechnic efforts, its effects are wholly on the surface and do not affect the intelligence: they fade away as all hasty impressions do. No one objects to this, however, as the one goal of all that "forcing" of the young idea is—success at the examination. It is sufficient, therefore, for the student to be, *at one time*, in a fit state to go through the ordeal. That ordeal gone through, the career being assured, the rest is only accessory.

That is how examinations gave birth to cramming. They have also developed a special school *régime*: the *grand internat* (huge boarding-schools).

In a country where examinations alone open the most ambitious careers, parents are inclined to count entirely on the School for the education of their children. Indeed, cramming implies peculiar training methods, artificial filling processes of which families are ignorant. Those practices cannot be directed or continued at home. Moreover, *time* is the chief point—and the child must be allowed no distraction from his work.

## II.

It must be acknowledged that this educational system is quite appropriate to the aim in view, which is to form civil and military officials.

The perfect official must abdicate his will: he must be trained to obey; he is to execute, without discussing them, the orders of his superiors. He is essentially an instrument in the hands of some other man.

Note how well the *grand internat* is fitted for that training. It seems to have been organized on the model of a barracks. Pupils rise in the morning at the sound of the drum, or the bell; they march in ranks from one occupation to the other; the very walks for exercise are like the fling-past of a regiment. Playtime takes place mostly in an interior yard surrounded by high buildings; the boys walk about in groups more often than they play. Besides, those recreations are short; generally half an hour in the morning, one hour after the midday meal, and another half-hour for the four-o'clock collation. *Excursions* are scarce: on the average once a month. Parents can only see their children twice a week, and for one hour at most, in a common parlour, filled with people who can overhear one another's conversations.

Obviously, such bringing-up suppresses in young men the habit of free and spontaneous action and originality.

It tends to suppress those differences which family influence might have developed. It casts all intellects in one uniform mould, makes them instruments indeed, ready to obey the impulsion which will be given them.

Passive obedience will be the more easily obtained because the examination system has not developed the habit of reflection, the faculty of judgment. An enormous mass

of matter has been swallowed hastily and anyhow: memory alone has done this. As he accepted, implicitly, the ready-made tuition imposed by the programmes, so will the young man accept the orders transmitted to him by the bureaucratic hierarchy. Besides, do not both tuition and orders come from the source, the State? As a schoolboy, you were taught the State's doctrines; as an official, you obey the State's instructions: *Il n'y a rien de changé!*

It was Napoleon who first had the intuition of the possible rôle of the School in forming officials. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the *grands internats* were still the exception; they began to multiply under the first Empire. Napoleon, in constituting the *Université de France*, generalized the type. Indeed, a State centralized as his was, could only be worked by means of a large number of officials. The State was thus interested in forming itself the young men who were soon to be employed in its service. It was naturally disposed to inculcate in them early, at an age when the ideas are not yet formed, those doctrines and habits which go to the making of good officials, namely, negation of initiative, passive obedience, uniformity of opinions and ideas—in short, everything which may serve to rob a man of his individuality.

The different Governments which succeeded one another in France since the first Empire, despite their different labels, installed themselves into the Napoleonic structure, which even to-day stands as our political edifice. Far from diminishing centralization, the numbers of officials have increased since the beginning of the century. And so the cramming and *grand internat* systems gradually developed.

## III.

Such is the treatment which most French people submit to, in the hope of being successful in the examinations which open the careers of the State. If all entertain such a hope, however, but few are called—and those who fail must needs find situations elsewhere.

Another question arises here—whether this educational system, so eminently suitable to forming officials, is equally good for preparing men capable of creating for themselves independent positions and really taking care of themselves.

To create for himself an independent position, a man requires first of all initiative, then strength of will and the habit of relying on self.

The system just described not only does not develop these aptitudes, but restricts and smothers them. Moreover, it has the effect of accustoming the minds to expect ready-made situations, in which advancement is the reward of patience rather than of constant effort. Indeed, both in the army and in the different departments, promotion comes mostly from seniority and protection. The difficulty is to get there; but when once you are in the place, you have but to follow the regular and automatic motion which carries you unfailingly from grade to grade. Evidently such prospects are not calculated to produce heroic souls and conquering hearts.

To create for himself an independent position, a man must be young too. Unless he is, he cannot confront without flinching—and surmount—the difficulties which bristle at the entrance of all enterprises. Besides, youth is the best age for learning a trade or profession.

But the aspiring official is kept in suspense at least until he is twenty years of age, very often twenty-five, some-



times thirty and beyond. When he has finally lost all hope of success, a great many careers are closed to him; he is too late for any, because beginnings are long, arduous, and ill-paid. Besides, the older, the more exacting he is—and the more exacting a man is, the less likely is he to find a situation. Time goes on, the man grows older, and the difficulties increase.

Youth is not everything, however; our young man must show natural ability, inclination, technical knowledge. No one is made a farmer, a manufacturer, a merchant, or a tradesman, in one day. All these careers require an apprenticeship, and the best is found in practice and family traditions.

Our School training, just described, does not prepare for any of these avocations. On the contrary, it inspires the young people with disgust, it teaches them the alleged superiority of public functions. How many heads of families whose positions rest on agriculture, industry, or trade, wonder at hearing their sons—just out of school—declare that they cannot continue the paternal calling! The School has disgusted them with it.

This influence on the part of the School is becoming so general that we have come to deplore nowadays the estrangement of French young men from the more usual occupations, which, however, are also the most useful and honourable.

In consequence, those young men who, having failed in their examinations, are obliged to throw themselves on such callings, only do so on compulsion, half-heartedly, without natural dispositions, or sufficient special education—in short, in the very worst of conditions for assuring success.

However, besides official functions, our educational *régime* particularly predisposes young men to all kinds of

office or administrative work as well as the liberal professions.

Any preference for the former is easily accounted for by its analogy with the work of public offices. The same aptitudes are required, and there is as little demand for initiative, exercise of will-power, of constant effort; on the other hand, equal security is offered: advancement is slow and sure, inevitable.

So young Frenchmen who have failed in their examinations willingly turn to these *administrations*, as the French word is. We all know that they are besieged by a crowd of candidates to all of whom it is impossible to give berths.

The attraction exercised by the liberal professions is also a direct consequence of our educational system. One of its distinctive traits, owing to the constant increase of the programmes, is its encyclopædic character. A young Frenchman generally comes out of college with the conviction that he knows everything, since he has dabbled in everything and can write and speak about everything. Behold him an *homme de lettres* in some measure! He has been almost condemned to that profession, because School has ill prepared him—or at any rate has rendered him unfit—for any other independent career.

But if our School *régime* thus multiplies to excess the number of men given to the liberal professions, it is a fact that these men owe to it a peculiar intellectual conformation.

Its characteristic feature is a difficulty and often an absolute powerlessness to study any question *thoroughly*. The Frenchman is at his best in works of imagination, in rapid and therefore venturesome generalizations. Most instructive on this point is a perusal of the *Journal de la Librairie*, which publishes a weekly account of literary production in France. Voluminous books are becoming scarcer and scarcer, and when you do come across one, it

is generally some huge compilation of a more or less encyclopædic character—not any personal work having required long and elaborate reflection; but rather some vast compendium meant to present an *ensemble* of facts under the most easily digestible form. With very few exceptions, there are now in France, for long personal literary efforts, neither authors nor readers. Indeed our publishers shrink from any proposal to publish a book in several volumes.

This inability to go to the bottom of any subject is not a “racial phenomenon,” as we can be convinced by comparing the literary production of the last two centuries and the beginning of this with the production of the last forty years.

This fact is mostly due to the cramming occasioned by the examinations. When the mind has been trained solely to skimming the surface of things, to learning exclusively from “manuals,” to comprehending things speedily rather than judiciously understanding them, to swallowing the greatest possible quantity of indigestible information; then does all methodical and thorough work become impossible. A mind so trained simply cannot do it.

And naturally this inability is in proportion to the length of time and intensity accorded to the cramming and examination *régime*. This phenomenon reaches its climax amongst pupils of our largest schools. They are superior in memory, in rapidity of conception, in aptitude to seize a demonstration as it were on the wing. These are, besides, the only qualities which there has been any attempt to develop in them—and to them they owe their successes in the examinations; the pupils prove decidedly inferior as soon as they are called to bring into practice those brilliant but empty qualities.

Our actual educational system therefore forms chiefly good officials; it is hardly capable of producing anything else. It is especially unfitted to form men.

## CHAPTER II.

### DOES THE GERMAN SCHOOL SYSTEM FORM MEN?

ONE might think that some evil genius takes a malignant pleasure in breaking all our idols one after the other.

It is the turn of the School, this time.

The School! What respect, what worship of the School was taught us! If the Germans conquered us, it was because their Schools were superior to our own; forthwith we enlarged our programmes of examinations and multiplied our educational establishments. No amount of expense was a luxury so long as Education was concerned: there was an era of palace-schools. A spendthrift does not drive on the road to ruin with greater enthusiasm.

The enthusiasm was general: a free School was not enough, it must be compulsory as well. Every one to the School! The sons of peasants, as well as the scions of the middle class, were dragged to School. Woe to the man rash enough to express the slightest doubt as to the sovereign efficiency of the School!

The order of the day then was—imitation of the Germans; as we borrowed their military institutions, so we borrowed their scholastic methods, their pedagogy, their philology—that famous German philology, so subtle, so keen! “Let the brats of the second form have good Latin texts, and you’ll see how the country will rise again!” the doctors of the University would say. And admiring France would repeat those magic words.

How is it that what yesterday was an incontestable truth

has become to-day a mistake? For no one doubts that it is a mistake; every one is agreed as to that, on both sides of the Rhine.

Among us, there was at first something like a dull rumour: some persons ventured to say that the School was not showing the expected results; the development of the educational programmes coincided with an obvious slackening of the actual benefit; the averages of examined students were going down in alarming fashion: figures were quoted, facts were instanced. People went the length of saying that the development of the School multiplied the number of excluded men (*les déclassés*), of incapables; that this constituted a grave danger.

As, however, those rumours were spread abroad by people unattached to the educational body, or placed outside the official world, the general public did not heed them, but accused the malcontents of being guilty of *parti pris*.

But presently some prominent members of the University of France, some actual heads of the educational body (a late Minister of *Instruction Publique* among them), began to raise their voices and utter the same complaints. In the Sorbonne itself the urgency of reform was advocated.

However, some might yet believe that this was but another infatuation of the French, ever prompt to fluctuate from one idea to another, from one extreme to the other; until it was announced that the same protest had just burst out in Germany—at Berlin.

And the author of the protest there was none other than the German Emperor himself.

So the two countries which of late years were loudest in proclaiming the sovereign virtue of the School, at present denounce it with no less energy as having failed to fulfil its promises—or, rather, their own expectations.

In what have the hopes of the German Emperor been disappointed? and what does he expect from the School? That will be an interesting and instructive investigation; it will be no less interesting and instructive to know *his* programmes, and to find out whether *his* expectations have any chance of being realized.

## I.

The first part of his speech deals with this idea: *The School does not yield what we expected of it.*

The Emperor first ascertains that the School has failed in the teaching itself—that is, *technically*.

“There would have been no need for me,” he says, “to issue the Cabinet order which the Minister has just alluded to, if the School had kept on the level on which it ought to have kept. I want first to remark that if I have presently to show some severity, it will be to no actual person, but to the system and the situation it has created. . . . The School has not done what we had a right to expect from it.”

“What is wrong?” he wonders. “The truth is, a good many points are wrong.”

And immediately the Emperor starts his impeachment against Education, the subjects taught, and the methods employed. He begins with philology, that same philology which was to have raised the study of dead languages to the height of a science, and lent such powerful aid to the literary training of the young generation.

“The root of the evil,” says he, “lies in this—that since 1870 the philologists have kept to the easy *rôle* of *beati possidentes*, and fixed their attention chiefly on the subjects to be taught, on the art of teaching, on knowledge itself; *not* on the formation of character and the requirements of our own present life. You, Mr. Privy Councillor Hinzpeter,



I beg your pardon for saying it, but you are an idealistic philologist; yet it is none the less true that the situation has reached a point where it must be put a stop to."

So much for the methods. As we see, the Emperor has no tender mercies for the methods. He is not more merciful to the subject of the tuition—what up to the present has been the basis of literary instruction—Latin. It is known that the Germans are as proud of their Latinists as they are of their philologists. That is another illusion which has to be shaken off. At least, this is what the German Emperor tells us:

"There are many objections raised, gentlemen; many things are said. Latin composition is very important too; Latin composition is excellent to fashion a man in the study of foreign languages, and what not!

"Yes, gentlemen, I have been through all that myself. What, then, does your Latin composition consist in? I often found that a young man had secured, for instance 4 (good average) for German composition, and 2 (very good) for Latin composition. This pupil, instead of any praise, deserves punishment, for he obviously had not worked his Latin composition in the proper way—that is, *without help*. Of all Latin compositions which we ever wrote, there was not one in a dozen with which we did not employ similar means; such work was marked as good. So much for Latin composition. But if we were to write a German composition on Lessing's 'Mina von Barnhelm,' it would be marked indifferent. . . . Therefore I say, Down with Latin composition! It is in our way, and makes us waste our time."

So the teaching of philology and Latin have not given the expected results.

Such is the first declaration made by the German Emperor, but he made another.

The Emperor declared that the School had failed from a *practical point of view*—that is to say, in forming the man and providing for his success in life. That is the principal part in his speech—at least it is on this failure to form men that the speaker insists most particularly. Anticipating the imperial mind, the Minister of Cults and Education, in his opening speech, had asked whether, after the changes in the situation of Prussia and Germany, “the German people ought to remain, as in the past, a people of thinkers, seeking their satisfaction within themselves?” He answers, No, because “*the eyes of the German nation are now fixed abroad and even towards colonization.*”

This is clear; the need is to favour the expansion of the German race, to render it fit to take its part in the conquest of the world, for which the European peoples are at the present time competing.

And the Minister concludes that the antiquated system still in force for superior education should be abandoned.

In his turn the Emperor, from the very beginning of his speech, expatiates on the unpractical character of the teaching: “First, let me point out before anything else that the question at issue concerns exclusively those technical and pedagogic measures which are to be adopted in order to educate our growing youth, *so as to provide for the necessities inherent in the Fatherland’s position in the world, and to fit our men for the struggle for life.*”

The secret is out: the young generations must be prepared for the “struggle for life;” they must be made practical men, capable of taking care of themselves, capable of competing abroad with the best-fitted emigrants of other races.

Well, on this ground the School has failed again. It has produced *déclassés*, human failures, journalists; worse than that, overworked, short-sighted abortions incapable

of any vigorous or energetic effects: so says the Emperor again, in most distinct words.

He first alludes to the "forcing" of the young, which ruins the body and is unfavourable to the development of the will.

"I now reach our boys' time-table, and find it absolutely necessary that the number of hours set for home work should be revised. Privy Councillor Hinzpeter may remember that it was whilst I was a pupil at the Cassel gymnasium that the parents' first protest was heard. The Government subsequently ordered an inquiry to be opened: we were then required to hand to our principal every morning a note stating how many hours each of us had devoted to home work. Well, gentlemen, I, for one, was obliged to work—and Herr Hinzpeter was there to see to it—seven hours at home! Add to this, six hours at the gymnasium, two hours for meals, and you can easily reckon what time I had to myself."

The Emperor adds that one single circumstance helped him to counteract the effects of such overwork, and even this was not within the reach of the generality of students. "Had I not had the opportunity of riding on horseback," he says, "and otherwise moving at liberty, I should not in a general way have known what goes on in the world."

Undoubtedly horseback exercise is excellent for counteracting the effects of mental strain, but it may be granted that it is not quite sufficient to impart a knowledge of life and the world.

At least the Emperor points out the evil. "I am of opinion," he adds, "that a decisive remedy should be found for this state of things. Gentlemen, the bow cannot be bent any further, nor can it be allowed to remain so far bent any longer. Things have gone too far already."

"The Schools have done superhuman work; I consider that they give us too many learned men: they turn out more learning than is good for the nation at large, more than is good for the individuals."

What will those now say who proclaimed that the greatness of vitality of a nation can be measured from the number of its *savants*?

"On this subject," the Emperor goes on, "the expression of Prince Bismarck, the *Proletariat of University Graduates*, is exact. Most of those candidates for Starvation (the word is hard), especially journalists, are public-school abortions" (the word is not only hard but is partly true). "This fact constitutes a danger for us. Through this excess, our country is now like a flooded field which can bear no further watering. I will not therefore authorize the opening of any more gymnasiums, unless cogent reasons are furnished for doing so. *We've got enough of them.*"

In their turn, what will those now say who proclaimed that the greatness and vitality of a nation can be measured from the number of its Schools? The man who thus condemns them is not an uncultured barbarian from the forests of Old Germany; he is himself a product of the most intense scholastic development of historic times, a product of the studious, University-ridden, pedantic Germany of latter days.

At the close of his speech, the Emperor reverts to the physical inferiority wrought by the system: "What can a man do who cannot see with his eyes? And there is a proportion of 74 per cent. short-sighted pupils in our Schools! When I was a pupil at the Cassel gymnasium, the classes were held in a well-ventilated hall, thanks to the desire expressed by my mother; well, out of my twenty-one fellow-students, eighteen wore spectacles.

"These things went to my heart, and I may tell you that

masses of petitions and beseeching letters from parents have reached me.

"Now, this is my business, since I am the father of my country, and it is my duty to declare that things shall not go on in this way.

"Gentlemen, men are not to look at the world through a pair of spectacles, but with their own eyes . . . we shall take care of this, I promise you."

The School has therefore failed practically as well as technically.

But that is not all. The School is responsible for still another fiasco: the School has failed *politically*—a grave reproach.

We know, indeed, how much the School had been relied on for instilling in young men a *proper* political tone. To make sure of the School was for all parties, and especially for a Government, the best means of success. This was an incontestable doctrine. Consequently, pitched battles were fought round the School, in France and in Germany. The School became the great political platform, and the source of numberless factions: in France, the new scholastic law with its famous Art. VII. sprang from it; in Germany, it gave birth to the Culturkampf.

The German Emperor kept pegging away at the School as much as our Governments ever did; and in a masterly way he kept harping on his theme, Prussian-like, as we did Jacobin-like—but the two fashions are identical.

And now, this same Emperor comes forth and solemnly declares that the School has not given him the political results which he expected—and he is in the best place to know! It seems to me that our own politicians are in the way of confessing as much, for a certain number of members of the majority—the less obtuse—mention only the necessity of disarming on the ground of the School; they



soon ascertained that the scholastic laws have alienated from them more minds than they brought over partisans.

What, then, from a political point of view, did the German Emperor expect from the School? Let him speak.

“If the School had done what we had a right to expect from it—and I know what I am speaking of, for I was educated at the gymnasium and know how things go on there—the School ought, first of all, to have opened the duel against Democracy.”

The very words used by the present French minority when they were in power! Whereas the Republicans said, Open the duel against the monarchical and clerical party! The same shibboleth prevails in all parties and in both countries; with the same end, namely, to turn the School into an engine of political domination.

But let us trace the Emperor's meaning. He adds: “The Schools and Universities ought to have taken up the question in earnest and instructed the young generations in such a way that young men who are now about my age, that is to say thirty, should by this time have brought together the materials wherewith I might work the State and thus speedily become master of the situation.”

At any rate, the Emperor cannot be suspected of dissimulation: he clearly means the Schools to manufacture for him mere auxiliaries who will enable him to “become master of the situation.” That is his idea of Education, his notion of the rôle of the School. If the German professors and German families agree with it, that is their business!

After stating what his expectations had been, the Emperor states that they were not fulfilled: “*Such was not the case,*” he says.

And he immediately adds: “The last moment when our Schools provided for the needs of our patriotic life and de-



velopment, was in the years '64, '66, and '70. Then the Prussian Schools were *depôts for the idea of Unity, which was taught everywhere.*"

"Every one in Prussia was animated with one idea: the restoration of the German Empire and recapture of Alsace and Lorraine. All this ceased after 1871. The Empire was constituted, we had what we wanted, and we fell asleep on our laurels. We should at once have proceeded to teach our youth that it is necessary to preserve what we have gained. Nothing was done in this direction, and for some time past *decentralizing tendencies have manifested themselves.* I am in a position to appreciate such things, for I am placed at the first rank and have to study these questions. These symptoms are due to the education of youth."

He then seeks the *actual source of the evil*, and finds it in the nature of the teaching and the matter taught. There it was we saw him breaking lances against philologists and Latin. He hotly rebukes teachers who dare contend that the "mission of the School is essentially the gymnastics of the mind," and immediately adds: "We cannot act any longer on such principles."

No wonder if "mind gymnastics" appear a somewhat weak instrument to a Prussian sovereign whose power was constituted by strength of arms. It was not by means of "mind gymnastics" that Prussia gradually absorbed the whole of Germany and edified the essentially military power which sways from Berlin; neither is it "mind gymnastics" which will maintain such a power.

And this is why the German Emperor very rightly complains that the School has not given him what he expected, politically, technically, and practically.

The failure of the German School system is therefore complete.

## II.

Things cannot go on thus. The Emperor is determined that they shall be altered, and every one else has but to make obeisance: is he not the Emperor?

What, then, is the Emperor's will? what does he suggest—or command—to solve the educational question, to set the School right again, *technically*, *practically*, and *politically*?

From a *technical* point of view, his solution is simple, but radical. He eliminates Latin from every educational establishment except the gymnasium; and we already know that he contemplates some means of limiting the number of gymnasia. The gymnasium is the school reserved for the higher classes and learned professions. Quoth the Emperor: "I will not authorize the opening of any more gymnasia, unless cogent reasons are furnished for such opening: we've got enough of them."

Again, whilst shelving Latin, he does not mince matters. "Down with Latin composition, say I; it is in our way, and makes us waste our time. . . . We must change the base of our education; that base is centuries old. It is the same old basis which did duty in mediæval monastic education, when Latin was taught with a little Greek."

I will not examine here the big question of Latin; neither have I a single word to say in favour of the way in which it is taught and which yields such poor results, nor of the exaggerated importance attached to it; but I cannot forbear pointing out that, technically, the only reform suggested by the Emperor consists in suppressing: a purely negative reform.

On the other hand, *practically*, the Emperor's reforming is *not* negative.

As we have seen, practical results are the Emperor's principal object. He means to have the young men prepared for the "struggle for life"; he means to favour the expansion of the German race abroad; he means to enable the Germans to compete successfully with other nations in the conquest of the globe. In short, he means to train practical men, capable of shifting for themselves, and to endow them with a knowledge of the world. You will remember that he regrets having had himself few opportunities of acquiring such knowledge beyond the horse-riding of his youthful days.

Now, you would never guess what means he proposes for realizing this magnificent programme.

What would you think of a man who, wishing to teach a child how to walk, should proceed to tie his legs securely? or, wanting to reveal to him vast horizons, should shut him up in a narrow cell and carefully stop all openings through which the child might peep outside?

Such is precisely the process which the German Emperor has imagined. But here again I must quote, otherwise you would refuse, and very rightly, to take my word for it.

"We must make the German language the basis of our teaching. German composition is to be the essential subject. When a candidate for the B.A. degree furnishes a German composition which requires no corrections, then the young man's mental culture can be appreciated, he shows what he is worth. . . . With Latin composition we lose the time that ought to be given to German."

This is not merely the legitimate desire to give the Germans a thorough knowledge of their mother-tongue, but rather an express wish to *exclude everything that is not German*, a definite intention to taboo all foreign elements, all foreign knowledge.

The same speech offers an odd proof of this: "I should

have been best pleased, had the name chosen for these our deliberations been the old German word *schulfrage*, instead of the hybrid, half-French word *schulquête*. We shall therefore use solely the word *schulfrage* in future."

Some may see in this hounding of foreign words an expression of ardent patriotism. The following instance, however, gives a better and more transparent interpretation of the new conditions which the Emperor means to impose on Education.

"I should wish to see greater attention paid amongst us to the national element, in so far as History, Geography, and Mythology are concerned. Let us begin at home by knowing our home better."

Suspend your judgment for awhile; you will find that the "home" to be acquainted with is not the Old German Fatherland, but that more recent Fatherland raised by the Prussian Dynasty, and in which, *nolens volens*, the whole German people are englobed. What the German youth is to study is contemporary recent history—that is to say, the history of that period during which Prussia gradually subjugated the rest of Germany. *That* is what the young generations must be taught, so as to be early inspired with love and admiration of the present *régime*. Neither does the Emperor dally with words.

"When I went to school, the Great Elector was but a hazy entity; the Seven Years' War was already placed outside meditation, and History ended with the last century, at the French Revolution. *The wars of 1813–15, which are of the highest importance for every young German*, were not gone through. Indeed, I was only enabled to learn those things by attending extra and most interesting classes."

In the next few words the Emperor allows his final aim to be apparent:

"*That* is the salient point; why on earth are our young

men kept in the dark? *Why is our government so much criticized, and foreign opinion so much heeded?*" This is explicit enough; the Emperor's meaning cannot be mistaken.

Here is candour for you! Let Young Germany's attention be diverted from abroad, and concentrated wholly on *New Germany*; let the young men be taught to admire the events which brought on the hegemony of Prussia; those events are the "salient point." By such skilful penning-up of the German mind, criticism "against our government" will be made to subside, and, as the Emperor further says, "Our young people will take another view of contemporary questions."

Indeed a strong, special bias *must* be impressed on their minds by bringing exclusively under their notice the heroic period of Prussian history. Old Germany herself would then no longer haunt their souls with the remembrance of its long and delightful franchises.

We now know what the Emperor means by *practical* education. He says, undisguisedly: "Gentlemen, *I am in need of soldiers*; I am in need of a strong generation, capable of serving their country. . . . We ought to apply to the superior Schools the organization in force *in our military and cadets' Schools*."

Well and good. But will this organization enable Young Germany to launch out into this real, work-a-day world of ours—not the world where men kill, but the world where men earn a livelihood? Will that organization make practical men of them, men fit for fruitful work, and full of the resources required in the midst of the intense activity of our time? Their power of initiative is what ought to be developed—and the model set before them is that of Prussian discipline!—the ideal offered them is the organization of "military and cadets' Schools." Their minds ought to



be opened, their horizon broadened, they should be initiated into all those enterprises through which a race extends its supremacy—not a military, but a social supremacy—over other inferiorly conditioned races. Instead of this, blinkers are placed over their eyes, so that they may be ignorant of the world of the past, and unaware of any but their own immediate little world. Of all the magnificent and instructive spectacles, they will only be allowed to see the small episode of Prussian history. They will know of the victories secured by the cannon, not of the victories won by work, perseverance, energy, initiative, and the power of will!

There are in India fakirs who spend their lives crouched in self-contemplation, with a conviction that they thus will reach a superior state—the ultimate Nirvána. But even in India, those misguided wretches are but exceptional phenomena. The Emperor of Germany would seem to have dreamt of putting a whole nation under that regimen, by compelling it to contemplate a single spot in the infinite universe—its solitary self.

It is for the German people to decide whether such a dream is to become reality.

But this ought to open *our* eyes, for we are somewhat familiar in France with that deluded state which consists in being shut up in a beatific and exclusive admiration of ourselves, and singing to ourselves that we are “la grande nation,” that we are in advance of all other countries, etc. We, too, are apt to believe, and to teach the young generations, that everything is to be dated from a recent epoch, from the Revolution of 1789. Meanwhile, we do not perceive that the world is going on, and going on without us.

If the reforms decreed by the German Emperor are negative from a technical and illusory from a practical point of view, will they at least bear fruit *politically*?



It would indeed be a pity were it otherwise; considering that these reforms were inspired solely by political interest—or what the Emperor believes to be political interest.

So he says: “The question now is to teach youth how to preserve what we have gained. Nothing has been done in this direction, and for some time now *decentralizing tendencies have manifested themselves.*”

This educational scheme is therefore conceived on purpose to oppose these alarming decentralizing tendencies. When once we realize this, the Emperor’s whole speech becomes dazzlingly clear and transparent.

For the imperial desire to be realized, the School ought to possess that very power and influence which it lacks. This deficiency on the part of the School the Emperor himself experienced—for is he not, after all, only trying to strengthen a system of education already shaped towards the glorification of the Prussian monarchy, and whose Grand Masters and inspirers really were Emperors?

Consequently the Berlin gymnasium professors have protested against the Emperor’s speech; they unanimously expressed their regrets at the reproaches addressed to them; they maintained that they had ever “considered it their *most sacred duty to teach youth the love of unified Germany*, and to prepare for the social order defenders capable of *resisting the action of revolutionary efforts.*”

Now, this system has utterly failed, as the Emperor has just told us—forcibly enough; and yet, in the very face of that failure, he is attempting to accentuate the system!

The German Emperor will not succeed in obtaining the desired effect, and moreover is running a great risk of obtaining the contrary result.

The system of education in favour with him can only accentuate the inaptitude of the German middle classes to seek a living in independent careers; for the Schools whose

programme the Emperor has just drawn are meant to cater to the needs of such ascending families: this programme will even increase their native unfitness for the "struggle for life," and their inaptitude to launch out into the world, and compete with better-fitted rivals. M. Poincard has skilfully described \* that inaptitude on the part of the German middle classes and their tendency to invade the military and administrative careers and the liberal professions, to the exclusion of the money-making or *usual* professions—the most useful both to individuals and to society at large.

By still increasing the special inferiority of these classes, the new scheme will create a state of suffering and discomfort. The State will be unable to keep (whatever the size of the army or the number of officers) all the incapables which such an unpractical and systematically limited education is bound to produce. Those human failures will naturally make the State responsible for their distressed position, for such men are always ready recruits for all oppositions. In consequence the symptoms of disaffection alluded to by the Emperor will but increase.

Nothing could show better the organic vice of those Governments where the sovereign is insistently intruding on local action and personal activity. If there is indeed one question which essentially concerns localities and families, it is assuredly the question of Education. On this ground, the action of the State has always been disastrous in every way. The Emperor will see his experience repeated.

If these lines were to meet the eyes of the German Emperor, he would for a certainty be much surprised at the criticism contained herein, for is he not convinced—at

\* Vide *La Science Sociale*: "Les Allemands hors de chez eux.—Les récentes tentatives coloniales du gouvernement impérial," t. IX., p. 426.

least he says so—that his educational programme opens the new way whither nations are tending? 'Tis the programme of the future! I am not exaggerating.

At the close of the sitting, he uttered the following words: "Gentlemen, the present moment is one of transition: we are on the eve of entering another century; and it has ever been an appanage of my House—that is to say, my predecessors have ever made it their privilege—to feel the impulses of the times, foresee the future, and be the leaders in those movements whose diagnoses they had discovered.

"I believe I have discovered the new tendencies of this expiring century, and I am resolved, in the matter of Education, as I was in the matter of our social reforms, to inaugurate decisively new methods that are unavoidable, for if we do not adopt now, we shall be compelled to do so in twenty years' time."

One is surprised to hear such language from the sovereign who a minute before was reducing the teaching of History to an admiring contemplation of the military deeds accomplished by his own ancestors—the sovereign who at one and the same time suppresses Technical Education, and renders the young generations of a great country powerless to undertake that famous "struggle for life" which he has just been trumpeting!

Yet, forsooth, this delusion leaves us unamazed: that is, it is one natural in a Prussian. Prussia, that half Oriental little nation of extreme Germany, was the last to take its part in the concert of European States, if I may use the jargon of diplomatists; it was the last to be constituted into one of the great Powers; and, like that unpunctual man who had been born a quarter of an hour too late, and excused himself by saying that he had never been able to make up for that lost quarter of an hour, Prussia has always remained two centuries behind the rest of the West-

ern world. On the banks of the Spree, Philip II. and Louis XIV. are still aped most seriously, as though these two illustrious dead had not been buried long ago with their political *régimes*; and that which is really the distant Past is decorated with the name of Future.

As we are on the subject of the future, the struggle for life, the necessity of seeing to the development of the German race outside Germany, and the nations' competition for the conquest of the world, it is interesting to examine how the actual conquerors of the world manage to train their young for that rough and magnificent fighting, and how they secure a triumphant superiority. It will be seen how utterly different is their system of education from that proposed by the German Emperor.

### III.

While I was penning the foregoing, I was favoured with a call from a friend of mine, anxious—like others—to equip his son in view of the “struggle for life.” Strange to say of a Frenchman, he does not wish to make of him an official, nor Civil Service clerk; he wants to enable him to take care of himself. He is therefore a seeker, but more seriously than the German Emperor, after that famous Practical Education which is so much spoken of and so little applied.

He obtained the programmes of a certain number of foreign Schools. One especially struck his notice, and he had the happy inspiration to show it me. An analysis of this will, I believe, be useful; and I shall add to it other information which I afterwards procured directly.

The School in question is an English training college for young men wishing *to start for themselves an establishment abroad*, to found in different countries those agricultural

concerns by means of which the Anglo-Saxon race is gradually taking possession of the world and elbowing out the other races. This corresponds to what the German Emperor pretends to realize with his programme; but you will see what very different means are employed.

This prospectus opens with two characteristic quotations, placed on the cover. The first is from John Stuart Mill: "It can be affirmed, without hesitation, that in the present state of the world Colonization is the best channel in which the capital of a rich and old country can be embarked." The second is from E. Forster: "Emigration is becoming more and more a necessity, not only for the working classes, but for all classes."

The programme first states the end aimed at: the establishment is meant for young men desirous of receiving a special and practical training destined to fill the blanks left by the ordinary school education. Mark, however, that English education is of itself very practical, as we well know.\* In short, the teaching professes to furnish the pupils with the proper qualifications for undertaking with success the "struggle for existence." The words are there, as they were in the Emperor's programme.

The principals are in communication with all the colonies, whence they receive the information which helps the young men's choice as to the scene of their activity. A great number of pupils have successfully settled abroad.

Details follow as to the situation of the School, and for more concise information a plan is annexed, setting forth its configuration and mental organization.

This college is established in the country. That is not such a matter of course as it may seem, considering that our *Institut Agronomique* is placed in the very centre of

\* On this subject, see M. Bureau's articles in *La Science Sociale*, t. IX., pp. 52, 256; t. X., p. 68.



Paris. The English establishment was built on a hill, between the sea and a navigable river on one side, and an essentially agricultural district on the other. These two conditions are somewhat more appropriate for preparing emigrants than the agglomeration of the German students in the midst of cities.

The plan shows the extent of the rural estate, whose management is so varied as to offer samples of all agricultural systems and produce. The different buildings and their respective uses are clearly marked, cattle and sheep farms, dairy, poultry-farm, workshops, boat-house, etc. Religious interest is evidenced in the mention of two churches situated in the vicinity.

After this preamble, the programme gives a table of the course of studies, in which the eminently practical character of the institution is strikingly apparent. We clearly see that here is no aim to divert the School to some political end, but solely that of equipping the young men with all the practical information they shall need. Contrarily to what takes place in our *Institut Agronomique*, the first place is given to practice; the theoretical lectures are merely meant to explain the work actually gone through. A whole colony of labourers and mechanics are permanently employed in the establishment for training the pupils in the different occupations made necessary in colonization.

Naturally agriculture comes first. Each pupil enters personally upon every detail of agricultural work. The most improved implements are placed in their hands, so that they may learn to handle them and to compare their relative value. A vegetable and fruit garden is at their disposal, stocked with all the better species, and where the different raising methods are pursued. The rearing of bees is the object of particular attention; indeed, nothing



is more practical, for in new countries, the bee lends valuable resources which often could but with difficulty be otherwise attained: honey—which may replace sugar and wax—used in so many ways. One part of the estate, planted with trees, is utilized for the study of forestry, and the programme points out the usefulness of such knowledge for pupils who mean to settle in Canada or Australia.

The rearing of cattle is the object of particular care, which is explained by its importance in most colonies; it is mostly with the rearing of cattle that a colonial estate is started.

They therefore do not fail to state in the programme that there are on the estate over seventy horses and colts, and that the college is famous for its fine breeds. Those breeds are preferably used that are best adapted for work in the colonies.

We are told that there are on the estate specimens of the different breeds of horned cattle, sheep, pigs, and poultry. The pupils are carefully taught their respective merits and characters. “They assist the shepherds, and are made familiar throughout the year with all details concerning that important department.”

The dairy is composed of fifty carefully selected cows. It is provided with all the most recent improvements, and methods are practised adapted to both hot and cold latitudes.

But a colonist should be able to nurse his animals, as well as himself, if they happen to fall sick. Therefore demonstrations and practice in veterinary art form part of the daily programme.

The pupils are also taught horse-riding, and ride daily, although there is no need for them, as was the case with the German Emperor, to take that exercise in order to acquire practical knowledge. But we all know that in

many new countries, the horse is still the only means of locomotion, the only means, too, for the survey and superintendence of a large estate.

Practical work is also done in surveying, levelling, drainage, and irrigation, as sojourn on an isolated estate requires a knowledge of all these subjects.

But it is not sufficient for a colonist to be capable of working his estate; owing to the possibly great distance of any urban centre, he should be acquainted in a measure with the exercise of most industries, he must be sufficient in himself for all his requirements. In fact, the task is set of forming *the most independent man that ever lived*.

This eminently practical consideration explains to us the second part of the School's programme, the work done in a series of special workshops:—

A blacksmith's workshop, where the pupils are taught to construct and fit the machines and implements of the farm, to repair tools, shoe horses, etc.

A carpentering and wheelwright's workshop, where they are taught the carpenter's craft, the repairing of their vehicles, the raising of wood buildings, etc.

A saddle and harness workshop, where they learn everything that pertains to that special industry.

To be fit for the kind of life which awaits them, these young men are bound to possess a good many other capabilities: they must be able to swim, to row and steer a boat, to establish pontoons, and construct rafts. A coast-guard, entrusted with the care of the School boats, teaches these accomplishments. The programme says: "He teaches them in addition the art of joining two ends of a rope without making a knot." I like this preciseness of detail: it shows these people's practical spirit, their love of *thoroughness*, and that they have grasped the fact that there is no useless knowledge.

A man should also be capable of nursing himself and others. "In this subject, so important for colonists, the prospectus tells us that the pupils are instructed according to the rules of the Association of St. John, on first help to drowned people, on the appliance of different sorts of bandages, on the processes necessary for setting disjointed or broken limbs, stopping hemorrhage; the treatment of wounds, burns, and all other ordinary accidents."

Up to now mention is made only of field or practical work—such work, indeed, constitutes the essential part of a training: the question here is not the formation of scribbling clerks, but of men of action (*struggleforlifers*). Ordinary *school-work* is only incidentally mentioned, quite at the end of the programme: "Instruction in School is merely meant to explain the work actually gone through out-of-doors."

Two hours a day (no educational hot-house this!) are reserved for courses of theoretical lectures by the Principal and other teachers on agriculture, geology, mineralogy, botany, forestry, surveying, mechanics, the veterinary art, etc. In addition to this, letters written by colonial authorities on all subjects which may be of interest to prospective colonists, are read in public.

The programme is supplemented by twenty-five photographic views showing the different departments at work. I regret I cannot reproduce them here, because the types of young men thus taken unaware by the camera inevitably impress one as members of an energetic, practical race, accustomed to effort (and not afraid of it) applied in right earnest to work for which they only count on themselves after God.

And what makes this example characteristic is that they are not poor fellows compelled by misery to expatriation, but, on the contrary, they are young men belonging to rich and well-to-do families, to that very middle class which the

German Emperor wants to subject to his reforms. The programme tells us this, and we can read it between the lines in the fees charged—2250 francs a year (£90) under seventeen; 2700 francs (100 guineas) under twenty; and 3150 francs (110 guineas) above that age.

These young men might therefore be tempted to seek at home a calm and peaceful existence; instead of that, they make ready, by assiduous practical work, to confront and conquer the hardships which await the settler in a new country.

I have said that these young men have to rely on themselves alone. I find a proof of this in a document annexed to the prospectus, which reproduces the speeches given at the last prize-giving by some men of mark who lend their moral support to this institution—which, by the way, has sprung from an exclusively private source, as is general with all such establishments in England.

Most of these patrons have led, or are leading, colonists' lives; and we hear with what stress they tell the young men that they must expect to encounter numerous difficulties, which each will have to surmount single-handed. This prospect, far from discouraging the young men, seems to act on them as a stimulus; that is because the prospect of difficulties to be conquered, which holds back the weakling, is the best incitement for the strong.

Hear the language of one of these patrons, Lord Knutsford: "You must be the hardest of task-masters to yourselves; you will have to struggle against ill-luck; your crops may be destroyed, your cattle may die, but do not be cast down by misfortune. Get up again like brave men; fight on and repair your losses. Indeed that *is* the real 'struggle for existence.' " Such speeches are the inspiring music which may urge a race to the conquest of the world—but not in Prussian fashion!

Another orator, Sir Graham Berry, General Agent for Victoria, expresses himself thus: "In all parts of the world, settlements can be formed under the British flag; wherever you wend your steps—from the coldest parts of Canada to the hottest regions in Africa, or in Australia, there will you find the flag which for the last thousand years has braved battle and tempest. Now is your time to think well what direction you will take, what particular occupation you will choose; have it well settled beforehand. Never hesitate; be fearless; be determined; be persevering. I believe an intelligent young Englishman need never find himself in trouble as long as there are so many English colonies open to him—as long as there is a chance to succeed there. I am no longer a young man; forty years have passed since I started for the colonies without any of the advantages which you have: unknown, burdened with but scanty capital, little technical knowledge, and not one friend in the country I was going to. Yet I became Prime Minister of that colony, and thrice have I presided over its Parliament."

When we think that not only the pupils of one college but really a whole nation are brought up under such methods, and launch out into the world armed *cap-à-pie* with such practical power, then we can understand a good many things.

Then we can see who are the men who have a right to call themselves the masters of the future, and who are bound to become the masters of the world; then we can feel that our sons ought not to be brought up under German, but under Anglo-Saxon methods, unless we wish them to be ousted and crushed as completely as mere Red Indians.

Figure to yourselves, indeed, one of the unfortunate young men trained in a German School to the mere con-

templation of the Prussian monarchy, and of Prussian militarism—having as grounds of his education Prussian geography, Prussian history (or rather that of the Prussian dynasty), foreign to every practice of an independent life—figure this young man suddenly brought face to face on any point of the globe, in competition with one of the fine fellows whose practical training we have just described!

Which of the two is really prepared for that future which the new continents offer and make necessary for the men of the Old World?

Which of the two will show himself capable of the origi-native power which nowadays can no longer be the *rôle* of sovereigns alone, but must spring from a whole race—as proclaimed by the German Emperor himself?

I have compared two programmes: one from the most powerful monarch in Europe, the other from a few private persons. Perhaps the powerful monarch does not realize that the only way for a sovereign to promote individual energy is to withdraw his own personal action: private initiative begins where State intervention ends.



## CHAPTER III.

### DOES THE ENGLISH SCHOOL SYSTEM FORM MEN?

IF the social question could be summed up in one formula, we might fearlessly say that the question is specially one of Education. Upon the whole, the actual necessity is that men should be adapted to the new conditions of the world—which call on individuals to take care of their own welfare. The old social framework, on which men formerly depended, is either broken or insufficient.

It is our luck, good or ill, to live at the time when this troublesome evolution is taking place. Our present embarrassed position is wholly due to the contrast felt between our archaic system of education and the newly arisen necessities of social life: we continue forming men for a society which is absolutely dead. It is extremely difficult for any man to react against such an education. I do not know whether my readers realize the fact, but for myself the phenomenon is but too obvious. I make out distinctly that there are two men in me; the one, thanks to the scientific study of social subjects, sees clearly what ought to be done, and can discourse about it more or less learnedly; the other, imprisoned in his primary formation, and overwhelmed as it were under the weight of the past, cannot put in practice the inspiration of the better side, or can do so only partially and with difficulty. My head has entered fully enough into the mode of Particularistic formation, which develops the power of initiative, but the rest of me

remains stranded in its Communistic formation.\* We might well paraphrase a well-known line of Virgil, and say: "O how difficult 'tis to shake off our social formation!"

But what is difficult for such of us as are of riper age, is not so for our children; they are softer clay, and can receive and keep fresh impressions. Even if *we* are to be left behind, let us help them to cross that Rubicon. Ay, that is the great duty of contemporary heads of families; those who do not fulfil it fail in their most sacred obligation, and will be severely punished for it in their sons.

Personally I wish to fulfil that duty, and I took advantage of another sojourn in England to study more closely and from a practical point of view the question of education. I hope the present study may bring as much enlightenment to my *confrères*, the French fathers of families, as it brought to myself.

## I.

Although English education is much better adapted than ours to the new conditions of life, and succeeds better in forming active, self-relying men, yet the English are more anxious than we are to secure educational reforms. Being more advanced than we are in the way of changing condi-

\* *Societies of a communistic formation* are characterized by a tendency to rely, not on self, but on the community, on the group, family, tribe, clan, public powers, etc. The populations of the East are the most striking representatives of this type.

*Societies of a particularistic formation* are characterized by a tendency to rely, not on the community, not on the group, but on self. Amongst them the private man (*le "particulier"*) triumphs over the public man. Anglo-Saxon populations are the most striking representatives of this type. (See P.S. to Introduction to English Edition.)

tions, they realize better than we do the necessity of keeping up with the times.

This necessity consists essentially in forming young men fit to shift for themselves in all difficulties and emergencies, in turning out practical and energetic men, instead of officials or mere scholars, who know of life only what they have learnt in books, which is little enough in all conscience. The product they endeavour to obtain is exactly what the conditions of social evolution actually demand—men.

I was talking one day in Edinburgh with a professor of the University of Dundee, on British education; he said to me: "We expect to-morrow, at the Summer Meeting, a man who is bound to interest you; he is the founder and principal of a School established in the Midlands, Dr. R....." I felt much astonished, next day, when we were introduced to each other.

There is in France a classical type of the School principal, of the teacher: most correct *tenue*, sombre-hued garments, long dark frock-coat; the solemn, formal, conscious air of a man thoroughly convinced of his sacerdotal functions; the gait slow, manner full of reserve, and a habit of dropping sententious sayings fit for improving the minds and souls of youth. Above all, dignity—an extraordinary amount of dignity.

The man who was shaking hands vigorously with me was quite different. Did you ever attempt to figure to yourself a pioneer, a squatter of the Far West? As for me, I do not picture him to myself different from the person of Dr. R..... Tall, spare, muscular, remarkably well-made for all sports that require agility, suppleness, energy; and with all that, a costume that completes the whole to a nicety; grey tweed jacket with band round the waist, knickerbockers, thick woollen stockings folded down under

the knees, big strong boots, and, lastly, on his head, a Tam o' Shanter cap. I am giving you these details, because I consider the man as a good representative of the type of School which I am going to describe: such a master, such a school.

The next day, which was a Saturday, when the classes do not meet, we were perched, Dr. R. . . . . and myself, on the seat of one of those huge English omnibuses, on an excursion in connection with the Summer Meeting. On our way, and during the greater part of the afternoon, the doctor was expounding to me the idea and plan of his School, answering my questions and putting questions to me in return.

This is the gist of his explanation. Contemporary teaching no longer answers the conditions of modern life; it forms men for the past, not for the present. The greater part of our youths waste most of their time studying dead languages for which very few will have any use later on. They get a smattering of modern languages and natural science, but remain ignorant of everything that concerns real life, practical matters, and the structure of society. Our system of games is as much in need of reform as our methods of tuition. Athletic overtraining is as much a reality as over-cramming. What makes the reformer's work difficult is the fact that our Schools are under the influence of the Universities, for which they prepare a certain percentage of the pupils. Now, the Universities, like all old corporations, hardly have any responsibility; and an invisible and intangible spectre hovers above the chancellors, masters, principals, and professors: it is the spirit of tradition and routine, which has more power than authority itself.

Good. But how does your School manage to modify this system?

Our aim is to achieve a harmonious development of all the human faculties. The boy is to become a complete man, so as to be capable of fulfilling all the ends of life. To achieve this, the School ought not to be an artificial centre where there is no communication with life except through books; it ought to be a small world, real, practical, where the child may find himself in close proximity to nature and reality. Theory is not enough; there must be practice as well; those two elements should be present in the School, as they are around us. Otherwise, the young man is condemned to enter a world entirely new to him, where he loses all his bearings. Man is not a mere intelligence, but an intelligence attached to a body. We are therefore to train the pupil's energy, will-power, physical strength, manual skill, agility.

As the doctor went on, I could perceive gradually the general idea which inspires and pervades his work; but to me this idea was somewhat confused and hazy. I asked him to describe for me, in detail, the employment of a whole day. The School time-table and other details (to which I will return presently) completed the information.

Our excursion was to end by a visit to the old church of D. . . . ., whence we were to go and have tea at the house of a large landowner of the neighbourhood, Mr. B. . . . . This gentleman, who for the last three years had attended my lectures at the Summer Meeting, and who is a reader of *La Science Sociale*, had had the courtesy to invite me to stay at his house over Sunday. I asked him whether he had heard of Dr. R. . . . . 's School. He said that he had visited it, and that his eldest son, aged thirteen, was to enter it as a pupil in about a month. He had not been content with visiting it, but had referred to parents of pupils, and their opinions struck me by their unanimous ap-

preciation of the results attained. But judge for yourself from the letters:—

“DEAR SIR,

“ . . . My son, aged fifteen, spent eighteen months in the A. . . . . School; he improved more there than he had done in any of the other schools he had been to. He profited morally and physically, and I was more than satisfied with the results. Dr. R. . . . . is a man of strong individuality, and a born teacher. I consider the methods and principles of the School excellent. My son liked the School and the work very much, and I believe this to be the general feeling amongst the pupils. The moral tone of the School is unexceptionable, and I am sure you cannot do better than send your son there.”

“DEAR SIR,

“In reply to your letter I have much pleasure in answering your inquiries.

“We have two boys at A. . . . ., and both have improved much in health during the time they have been there. They write us that the last term has passed very quietly, and that they are quite happy. The mode of life there is a very healthy one. The boys are taught to rely upon themselves so as to become independent. The moral tone of the School is good; and the pupils, as far as I can judge, belong to good families.

“The relations between masters and boys are cordial. One of the teachers spent Christmas with us, and we were struck to see on what brotherly terms he was with our boys. The latter seem to like all their masters.

“Our eldest son is progressing rapidly in his studies. The second is more backward, but we find him much brighter, and both have become more active. The School methods encourage individuality.



"There is no denominational teaching, but morning and evening prayers are gone through; besides that, the boys attend the parish church. We are Congregationalists, and the boys are always happy to return to their chapel.

"We hope soon to send another son to the School; but he is too young, being only eight and a half. . . "

"DEAR SIR,

"I am able to answer with the greatest pleasure your inquiries anent the A. . . . . School, as my son has been there for the last four terms. He feels very happy there, and is thriving. You may have realized, from the prospectus, what the aim of the School is. The classical teaching is not too prominent, but they teach modern languages and everything that may prove of use and perhaps necessary to the boys in after-life. Morals and health are particularly looked after.

"The food is excellent and varied; quite different from the food generally served in Schools.

"The principles advertised in the prospectus are rigorously adhered to by its Director—a man of very decided mind and character, and at the same time full of sympathy for young people.

"The number of pupils being limited to about fifty, each boy can be studied and carefully trained. I spent a couple of days there, and was greatly impressed by the pleasantness of the life.

"I see no fault in this system of education, unless it is—and you may perhaps think that is no fault—the absence of any denominational teaching of Scripture.

"The house is healthy and comfortable. I may add that the masters are pleasant and cultured men. Dr. R. . . . . evidently makes a point of engaging gentlemen of high and

refined characters, who may influence the boys for good. Several amongst them are accomplished musicians."

The opinion expressed by Mr. B. . . . ., and the testimonials here recorded, induced me to push the inquiry further; here are the results of my investigation.

## II.

The School founded by Dr. R. . . . . was opened in 1889, at A. . . . ., in D—shire. It is situated in the open country, in the middle of a rural estate—which is, as we shall presently see, of essential importance to this new system of education. The prospectus takes good care to mention that "there is no large town in the immediate neighbourhood."

Although of recent date, this institution has already given birth to another School, constituted on the same principles, by one of the A. . . . . teachers, Mr. B. . . . ., who was trained by Dr. R. . . . .; it is situated in the south of England, at B. . . . ., in Sussex. I have before me an article in the *Review of Reviews* which, under the title, "Two Experiments: A. . . . . and B. . . . .," gives a pithy account of the two Schools, with illustrations supplementing the description. Moreover, I have recently made two stays at the B. . . . . School, and was thus able to study its working in the minutest details.

The two Schools are most unlike our own cold, bare school-buildings; they are comfortable English country-houses. They produce an impression of real—not artificial—life; they cannot fail to remind the inmates of their own homes—not of a barracks or a prison.

Instead of our French narrow yards, shut in between high walls, all round is air, light, space, verdure. The

first exterior view is that of a pleasant residence, and it has not yet been proved that a School ought to present a forbidding appearance.

The same effect prevails when you get inside. The B. . . . . dining-room, for instance, is quite a family room—cheerful and comfortable; the table is elegantly laid, the cloth snow-white; the furniture is good and artistic; a piano, pictures, statues, easy-chairs betoken an equal appreciation of the pleasant and the useful. Compare this with our detestable French school refectories, and one is struck at the outset with the difference between the two systems of education.

The feeling will be intensified when I add that the masters, the principal and his wife and daughters have their meals with the pupils. It is family life. Here the child is not violently withdrawn from his ordinary surroundings, and transported into a special and thoroughly artificial world; he has merely passed from one home to another. As the prospectus says, "This School is a *home*, not merely a place for teaching."

Such is the frame; let us now gaze at the picture.

I believe the simplest way is for me first to reproduce the time-table, and then enter into the principal divisions:

- |           |                       |  |
|-----------|-----------------------|--|
| 6.15 a.m. | (7 o'clock in winter) | The pupils rise and partake of a light collation.  |
| 6.30      | „                     | Drill.   |
| 6.45      | „                     | School-work.   |
| 7.30      | „                     | Chapel.  |
| 7.45      | „                     | Breakfast (this is a serious breakfast, <i>à l'Anglaise</i> , comprising bacon, eggs, etc.), after which, tidying of the bedrooms: each pupil is expected to make his bed. |
| 8.30      | „                     | School-work.   |
| 10.45     | „                     | Light lunch; if weather permits, exercise of the lungs in the open air (naked to the waist).   |
| 11.15     | „                     | School-work.   |

12.45 p.m.	Singing or swimming in the river (according to season).
1.0	„ Dinner.
1.30	„ Organ or piano practice.
1.45	„ Games and garden-work, or walking, cycling, etc.
4.0	„ Practice in the workshops.
6.0	„ Tea.
6.30	„ Singing; dramatic or musical rehearsing, etc.
8.30	„ Supper and chapel.
9.0	„ Bedtime.

The chief impression in reading this time-table is produced by the variety of exercises which make up the day's work. You can trace a purpose in avoiding every kind of "forcing," at the same time developing simultaneously all natural aptitude; thus we have scholastic, manual, and artistic instruction.

Here is how the day is spent:—

Intellectual work	...	...	...	5	hours.
Physical exercise and manual work	...	...	...	4½	„
Artistic work and indoor recreations	...	...	...	2½	„
Sleep	...	...	...	9	„
Meals and spare time	...	...	...	3	„
					—
Total	...	...	...	24	„

We may add that on Sunday there is no work, the boys' time is their own.

In fact, each week is divided into three distinct parts: the morning is especially reserved for intellectual work, actual school-work; the afternoon is kept for manual work on the estate or in the workshop; the evening is consecrated to art, music, and indoor recreations.

Let us try, by examining in detail these three divisions, to gain an insight into the working of the new School and its likely results.

The school-work is actuated by the following objects: "Make the pupils intimate with the *things* as well as with

the names of things, so as to proceed constantly from the concrete to the abstract. Teach the young men to *use* the knowledge they have acquired, and instil in them a wish to learn for their own sake, without the stimulus of rewards or prizes."

It is a very common opinion in England and in America that the tendency to promote hard work by means of emulation is a mistake; it makes the pupils' progress a matter of mutual jealousy, developing thereby a bad side of human nature, whereas work and progress ought to be considered simple matters of duty. In order to transform boys into men, we should treat them as men, by appealing as much as possible to their consciences. "Such a method," says Dr. R. . . . ., "far from diminishing the boys' interest in their work, tends to augment it, because this interest has then for its object not a reward, but the work itself. It is not good that young people should be made to believe that a prize or honorary distinction is the aim and end of their education. They must be taught that life is no lottery, and that the gratification of vanity is not all-important."

Our system being founded on wholly opposite methods, I am much afraid such a view of the question may appear very extraordinary to the French reader. However, Dr. R. . . . . 's views are shared by numerous English teachers, who, in their educational forming of men, seem to achieve very remarkable results.

According to a letter which reaches me from M. Bureau, the Americans entertain similar opinions. I will quote the remarks of the principal of the St. Paul (Minn.) High School: "We never give our pupils any prizes, we never make them compete among themselves. No doubt it often happens that they work together at the same subject; but when giving an account of the work of each, I take care to express myself in such a way as not to indicate *which of*

*the pupils has done best.* I tell each one, 'You have done better—or worse—than on such a day;' never, 'You have done better than So-and-So.' I am of opinion that it is bad for a boy to be able to say, 'I am superior to another;' he must be able to say, 'I am superior to what I was a week ago.' ”

The teaching of languages, especially modern languages, takes an important place in the new School, and differs markedly from the method generally in force. No one will be astonished when I say that we study languages, but do not learn them. Evidently our method is wrong. The method employed at Dr. R. . . . .’s seems to me more successful. During the first two years, children of ten and eleven years of age are taught in English. Afterwards, for a similar period, the instructor explains himself in French as much as possible; then, for another two years, German is employed. Latin and—for those who wish to learn it—Greek come at the end.

It will be understood, without my being insistent, that such polyglot teaching is only possible when a practical method is adhered to, consisting, so far as modern languages are concerned, in learning to speak first, reserving the study of grammar for a subsequent period, and even then limiting its study to what is strictly necessary for acquiring a practical mastery of the language. This method, generally unknown to modern language teachers, is that of Nature herself; through it, without effort and almost unconsciously, we have all learnt our mother-tongue, but in such a way as to be able to *use* it, which surely is of some importance. I have four children, the eldest of whom is nine years old; they are learning German on this method—by talking with their governess; their progress has been extremely rapid. After four months they not only used German in their games, but, what is the quintes-



sence of success, they quarrelled in German! They are now learning the German grammar in German, exactly as they learn the French grammar in French. I have made a point of citing this example, which is present before me, to justify the method employed in the new School.

In order that the pupils may not forget the languages learnt in preceding years, they continue using them in their conversation for several hours every day.

The teaching of mathematics partakes of the same practical character; pupils are required to work applications of the theories expounded. They manufacture certain objects on scientific principles; they go through surveying operations. They are furnished with the different bills and memoranda concerning the expenditure on the farm, the garden, the workshops, the games, stationery, the chemical laboratory, food, fuel, etc. They have to complete all these accounts, enter them, make all necessary calculations, verifications, etc. It will be granted that such processes impart to abstract studies a peculiar interest; their practical utility is obvious. Figures are made to live; they help equally in teaching the art of the housekeeper, and that of the industrial or commercial organizer. In short, the School prepares practical men, and may be credited with possessing a really social character.

The study of natural sciences begins with the direct observation of nature; which is the easier here because the School is in the country, and the children have not far to go for object-lessons. They gather numerous specimens—mineral, vegetable, and animal. Moreover, the habits of animals and their appearance and characteristics are studied before their internal organization; the shapes and structures of plants are considered before their classification; the names and aspects of stars and planets before the laws governing their motions. Excursions (on foot or on cycle),

which we have seen mentioned in the time-table, offer excellent opportunities for observation. Science thus becomes more natural, more intelligible, more attractive; it reaches the mind more easily, and is absorbed more deeply. Study thus breeds no disgust—as too often is the case with our own methods; but scientific curiosity has been awakened, and a desire for further knowledge is developed after the boy has left school. History is taught on a method similar to that advocated for social science. To create interest in the work, the School relies mostly on “the *observation of causes and effects* in the characters and movements of the drama, rather than on taxing the memory with whole series of facts and dates.” Great importance is attached to the study of the physical character of a country, and its relation to its political and commercial development. They begin with the history of England, then proceed with some characteristic period of universal history. Thus, with Greek history, the origin of our social systems is investigated; with Roman history, they examine the type of State whose huge public powers most favour the foreign expansion of a race.

Up to fifteen years of age the teaching is the same for all pupils; after that it differs more or less according to the profession chosen for each boy. More time and attention are given to different subjects, according to whether a pupil is destined for one of the Universities, for a professional career, or whether he chooses as his vocation agriculture, industry, commerce, or colonization. The suppleness of the programme, the absence of a uniform groove into which all the students are expected to adjust themselves, is not one of the least remarkable points in the management of the School. The teaching is adapted to the pupils—not the pupils to the teaching.

Upon the whole, the dominant idea in the programme is

a determination never to separate practice from theory, and to impart to the pupils as far as possible an education that will really be of service to them in the conduct of their lives.

### III.

The different courses of study just enumerated occupy the three morning classes. The afternoon is almost wholly given to manual training and physical exercise; the education of the body following that of the mind. Considering the sovereign contempt of the body evinced by our educational system, this part of the programme will, no doubt, astonish our French fathers. I met lately a boy of nine, a pupil at the *Collège Stanislas* in Paris, who after working all day at school was yet obliged to study at home every night until nine or ten o'clock. Such overwork is not only disastrous for health, but equally so for the studies themselves; it rests on the mistaken belief that a person learns in proportion to the time spent over his books.

The afternoon (1.45 to 6.0) is devoted to garden-work, the workshops, or excursions (afoot or cycling).

"Our aim," says the programme, "is to develop physical education, a knowledge of and interest in industrial occupations, energy of enterprise, and the exact appreciation of any accomplished work—whether that work is to be done by the pupil's own hands, or only superintended. Many breakdowns in life are caused by bodily weakness: our boys are therefore drilled daily, they take plenty of exercise, and are put to some manual work every day. This is necessary for invigorating the body and diminishing its sensitiveness—which arises mostly from mental overwork and a too sedentary way of living."

This shows again an intention to enable the pupils to accomplish work which may have a practical purpose and

be of actual use in real life. In fact, the boys have almost built and organized their School; like Robinson Crusoe in his desert island, they have themselves produced a good part of the objects that surround them and which they use and enjoy.

At the foundation of the School the garden was a wilderness of weeds, the farm a waste of rubbish. The boys took it in hand. They made pathways and established a whole system of drainage. They tarred all the gates and railings, painted the woodwork and buildings, and prepared and enclosed a football ground. In the workshop, where they are taught carpentry and the rudiments of the joiner's craft, they have manufactured a considerable number of the articles of furniture in use in the house.

Among different objects manufactured by the pupils in the workshop, I note a table, a chest of drawers, a diver's apparatus, a duck-house, a pigeon-house, a wood-shed, two boats; and another boat is actually on the stocks.

During a farm labourer's three-days' illness, some pupils volunteered to do his work, and take care of his cattle—and did so. Others, wanting to become joint-owners of a horse, went to the fair and purchased one; older pupils taught them to ride and drive him.

In the summer, garden and farm work naturally assumes great importance; cricket and tennis take the place of football; cycling and photographing expeditions occupy all free afternoons.

As I am writing, I receive a letter from Mr. B....., who has just taken his son to A....., and is kind enough to tell me what he has seen there.

"When I arrived," he writes, "several boys were busy with their cricket belongings, manufactured by themselves the preceding year. They talk now of building another bridge over the river, which is thirty or forty yards wide;

the pillars will be made of masonry, so as to offer more resistance to the stream. The whole will be done by the pupils.

"There is a little wooded valley that extends from the grounds to the school buildings, which latter stand on an eminence about a hundred feet above the river level. A tiny brook follows the bottom of this valley, which the boys have utilized in the construction of several little ponds or reservoirs connected together. All clearing away was done by them, save where the intervention of the masons was judged absolutely necessary.

"There is also a project of adding to the school buildings until they are capable of containing one hundred pupils, the extreme number which Dr. R. . . . . thinks it possible to direct in a thorough manner. As preparatory work, the pupils will make a survey of the ground and draw an exact plan of the establishment.

"Close to the house, there is a temporary chemical laboratory, and a carpenter's workshop, where the boys, under the supervision of Herr N. . . . . (whom you met in Edinburgh), accomplish varied work either for their own personal use or for that of the School. It is intended, next term, to undertake special work in wood, on the Slojd progressive method, which you have seen worked at the Summer Meeting.

"Inside the house, I note the absence of all useless luxury, whilst all rooms are furnished most comfortably. At lunch, I was struck by the happy looks of the boys and their lack of bashfulness. They were seated round half a dozen tables, each presided over by a master. The prayers at meals are sung with vigour and enthusiasm.

"The frankness and confidence of the boys towards their masters is very remarkable. The latter are in the habit of going about and behaving with the boys rather like elder



brothers than persons of a different level. They are constantly using the same expressions of language, and even at times the same slang as the boys. The only distinction in appearance is a sort of academic robe worn by the masters.

“ . . . Dr. R. . . . . considers it an important point to initiate the boys in a knowledge of outside business; for instance, he sends them on very serious errands, trusts them with the drawing of money from the bank, etc. . . . ”

Such ordinary occupations and manual tasks are not only an element of education, a means of acquiring a quantity of practical knowledge which theory cannot impart; but they also develop the body and gradually train it to the degree necessary for men who will have to confront successfully the difficulties of life. It will therefore be readily understood why Dr. R. . . . . wished to ascertain very precisely—in fact, with an almost mathematical exactness—the actual results obtained from this point of view.

“ We wished,” he says, “ to ascertain the rate of the boys’ growth, so as to make sure that their bodies are properly nourished and that their way of living is favourable to good health. To this effect we made out the rate of growth of each boy whilst at the School on the one hand, and during the holidays on the other. If the corporal development had been less during the sojourn at the School, our *régime* obviously ought to be considered defective. True that our scales do not register the degree of suppleness and agility acquired by our scholars; but it was important to make sure that these qualities had not been acquired at the expense of others. The results registered are interesting.”

Here follow two comparative tables, one relative to weight, the other to size, stating in both cases the boys’ gains during the school and home periods respectively.



From these it appears that the increase was greatest during the school period.

In fact, this circumstance should surprise no one, for the mode of life we have just described is eminently favourable to physical development. "Without making too much of these figures," Dr. R. . . . . goes on, "they at least prove that in our School—thanks to our system of food, of dress, and of living—strong and sound men are made. We've had to deal with little illness; even mere headaches and colds are unfrequent here. Our mode of life teaches young men that good health ought to be the general rule, and that disease is the consequence of error, ignorance, vice, overwork, and misconception of what *work* ought to be. We make it a great point for our pupils to be very careful in their habits of cleanliness and personal hygiene." They bathe daily; each boy has his tub at the side of his bed. I make of this a point of comparison with the practice of our Schools, where water is so sparingly allowed that it is almost an article of luxury. We are quite as sparing of air as of water; at A. . . . . and B. . . . . the boys sleep with open windows, summer and winter alike.

#### IV.

What with school-work, which fills the morning, manual work and physical exercises, which occupy the afternoon, we have now reached 6 p.m., tea-time. There are still three hours left until bed-time. How are they employed?

According to De Bonald, "man is an intellect served by organs:" we have just seen how the morning was employed in developing the former, and the afternoon in developing the latter. But man has other attributes; he is a sociable being. In order, therefore, to entirely develop the man he should be trained in view of this sociability, he should be

taught good manners and rendered capable of giving and taking pleasure in the company of his kind.

The last three hours of each day are devoted to forming the "sociable man." The process is interesting to examine.

"Our aim," said Dr. R. . . . ., "is to accustom our young men to be neither awkward nor shy, and to enjoy the company of their elders. So every night they gather in the drawing-room, to meet the ladies of the School and our visitors. The room in which our evenings are thus spent has been arranged so as to give an impression of happiness and harmony; the furniture, the pictures, the statues were chosen with this end."

From six to nine, the School is thus transformed into a family drawing-room; but mere conversation is not the rule, they also play and sing, rehearse comedies, give concerts, etc.

Music, indeed, forms an important feature in this School. The prospectus says: "Music is one of our chief subjects. Every week we have a musical *soirée*, and every evening some piano performances. The boys feel greatly the effects of this. There are here as many violins as cameras."

For the dramatic performances, the pupils have themselves constructed a theatre. These exercises are not only for amusement, but are considered as a serious means of education. One evening weekly is given to reading the works of Shakespeare.

We shall give a very complete idea of this side of the school life when we add that there are two Debating Clubs in the School, and that the pupils have their school Magazine (illustrated). "This publication develops literary expression and artistic skill; moreover, it gives the boys an idea that their School is a complete little world."

Another element which also contributes to promoting artistic feeling is the school Museum, in course of formation,

and which already includes some copies of the old masters, sculptures, specimens of beautiful furniture, etc.

The day, which began with a visit to the chapel, ends in the same way. However, the School professes no conformity with any particular sect; religious practices are wholly undogmatic and unsectarian. At chapel, as in the prayers which precede meals, the services are limited to reading out of the Bible, hymns, and prayers of a general religious character. However, as the Sunday is a holiday, the boys are at liberty to attend their own particular place of worship in the neighbourhood. Thus several pupils, who are Roman Catholics, attend mass at a church not far distant.

Concerning religion, the prospectus says: "Religion permeates our whole life, and life should indeed be saturated with it. We do not present religion to children, as a portion of our daily life, but as a harmonious whole which is to penetrate us thoroughly, whatever sect we may belong to. During a quarter of an hour, morning and evening, we meet together to express faith and hope with exterior signs."

Such is this School, and such is its programme. It is an extremely interesting School, insomuch as it seems to me to mark a stage in the evolution of a system of education better fitted to the new conditions of social life. In its practical character, in its chief aim to form the man, the whole man, and develop all faculties and the full power of personal energy and initiative, this School presents a striking contrast to all our modern systems of teaching.

It is an example of skilfully taken bearings in the direction of the Particularistic formation which is actually taking possession of the world. For a new world a new education is needed, one that may train a man to rely on himself alone, rather than on the community or any group; one that may lead a man to look always to the future, instead of the past.

## V.

I was talking one day with a friend about this new School. He said: "This experiment is most interesting; but there is here, in my opinion, a grave fault: the school is an *internat*."

Now, the "*internat*" such as prevails in France is indeed an institution equally unhealthy for the body and for the mind: large barracks, enclosing hundreds of closely penned-up children, subjected to the narrowest discipline; every initiative on their part restricted or crushed. A system fit, perhaps, for the formation of a soldier or official, but certainly fatal to the development of virile energy, spontaneous action, and the consciousness of personal worth.

It would be a gross mistake for any French person to imagine that there is any similarity between French and English boarding-schools (*internats*). Let us beware of the treachery of names; the same name is frequently applied to very different things. At A. . . . ., the number of pupils is limited at present to fifty, and will never be more than one hundred, as stated by Dr. R. . . . ., who knows that educating a larger number under one roof is an impossibility. Moreover, when his pupils quit their families, they enter another family—that of their principal, in whose company they take their meals and whom they meet every night in the drawing-room; it is, so to say, a magnified home life. Then, the boys' separation from their own families is nothing like so complete as among us; holidays are more numerous and longer; seven weeks at Midsummer, four weeks at Christmas, three weeks at Easter. The boys are therefore amidst their own people, for three and a half months every year, at varying periods, and are never quite outside home or family influence.

Each type of society has its own modes of education, and produces a scholastic system adapted to itself.

Societies of a *Communitistic Family formation* are characterized by the grouping of several couples into one household: this type is that of the less progressive populations of the East. There, the children do not rely on themselves for their establishment, but on the family community, which will keep them or welcome them back if perchance they have left home and failed. In these conditions little personal instruction is needed, and only a minimum instruction is given: the family, sometimes helped by the priest, is sufficient for imparting it. We know, indeed, that these societies do not shine much in the matter of culture; they are fully representative of education within the family and by the family.

In societies of a *Communitistic State formation*, the large public community takes the place of the dissolved family community; here the young people rely principally on the State for their establishment in life, through the many appointments which the State distributes in the army or the different services. Most of the nations of Western Europe, notably France and Germany, belong to this type. To obtain these appointments examinations have to be passed, which, in order to keep away the bulk of applicants, are made stiffer and more difficult. The cramming system is the result of such conditions, and it pervades all teaching: scholastic "forcing" the process of mnemonic learning results in a mass of indigestible matter. There is no question here of forming men fit to confront the difficulties of life, but only of forming candidates prepared to face the chances of examinations. The kind of School which most readily springs from these conditions is the *grand internat*. Here everything is sacrificed to the supreme and only goal — Examination, the apparent end of the young man's life,



towards which he is led by unceasing overwork. There is every advantage in crowding within each of these huge colleges five hundred, one thousand pupils, or more; for it is not the business of the masters to follow each individual boy, to make a man of him, to fill the place of a father; indeed, the master need not associate with his pupils in any way. Really, in such conditions, the best master is not the worthiest, the most learned, or the most clear-sighted, but rather he that displays most skill in over-cramming the boys in the shortest time; he who is the most up-to-date as to the tricks that succeed at exams., and the best informed as to the fads and peculiarities of the examiners.

The third type is that of *societies of an Individualistic formation*, of which the Scandinavian and English-speaking races are the best examples; and among them education is a very different affair. Here the individual relies for his establishment neither on the family nor on the State, which disposes of but few appointments, because public powers are not much centralized, and do not employ a very large number of officials. Here the individual relies principally on his own energy and resources to succeed in an independent career.

The chief aim of education, in such a state of society, must therefore be to develop these qualities, and form practical men. For this, the School must needs preserve as much as possible the atmosphere of the outside world. The kind of school which best answers these conditions, and consequently is most flourishing, is a school limited to a comparatively small number of pupils; day schools for families living in towns, and boarding-schools for those who live in the country. Even the latter tends to reproduce family life, which keeps the youngsters in touch with the normal conditions of home.



Obviously a division of schools into day and boarding schools (*externats* and *internats*), is inadequate; either word may express in diametrically opposite social states scholastic establishments of a totally different character, and giving absolutely contrary results.

From these considerations it appears that the great obstacle to reforming our Schools in the sense just indicated, is to be found in our social state, in our very customs and manners, which urge our youth to embrace the ready-made careers which can be entered only through examinations. It might be supposed, then, that the new type of School presents for us but a platonic interest. It is by no means so.

As long as the numbers of candidates for examinations were relatively limited, the young men could entertain hopes of success after a fair amount of cramming; but circumstances are changed. Nowadays our youth rushes to the storming of the ready-made situations; the rank and file of the people join in the *mêlée*; there are a hundred competitors for every place. The examination is no longer an open entrance to a career, but a high and almost impregnable wall. To urge our children to go and break their heads against a brick wall is hardly wise. In consequence, the shrewder and more thoughtful among us are beginning to look upon independent callings with less disdain. But to succeed in such callings, precisely those qualities are required which are not to be expected from our present system of education, and which are, on the contrary, developed in the highest degree by the kind of school we have just described.

## CHAPTER IV.

### HOW ARE WE TO BRING UP OUR CHILDREN?

#### I.

OUR guiding principle in establishing our children, on this the French side of the Channel, consists in gathering for each, by dint of economy, a *dot*—a portion; then we marry them to consorts similarly placed as to fortune; and in time we have them admitted, if possible, into some public office.

This series of processes is just now met by a new and growing difficulty, expressed by the fall in the rate of interest on money. From five per cent. it fell to four, and now we can only obtain three. With such a rate of interest, it is becoming more and more difficult to endow one's children.

Until now, this difficulty has been partly hidden, owing to the abundance of money in France. We boast that France is a wealthy country, controlling an enormous quantity of bullion, which is quite true. In fact, the greatest money market of the world is at present in France.

Unfortunately, this abundance of money at command is not due solely to national money-earning; it proceeds partly from factitious causes which cannot act much longer, and which are in truth symptoms of decadence rather than of prosperity.

This abundance of money was first caused by restricting the number of our children. We know but too well that the number of births in France is diminishing year by year,

and that, according to the last census, deaths are more numerous than births, which is a very rare phenomenon in the history of humanity. At the present time, France is the only country in this plight.

Now, a small number of children in a family is an abundant source of economy. If to bring up half a dozen children, you spend, say, six thousand francs, you may bring up one child at an outlay of only one thousand francs, and thereby save five thousand francs per year. The French practise this form of economy wholesale, with the result that they generally can boast of more ready money than populations given to rearing large families. This is actually one of the reasons why France represents the largest money market.

But there is another cause, namely, the aversion shown by the French for independent callings—agriculture, industrial pursuits, commerce. These professions are not sought after; we prefer administrative positions. All our young men rush to the Government Schools, and the crush at the doors is general. This is no exaggeration. Every Frenchman who may have made a little money as a farmer, a manufacturer or a merchant, has no brighter dream than to retire, and make his son an officer or an official, or launch him into one of the liberal professions.

In consequence, we have no tendency to trade with our own capital. Our savings are invested, and whether in stocks, consols, or stock exchange ventures, the money is brought on the market. This is how our reluctance to enter independent professions contributes to swell the amount of unemployed money in France.

But the very factors which bring about this abundance of money tend to diminish it yearly, and will end in the near future by exhausting the supply.

Indeed, if the limited number of children on the one

hand increases our savings, on the other it lessens the working or producing power. A father obliged to feed and educate six children has to work more, and consequently contributes more to the public wealth than the man who has but one child to look after. Moreover, young people who are members of large families, and therefore unable to count upon paternal resources, are naturally bound to display a greater disposition to personal effort, and more spirit of initiative than an only son, who finds it but too natural to count on his parents' help for his success in life.

On the other hand, if through our aversion to lucrative occupations, we are induced to bring the whole of our wealth on the market, the source of that wealth is stopped by the very deed, for there is no other source of wealth than agriculture, industry, and commerce. We are too much given to forgetting that all other professions are but parasitical occupations, drawing the resources that feed them from the three essential callings I have just named.

Some people may say, "Well, this will surely last our time." But I am not so sure of that. At any rate, it will *not* last as long as our sons' time.

Already many of those wretched young men, in spite of the number of places, are kept away from them by the endless lines of candidates who only meet with failure for their pains.

And what are they to do now? What *can* they do? What are they *fit* to do? For *what* were they fitted by the education they received at the hands of the family and at the School?

They were educated for an administrative career, or for the army. They were repeatedly told that there was nothing else respectable, nothing else worthy of their ambition. Such is the order of the day, not only in the upper middle class, but even in the more modest walks of life. In the

drawing-room, as in the shop and the farm, this same unreasonable prejudice flourishes, making the whole nation as mad as March hares. Indeed, according to official reports, for a single vacancy you may often count thousands of candidates.

And the poor fellows go on waiting: they fill the administrative ante-chambers; they try to move heaven and earth; they complain aloud. One thing they do *not* do: they do not manage to do something for themselves; they never think of attempting some kind of independent work which might easily be more lucrative, and in which they certainly would find more dignity and freedom.

They do not do so, because they foolishly believe it to be *infra dig.* To be an unsuccessful candidate for an official post, youth and substance wasted by indefinite waiting, seems to them not so despicable. They do not mind being almost an official. The mere phrase—*un fonctionnaire*—has, alas! a glamour about it in this official-ridden country.

They do not attempt to do something for themselves because they are powerless to do so. Our French training, excellent for the formation of officials, is of no value in forming independent, resourceful men, able to cope with the difficulties of life. They are good for nothing but subordinate functions, the remuneration for which will be a fixed salary, gained without exertion and payable monthly. On entering, the man sees in advance his whole life. At such an age he will be *sous-chef* (second in command of one of the offices of a subdivision of a department); later he will be *chef de bureau*; and later still he will get his *retraite*. The only date he does not seem to know is that of his death. Of the chances of a man's life this is the *reductio ad absurdum*.

We therefore cannot arrive at any other conclusion than this: That the education of our children must be on differ-

ent lines if we wish them to be equal to the necessities of the times, if we wish them to be enabled to fight for themselves in the social crisis which is just opening.

The universal character of this crisis requires us to make a very clear exposition of the educational question as it actually presents itself.

The points are: The methods of transmitting to our children the continuation of our work have to be altered. The present methods no longer answer the purpose. We educate our children in view of their success in life, to the best of our ability to this end, we employ those methods which succeeded best with ourselves; and yet the results now prove quite different, and often the very opposite of our expectations. Some of our most serious, the most thoughtful, most cultured, men, some of the best connected too, are anxiously asking themselves this question: "How on earth are we to bring up our children and successfully establish them?" (Indeed, they have cause to be anxious!)

Now, the teaching of social science bids us not to be scandalized at such a state of confusion. Scandal is the word to express the effect produced on the minds; men are ashamed, indignant at such a state of things. Some see in it most uncanny signs: an evil spirit is alleged to be abroad, conjured by the general cowardice and abandonment of all good principles. Men become angry, and disposed to mutual recrimination, and meanwhile they go on as in the past, actuated by a conviction that we ought to return to the old methods—and their failure is wholesale.

Social science teaches us a more just and more conclusive appreciation of facts. By the analysis, comparison, and classification of these facts we are shown that our world is now passing, and necessarily, to a new condition which is not ephemeral, but durable, by a transition between the past and the future.



Thus we are taught the causes, the direction, and the ultimate results of this crisis, which in some points is exceptional in the history of the world.

First, the causes—What are they? These causes are derived from the continuous change in the methods of production and transport—in other words, change in our means of existence. Formerly, the places of production were small workshops, often at home. The *clientèle* was limited and local. Work was done by hand or with small motors, and methods of work were permanent and often traditional. The father used to transmit them religiously to the son; of innovation there was little or none, and what there was of it was exceedingly slow in its action. Competition only existed between artisans of a neighbourhood, for the feeble means of transport at command did not allow of any considerable amount of export or import. Moreover, competition was made still less serious by a whole series of restrictive regulations which fixed the methods of manufacture, the number of masters, workers, and apprentices.

Everything tended, therefore, to assure stability and promote traditional methods. Hence an education directed towards stability, tradition, and the past, was perfectly adapted to the social necessities of those times. The results obtained were appreciated for a long period.

Social conditions are now reversed: production takes place in large workshops with the help of motors of enormous power, the *clientèle* supplied is world-wide, and the demand almost unlimited. The methods of work are subjected to constant improvement, following the progress of science. Innovation takes everywhere the place of tradition. Men must be ever ready to produce more, or better, or cheaper, if they will hold their own against competition. Instead of a calm, jog-trot kind of existence, it is life intense and struggling. Moreover, there is no choice, no al-

ternative; the new conditions intrude themselves brutally and must be humoured.

Now when human means of existence are modified, the condition of humanity at large is modified; and this constitutes a social crisis—a crisis in the means of existence.

The new situation was brought on by the sudden advent of modern natural science, which will never say its last word, and, as every one who has eyes can see, is now only beginning. The world is henceforth launched into a career of everlasting transformations, which cannot be stopped. This cuts us off definitely from the past, when things had some stability and even apparent fixity. The question is how to be prepared to make the best possible use of this evolution and guard against its temporary dangers. Between the man of the past and the man of the present, there is the same difference as between two soldiers: the one called to defend a citadel, the other sent to the front for defensive and offensive warfare. The difference is total and complete. And there is in all this no evil spirit or general cowardice, as is the gloomy refrain of blind fault-finders; there is a novel material situation for humanity, ordained by Providence, which gave man the progressive science of Nature. It is for man to accommodate himself to such progress, not only in his own interest, but also as a matter of duty.

I have said that social science shows the *direction* as well as the *causes* of the crisis, and the direction is very distinct indeed. The crisis leads men towards a new state, in which they are no longer to be enrolled as heretofore; no longer are they to count for their maintenance on any constant surroundings, or on habits of life adapted to any permanent situation. These surroundings have long been cracking around them, and are now subsiding and dissolving from the effect of the necessities just stated. Hence-

forth any man educated and settled according to the old enrolling methods is condemned to swift failure and ultimate fall. Education, therefore—instead of fitting men for enrolment and training them to rely on family surroundings, and transitory institutions—instead of forming them for factitious administrative careers and promising them these snug little berths in which there is demand for neither effort nor initiative, and which might fail them at any time—education ought to make our men fit to rely upon themselves in all emergencies, and quick to fall on their feet after all accidents.

That system of education which tends to adapt the young men to any institution, whether family or political, is bound to fail; the only successful education is that which will adapt the young man to his environment, and will train him to make the best use of himself under any circumstances.

This is exactly the contrary of what we French have been aiming at for the last hundred years. When speaking about their children, French parents are wont to use such language as this: "Oh, let them do as we did;" or, "A good family and many friends—that's enough to push you on and settle you in life;" or, "What the boy wants is a good appointment in one of the services, in the magistracy, or perhaps in the army: such posts are safe; the boy will be free from trouble, and will meet with no ups and downs;" or again, "We have enough, and our sons need not worry; *they* will have enough, too, with a safe salary and their wives' dowry," and so on. Such language we know but too well. Many of us have used it ourselves.

All this is beginning to sound singularly false to our ears. No family connections, no friends, no public career, no dowry offer nowadays any guarantee as to the future of ourselves or children. There is nothing for it but to make

them capable and strong enough (alas! that they should not be so) to confront by themselves the ever-changing difficulties of the struggle for existence.

Unfortunately, that is precisely what we feel very incapable of doing, because most of us have been trained in other ways. We simply do not know how to do it.

And yet the results make it worth while trying. This new education will give us men, strong men, who will not sink under difficulties, and will not yield to them. They will become Christian free agents who will rely on nothing but their own capacity. There is the same difference between us, attached as we are to our surroundings—our own world, as we often say—and men trained to self-reliance, as there is between us and those savage tribes which are converted *en masse* by the mere example of their chiefs.

Such are the causes, the direction, and the results of this social crisis, whose portents affect education and the whole world. Whether we like it or not, we shall have to pass through it, and what we have to do is about the opposite of what we have done up to the present time.

I shall be told, "That is all very well—but how are we to manage it?"

In order to avoid all groping in the dark, all mistakes and fiascoes, we must be guided by actual experience; and as we have had no experience at home, where education has been on wrong lines, we must needs look for it abroad. We must act like those peoples who have surmounted the difficulty, and who bring up young men capable of shifting for themselves independently of any family, friends, connections, or State aid.

Now, such peoples do exist, and unless we are blind we are bound to see them, for they invade the world, clear the land, and put it under cultivation, colonize it, and oust the tenants of the old social *régime*, accomplishing the whole of

the stupendous task by the might of private initiative and the triumphant power of the self-relying individual. And if one single example can give an idea, as I believe it will, of the difference between men formed by the new methods and men formed by the old (which unfortunately are still our own), look at what *they* have made of Northern America, and then look at what the other race has made of Southern America. It is the difference between night and day, between light and darkness. On the one side, a forward motion of Society, and the greatest known development of agriculture, commerce and industry; on the other, Society thrown backwards, and plunged to grovel in a morass of idle, unproductive town life, and given up to officialism and political revolutions. In the North we have the rising of the future; in the South, the crumbling and decaying past.

So true is this, that we already see Southern America invaded by the robust offspring of the Northern races, who gradually take possession of the rural estates abandoned by Spanish and Portuguese incapacity; gradually they are taking possession of the railways, the banks, industry, and trade.

At the time of our last Universal Exhibition, I was talking of these things with the President of the Argentine Republic section. He spoke of that invasion of the English and their brothers the Americans, and he lamented it. He found fault with the invaders, as the weak always do, because recrimination is easier than adopting the ways of the strong.

Ay, such are the ways of those redoubtable competitors. Their growing youth is not afraid of the strife. They are the race which, through their training, can always preserve their moral and religious energy. Their faith is not wholly that of the Catholic Church, and yet there is not by far as



much infidelity amongst them as there is here. Why? Simply because they are more convinced of the full responsibility of every individual man.

This is easily explained. In the old social system the individual is sustained less by himself, his own will and initiative, than by the protective framework of Society, whether it take the form of family, school, regiment, office, or the State itself. The props that sustain him in his traditions and beliefs—political, social, or religious—are held up from outside, and there is no interior foundation for them. In other words, the individual acts or thinks in such or such a fashion only because everybody else in his little world acts and thinks in the same fashion.

Consequently this is what follows. As soon as the protective framework happens to subside, the man breaks down. In the old society, the domestic, political, or social framework was sufficiently strong and rigid to uphold even enfeebled individuals—like those decrepit houses which are only kept standing by the help of others on either side. Look out, however, when the props are removed!

That is precisely what happened to our old social framework, the *débris* of which now covers the soil. And as we were unprepared to do without our props, we have completely lost our bearings. We call to our help all those institutions on which we had been accustomed to rely—the family, the corporation, the State (Monarchy for some, Republic for others), the Church—we cry to everything to help us, and never think of helping ourselves! We fill the air with our complaints, instead of finding out the course followed by those who rely on individual initiative, and doing likewise.



## II.

Well, what course do these peoples follow in regard to their children?

This is what they do:

*1st Process.*—*They do not consider that their children belong to them, nor that they are a mere continuation or survival, as it were, of themselves.* They consider, on the contrary, that they are beings who presently will have to be independent of them. Hence they have no greater anxiety than to hasten their emancipation (since they must be emancipated) under the best possible conditions. They aim at nothing else; that is the form assumed by their paternal devotion. This devotion does not consist on their part in absorbing their children, appropriating their persons, and making them obedient, pleasant companions. In the form assumed by our own paternal devotion there enters a large proportion of selfishness—properly disguised selfishness, of course. We have all seen such a thing as a marriage put off because the young people would have had to go—not abroad, but only into the provinces or into some other towns. We are too fond of our children! But do we love them so dearly for their sake only or for our own?

*2nd Process.*—Among these peoples, *parents treat their children from the very beginning, and ever after, as grown-up persons, as separate personalities.* By this they make them responsible, original personalities. Treat people as of some value, and they will endeavour to acquire that value. We, on the contrary, treat our children as children, not only while they are children, but also after they have grown to quite a ripe age; we cannot drop the habit of treating them as children, because they are our children!

*3rd Process.*—Among them, *parents educate their children*

*in view of future necessities; not up to the past, but up to date, up to the future.* They do not propose their own past careers and environments as models to their children. *We* act as did those French noblemen of the last century, who at the beginning of this century still brought up their children as if for the olden time, for their former rank, their vanished fortune, the Court—for vain memories, for ghosts of memories.

*4th Process.*—Among them, parents study most carefully the health (so do we—but we often sacrifice it to studies, examinations, enforced dwelling in cities, and what not?); *they also endeavour to increase, as much as possible, the strength, energy, and physical development of their children.* And they are not so foolish as to attempt to promote vigour by an over-training in physical exercises which would weaken the body; they go in for no gymnastic feats: their comprehension of the normal conditions of physical life is remarkable.

You are aware that an attempt is actually being made here to import English sports and games, and substitute them for our detestable regulation gymnastics, one addition amongst others to our pedagogic methods, into which there enters no interesting or spontaneous element. Again the hateful restraining framework! I know very well that this following of the English games has not always been very successful; that in this, as in a good many other things, we may be displaying but a short-lived infatuation; that the games are conducted in a somewhat too administrative fashion; that many of our schoolboys yield rather to a wish to avoid their school-work than to any desire to improve their constitutions. But at least from this imperfect copy one can form some idea of the original. It is incontestable that such games are eminently favourable to physical improvement, and contribute, moreover, to impart calmness

and self-possession, without which there is no success possible.

*5th Process.*—Among them, *the children are very early initiated into the practice of material, every-day acts*; thus there is no hesitation in letting them go about by themselves, trusting them with certain affairs, or commissions within—and sometimes purposely beyond—their capacity. This sort of thing astonishes a Frenchman on a visit to England or America. English people, in their turn, are astonished at our astonishment—so natural is the thing to them, so essential a point in that system of education whose aim it is to turn out men and not mere scholars or officials.

If I were not uneasy lest I might scandalize my reader, I would add that those people treat their girls very much like their boys, for similar reasons. But it would then be necessary for me to explain a good many things to justify this practice—for which we are unprepared in France, but which over there presents more advantages than drawbacks. But this would take me too far.

*6th Process.*—Among them, *as a rule, parents have their boys taught some manual trade*. Indeed, they feel none of that superb disdain which we entertain for manual work. They have long ago shaken off that old prejudice which to us has been more disastrous than a hundred defeats on the battle-field; they do not believe that there are noble and ignoble callings, but more correctly consider that some men are capable and others incapable, some idle and others diligent. So the son of a peer will become a farmer, a manufacturer, or a tradesman, without losing in anything; in fact, this is happening every day. Yet I am mistaken; there *are* two professions which they consider inferior to all others, namely, that of a politician and that of an official. First because it “does not pay”—as they say—to be either, only the highest posts being lucrative; and then

because both rob a man of his independence. Those posts are therefore not numerous, and generally left, in Great Britain, to persons of Celtic origin, Irish, Scotch, or Welsh, and in the United States to Irishmen and Germans. My friend, M. Paul de Rousiers, who went to America and studied the States on our principles, has shed much light on this fact in his remarkable work, "*La Vie Américaine.*"

This tendency to teach boys manual trades is well in keeping with their methods, according to which most professions are learnt by practice alone, whereas our whole teaching is done at the Schools. For instance, their engineers are not trained in the Schools, but at the works. Indeed, what is theory in all professions but the complement of practice?

The contrary is the case among us, where theory is given the first place. Thus we have placed in Paris our *Institut Agronomique*, which prepares officials for the Agriculture Department; and there is a proposal to transfer to Paris our Naval School!

*7th Process.*—Among them, *the parents precede the children in the knowledge of all things that are new and useful.* How could it be otherwise in a society where the minds are turned to the future and the unceasing improvements in the usual professions, *not* to the past and the essentially stationary administrative situations; in a society where success is sought, not with the help of State machinery, but almost entirely through individual initiative and personal worth? Hence there is a constant preoccupation on the part of the Anglo-Saxon to gather solid, positive facts, most often without much order or method, but yet facts of value. That is what he requires from his newspapers, which resemble ours as day resembles night. The aim of our newspapers is to amuse, the aim of our so-called serious papers is to raise political passions, which is another way

of amusing—that is to say, of wasting time. *Their* newspapers, on the contrary, seem to have as their aim to give correct and speedy information. Little theory, few general observations—facts, facts, facts. These two utterly different forms of journalism would be almost enough to completely illustrate in what manner the two societies differ.

After this, one cannot be astonished to find that a father's conversation with his children bears on serious, real, manly topics. Their talk does not run on the world of fashion (English fashion!), and Society tittle-tattle, nor on the good old time when life was so easy, so calm, so pleasant! No, they vaunt the Struggle for Existence, and Self-Help.

*8th Process.*—Among them *there is little display of parental authority*; they reserve such display for exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. Have we not said that they consider their children as independent beings, and treat them as men? Indeed, you cannot form men by keeping them constantly under a yoke, even if it be the paternal yoke. They think that real education consists not in constraint, but in what they call “training.” They do more by advice and gentle persuasion than by actual ordering, and are careful to make their disinterestedness more apparent than their authority. The child is allowed to digest this process—and set to work.

*9th Process.*—The following, which I have kept for the end, is the most fundamental and decisive process: *The boys know that their parents will not take care of their situation in life.* In France, we are accustomed to such a question as this: “What will you do with your son?” The serious answer is: “I’ll make a magistrate, an official of him,” or something of the sort. The man would not think himself a good father unless he assured the future of his son, and found for him whatever situation he (the father) thinks most suitable. His devotion even goes the length



of robbing himself of part of his fortune in order to endow his children.

An English or American father does not portion his children; each generation has to take care of itself. Among us, on the contrary, one generation is expected to provide for the establishment of the next. And this is what happens:—

You have, it may be, three, four, or five children. In order to obviate your children going down in the social scale, you have to make—in addition to your own—three, four, or five fortunes, and that before your children have attained their majority, that is, within about twenty years. Otherwise, how can you get them married, since they will be accepted mostly on account of their money? You know that means working like a horse—enough, indeed, to “give up the situation,” which is what so many French fathers are doing with enthusiasm, by being content with having only one or two children.

I was re-reading lately Franklin's correspondence. In a letter to his mother he alludes to one of his sons, who, probably relying on his father's fortune, showed little eagerness to find a situation for himself. “He must be disabused,” writes Franklin, “and shown that, at the rate I am spending my money, there won't be any left for him.”

You fire with indignation at the idea of leaving your children no *hereditary* fortune. Your fatherly love revolts at the thought. You are forgetting that the Anglo-Saxon father, who gives no money to his children, gives them in reality what is infinitely more than money; he gives them precisely what we are anxious to give, but cannot succeed in giving to ours,—that devouring spirit of initiative, that capacity to take care of themselves which we would fain purchase with gold, and which all the gold we actually put by so painfully, so meanly, only smothers. As a



matter of fact, we go on saving, living as beggars, and practising systematic sterility, so as to allow our children to live without working, or by working as little as possible. We fancy we are thus assuring their future. However, look around you and see *what* men rise in the world, are most successful in all careers, and everywhere get the best places; nine times out of ten, such men are *parvenus*, self-made men, men who originally had to rough it, and who only succeeded through their dogged perseverance and personal initiative. And now, look at the others, the *filis de famille*, thus named rightly because they rely more on their families than on themselves, more on their parents' fortune and prospective wives' dowry than on their own work. Well, these *filis de famille* are sinking daily to the very bottom; they are, as a rule, inferior to all in everything, in spite of having received a "first-class" education; they have lost in this country all influence, all authority; they have made monarchy an improbability. Incapable as they are of improving themselves by their work, they only succeed in maintaining themselves if their case is that of an only son, or through the instrumentality of a *mariage d'argent*.

Young men brought up in the Anglo-Saxon way—that is, made strong in their bodies, accustomed to material facts, having always been treated as men, trained to rely on themselves alone, and looking upon life as a battle (the Christian view of life)—bring a superabundance of youthful strength to cope with the difficulties of existence; they enjoy these difficulties, expect them, triumph over them; fitted as they are for the strife, they improve in the midst of it as in their element.

And now judge, compare, and come to a decision. I have tried to show what are the hidden springs which move that race to threaten and invade the older and more

decrepit societies. The miracle which is being accomplished by that race is that they are on the point of ousting others with but a modicum of public power at their backs. Where, then, lies their power? They can boast the strongest social power—and social force is bound to prevail over all the armies and public powers of the world.

The great peril, the great rivalry, are not, as we think, on the other side of the Rhine; militarism and Socialism will spare us the trouble of getting rid of that enemy—and that before long.

The great peril, the great rivalry, are on the other side of the Channel, and on the other side of the Atlantic; they are wherever is to be found an Anglo-Saxon pioneer, an Anglo-Saxon settler or squatter. The man is not much considered, because he does not come, like the German, along with big battalions and perfected weapons; he is despised because he arrives with his plough and by himself. This comes from our being ignorant of what that plough is worth, and what that man is worth.

When once we know that, we shall know where the danger is, and at the same time where the remedy lies.



## BOOK II.

### THE FRENCHMAN AND THE ANGLO-SAXON IN PRIVATE LIFE.

THE differences in education which we have just stated are reflected first in private life. I intend to give in this book a few examples taken from France and from England.

Our French education compromises our vitality and our social power; this is a double cause of inferiority.

On the other hand, English education and the whole social atmosphere develop in the highest degree the capability of the race to rise and triumph over the contemporary difficulties of existence.

## CHAPTER I.

### OUR MODE OF EDUCATION REDUCES THE BIRTH-RATE IN FRANCE.

**T**HERE is no need here to prove the diminution of births in France. Abundant proof on this score has been furnished by statistics. Moralists, economists, and politicians have vied with each other in treating this vital question.

But if they all agree in stating the fact, they cease to do so when the problem is to determine its exact causes. All method on their part is reduced to irresponsible groping in the dark. We shall, therefore, examine it with the help of the light shed by social science.

### I.

As we have said, the diminution of the birth-rate in France is an incontestable fact, but a few figures will clearly establish it.

The following is a table of births during a period of more than a hundred years per 10,000 inhabitants:—

Years.		Births.	Years.		Births.
1770-1780	...	380	1841-1850	...	274
1801-1810	...	325	1851-1860	...	267
1811-1820	...	316	1861-1868	...	264
1821-1830	...	309	1869-1880	...	245
1831-1840	...	289	1880-1896	...	220

As you see, from 1770 to 1896 the proportion of births fell from 380 to 220 per 10,000 inhabitants, a diminution of more than one-third.

In 1881 the number of births in France was 937,057; in 1890 it was only 838,057—that is, say, 100,000 less. Now mark that this number of births is lower by 38,446 than that of deaths. This victory of death over life occurs in times of peace. Such is at present the normal record of births in France, and it becomes accentuated year after year.

There were in 1890—

42,520	births less than in 1889	
44,580	„ „	1888
61,275	„ „	1887
74,779	„ „	1886
86,499	„ „	1885
99,699	„ „	1884
99,885	„ „	1883

Marriages also diminish year by year, although in a lesser proportion.

In 1884 there were 289,555 marriages.

„ 1885	„ „	283,170	„
„ 1886	„ „	283,208	„
„ 1887	„ „	277,060	„
„ 1888	„ „	276,848	„
„ 1889	„ „	272,934	„
„ 1890	„ „	269,332	„

So in 1890 there were 20,223 marriages less than in 1884, a period of six years, and the decrease has been constant, except in 1886, when the increase was only a few units.

On the other hand, the number of deaths increase steadily.

In 1881 there were 828,828 deaths.

„ 1882	„ „	833,539	„
„ 1883	„ „	841,141	„
„ 1884	„ „	858,784	„
„ 1886	„ „	860,222	„
„ 1890	„ „	876,505	„



So that in 1890 there were 47,677 more deaths than in 1881, and 35,364 more than in 1883; whilst there were 100,000 less births in that year (1890), which means 135,090 vacancies in the population.

If now we compare the French birth-rate with that of other nations, we shall find that Norway doubles her population in 51 years; Austria, in 62; England, in 63; Denmark, in 73; Sweden, in 89; Germany, in 98; and France, in 334.

There are discrepancies in the various statistics, but all agree in placing France much behind other countries in the matter of birth-rate.

The decrease in the number of births being an established fact, let us seek the reason.

On this point, statistics are powerless to enlighten us; they furnish us with figures, averages, generalities, but their mission is not the explanation of phenomena.

Fall in the birth-rate is generally attributed to very many causes. In a pamphlet,\* the Marquis de Nadaillac enumerates no less than seventeen, some of which, however, are but repetitions. When submitted to close examination, they can be divided into two categories:

1. Assumptions that are not causes.
2. Secondary causes derived from one primary cause.

We shall examine in turn those categories, and compare them; then we shall endeavour to find out the primary cause.

\* M. de Nadaillac, Corresponding Member of the Institut de France, "*Affaiblissement de la Natalité en France.*" Paris: G. Masson.

## II.

Amongst the alleged factors, we find in the first place the assumption of "the natural lack of fecundity of the French race."

"All races," says M. de Nadaillac, "are not equally prolific. Climatic, social, economic, and biological conditions exercise influence on the point—although this influence may as yet be but imperfectly defined. The fecundity of Chinese women is remarkable, that of Polynesian women is feeble. It may be stated in a general way that the Latin races (and the French particularly) are less prolific than the Slavonic and Anglo-Saxon races. This constitutes for us, from a population point of view, an incontestable inferiority." \*

No doubt some races seem to be more prolific than others, and the causes of such differences might be easily traced by a methodical analysis of the physical and social conditions of each; but we have now to do with France alone—and we can hardly admit that the *decrease* in the birth-rate is a question of race.

If it were, how could we explain the extraordinary fecundity of the French race until the Revolution, its increase in Canada, in Louisiana, in India, at Haiti, Mauritius, Bourbon, in Italy, etc.? Even in our own days, how is it that our Canadian descendants are multiplying at a much higher rate than the Anglo-Saxons themselves? The French Canadian population doubles once in every twenty-eight years, whereas the population of France doubles in three hundred and thirty-four years. Obviously we have to deal here with no race question, but with the effects of some other cause which began to act at a relatively recent epoch.

It is worthy of notice, too, that the birth-rate is very high in some parts of France—Brittany, for instance.

\* Nadaillac, *ibid.*, pp. 71, 72.

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“During the four years 1880-83, the excess of births in the five Breton *départements* rose to 74,990, a total nearly equal to that of the whole of France in the same period. If all the provinces could produce such a contingent, we should have nothing to envy in our neighbours, in the matter of increase of population.” \*

Moreover, the increase is steady enough in our industrial *départements*, as we shall see presently. In the others the decrease has been constant ever since the beginning of the century. Yet there has occurred no alteration in the race that could explain this growing diminution.

The race argument is therefore valueless, being contrary to facts.

Facts also controvert the argument based on *intemperance*.

For the last fifty years intemperance has been severely aggravated by the substitution of distilled for fermented drinks. The consumption of alcohol has increased in a large proportion: in 1788 it was about 370,000 hectolitres; in 1882 it was 1,766,000 hectolitres.

True; but it is none the less true, on the other hand, that the consumption of alcohol is less in France than in some other countries, particularly in Northern Europe, where, however, the proportion of births is highest. Even in France, one of the zones where intemperance makes the worst ravages is precisely the prolific Brittany. In the South, on the contrary, where the populations consume very little alcohol, there are some *départements* where deaths are in excess of births. We must therefore recognize that intemperance has not, in France, any influence on the number of the population.

The weight of military compulsory service is another of the alleged causes.

\* Nadaillac, *ibid.*, p. 52.

But general compulsory service also exists in Germany, and yet we have seen that the increase in the population is in no way affected in that country. It is stated that mortality is higher amongst young men serving in the army than with the rest of the German youths, but this circumstance does not modify sensibly the general result.

Lastly, *the heavy charges on tax-payers* are said to form one of the causes.

These charges are assuredly very heavy. Under the second Empire, the tax-payer paid yearly 59 francs; in 1872, 85 francs; he pays to-day 109 francs. Since 1820, the land-tax revenue has risen from 243 to 357 million francs; the *Portes et Fenêtres* (Door and Window Tax) rose from 29 to 40 million francs; the tax on patents from 40 to 163 million francs.

If this alleged factor had any serious influence it would be found that those regions in which the taxes weigh heaviest, that is the poorest regions, would present the smallest proportion of births; and the wealthiest show a high increase.

But precisely the contrary is the fact. The rich farmers of Normandy and Picardy, who realized such fine profits until the agricultural crisis set in, keep to one or two children, whereas such poor regions as Brittany, and the Ardèche, Lozère, Aveyron, the Haute Loire, Corrèze, etc., show constant increase.

I have before me a representative map of births in France, on which the lower rates of births are shown by dark tints; these tints are spread over the richest parts of the country, and thus refute the tax argument.

These diverse factors have therefore no perceptible action in the matter.

But there *are* causes which seem to act more effectively.

## III.

The causes which we are going to examine evidently exercise an influence over the diminution of births in France. They are not fortuitous. Indeed, so many causes could not be present in one country at any one time, unless some peculiar circumstance favoured their existence. Their very coincidence suffices to demonstrate that there must be an ulterior reason.

When a man commits blunder after blunder, fault after fault, mistake after mistake, it can be rightly said that there must be in that man something lacking, or deranged.

So it is with France. Indeed, you will see that all the causes alleged to explain the diminution of births are themselves inexplicable without the intervention of an ulterior reason.

1. The first assumption is somewhat naïve.

"*Man's will*," says M. de Nadaillac, "is one of the primary causes of the low birth-rate in France."

There can be no doubt, indeed, that if the French wished to have many children, they could have quite as many as other people. But *why* do they not wish it? that is precisely the question. It is obvious, then, that this explains nothing.

2. *The increase in the number of small properties.*

Here a distinction must be drawn.

If by "small properties" we mean little estates of a permanent character, which heads of families transmit to their heirs according to their best judgment of family necessities, then the birth-rate is in this case by no means lower than among the larger land-owners; indeed, the birth-rate is as high as in England, which is a country of large landed properties, and as high as in Norway, the Hanoverian Luneburg, the Swiss cantons, the Basque provinces, etc., where small estates prevail.

If, on the contrary, by "increase of small property" we mean enforced, constant dividing and parcelling out of estates, whatever their dimensions, that is another question, as we shall see presently. Let us only state here that in France, where this process prevails, the proportion of births is as low on the large estates of Normandy and Picardy as among the small holdings of Champagne.

3. *The aversion of the French for marriage*, and the demoralization incident to the indulgence in luxury, the satisfaction of factitious wants, artificial pleasures, etc.

There is indeed a progressive diminution in the number of marriages. If we only take into account the marriageable portion of the population, our country comes eleventh on the list; the English, the Dutch, the Austrians, etc., come before us. The growing demoralization surely has something to do with this. But what ought to be stated is *why* the French for the last hundred years have shown such an estrangement from the institution of marriage, and *why* they have shown themselves more subject to demoralization than their neighbours.

4. *A selfish desire to secure a larger share of enjoyment.*

This certainly does exist; but there would remain to be shown why the French suddenly displayed such thirsting for enjoyment. Why are not the English, the Germans, the Russians consumed with the same thirst? Is it to be supposed that they, too, are not naturally inclined to increase their sources of enjoyment? Or is there some cause (no longer active among the French) which prevents them trying to secure more personal satisfaction by limiting the number of their children? What is the explanation?

5. *The development of the means of personal comfort*, owing to the rise in wages and salaries.

This, too, is a world-wide change, and cannot explain any situation peculiar to France. M. de Nadaillac himself



acknowledges that this fact explains nothing. "Everywhere," says he, "there is a large increase in the ease and comfort of rural as well as urban populations; everywhere we find considerably higher wages, the people feed and dress better, the homes are healthier and more adapted to the needs of families, hygienic conditions are better understood and applied. Everywhere, too, these causes have been favourable to the increase of the birth-rate. Through what fatal law do these causes produce in France totally different effects?" \* Yes, why is it? We must find another reason to explain this fact.

6. *The development of urban districts*, where the birth-rate is lower.

The decrease of the agricultural and the increase of the urban populations are incontestable facts. In 1846 the population of the rural districts made up three-quarters of the population of France; now it is barely 65 per cent. of the whole, and is constantly decreasing. The cities alone show an increase equal to five-sevenths of the whole.

But if this fact is incontrovertible, it is also general, and therefore does not explain anything in our special case.

In England, the development of large towns is even greater. Out of every ten persons, five live in towns. In Germany the town population has increased from 14 to 15 per cent. Berlin, which two centuries ago had 17,400 inhabitants, now has 1,316,282. The same is true of Italy, of Spain, of Austria—everywhere.

How, then, is it that notwithstanding these unfavourable conditions, the birth-rate does not decrease in other countries as it does in France? It must be that France, on this point as well, is placed under some peculiar influence.

7. *The overwork in Schools.*

In no country is that overworking so prevalent as it is in

\* Nadaillac, *ibid.*, p. 18.

France. Moreover, it is further aggravated by the effects of the sedentary life imposed on the boarders in our *lycées*, a kind of life which is bound to breed debility in the individual and his offspring. This fact may appear as a triumphant proof; but really it only acts on the more highly educated classes.

Besides, we have yet to find the cause of such overworking. It is not a spontaneous product peculiar to the French soil.

#### IV.

The different reasons just enumerated are obviously insufficient to explain the situation. They necessarily must spring from some higher, more general cause.

Whatever it may be, the cause we are seeking is undoubtedly one whose influence on the family is strong and direct, since the family is the source of the population. There must be some mysterious pressure which makes the conditions of the family particularly difficult in France.

Perpetuation is the natural tendency of every family; man loves to see himself repeated in numerous offspring. When nothing occurs to thwart this tendency, he gives way to it: the children are many, and the advent of each is joyfully welcomed. This is because in such cases a numerous family is a force, and the children are a support instead of an embarrassment.

And wherefore?

Because the great question, *the establishment of the children* is easily and naturally solved, through the very mechanism of social conditions. That is what happens indeed in societies where the family community still prevails more or less: among them, parents may rely on the help of the community in bringing up and establishing their children. The populations of the East are eminently prolific. The

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general feeling finds vent in such proverbs as "Large families are blest by the Lord;" or again, "Woe to the barren woman!"

In France the birth-rate is maintained only amongst the few populations which have more or less preserved the communistic form, such as are met with in Brittany, in the Pyrenees, and in the mountainous regions of Central France.

At the other extremity of the social world, we find the same fecundity among societies of a particularistic formation. There, too, the fate of the children is assured, not by the community, but by the intense development of individual activity, thanks to the training given to young people, which enables them to find positions for themselves. Heads of families have no need to provide for their children's establishment; they give them no portions.

Why is it not so any longer over the greatest part of France? Why are large families no longer envied? Why, on the contrary, do we pity them? Why is it our ideal to have two children—a boy and a girl—or even only one child, the "son and heir"?

Because, among us, a numerous family is such an overwhelming burden that, do what they may, there is but one resource for the parents, and that is to elude the difficulty.

They cannot rely for the settling of their children either on the family community, which is dissolved, nor on the children's own initiative, which is smothered by their mode of education.

The establishment of the children therefore remains in charge of the parents. A French father cannot get his children married except by giving each a portion; he is thus compelled to make as many fortunes as he has children, and this before the marriage of each, that is to say, within a period of eighteen to thirty years!

You have just married. One year later, you have one child. Is your vision that of a fair little head, a sweet smile? No; the vision is the surging ghost of a dowry, a portion which you will have to find. Eighteen months or two years later, another child—that is another portion to constitute. Two portions in twenty-five years! You feel unequal to doing more, and in presence of a material impossibility you make up your mind to stop the expense.

And that is why the French have few children. The social conventions make their task an impossibility; and then, not being able to destroy the conventions, they destroy the race.

They are the more inclined to limit the number of their children, because after marrying off, they will find their circumstances reduced by the amount of the portion given, which their honour is at stake in making as large as possible. Everybody knows how much Mr. So-and-So gives his children. Thus it is the parents' business to provide a competency for each of their children, and moreover to see that their own fortunes do not suffer from the repeated assaults.

Statistics fully establish the influence of the dowry system in promoting voluntary sterility; the wealthier, the more provident classes (those who have to raise the money wherewith to portion their children), are those that have the smaller families. The poorer and less provident (the working classes) have large families; they are the classes whose children are left to grow and start in life as best they can.

Thus, in the industrial *département* of the *Nord*, where the working population is numerous, there is a considerable excess in the number of births as compared to deaths—51,197 births, against 35,089 deaths. On the contrary, in rich agricultural districts, the death-rate is higher. In the

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*Eure*, 6842 births, and 8128 deaths; in the *Oise*, 8851 births, and 9068 deaths; in the *Orne*, 6851 births, and 8534 deaths, etc.

So that we must arrive at this strange conclusion, that in France, with sundry exceptions, the birth-rate is partly maintained only through the multiplication of the improvident and the incapable. What sort of a future can such circumstances foreshadow for France?

We shall now see that such conditions imposed on the family can explain the secondary causes before enumerated.

First, the determination to have few children is sufficiently explained by the impossibility on the parents' part to gather the money for a number of portions. In such conditions marriage is but a heavy charge which must be avoided.

Having thus renounced the hope of rearing and establishing a large family, having reduced their liabilities to a minimum of one or two children to be settled, they feel inclined to indulge themselves in the greatest possible sum of enjoyment. A childless couple, or a couple with but one or two children, have much in common with the "selfish bachelor" type. They have none of the stimulus towards thrift and sacrifice which is furnished by the necessity of bringing up and starting in life a numerous family.

It is a very remarkable fact, indeed, that our social state produces two quite different results. On the one hand, large families make the parents' situation most difficult and their lives a series of privations. On the other, those who have few children find themselves in very easy circumstances; they can enjoy great comfort and can indulge in all pleasures. In short, they can live almost like bachelors.

As for the children, accustomed to rely more on the prospective portion than on their own initiative, they are little inclined to make for themselves independent positions—

whether at home or abroad—and are mostly tempted to embrace administrative careers.

In order to stop the rush, examinations are multiplied—but in vain. The crowd of candidates becomes a crush. Any one who wishes to obtain entrance must overwork himself; hence *the cramming in the Schools*.

All the causes advanced by economists proceed, therefore, from one primary and only cause; the conditions imposed on the family by our social state.

## V.

Is this diminution in the birth-rate in France an evil or a boon? Are we to rejoice at it, or should we deplore it? Economists do not agree on this point.

M. Maurice Block has contended, in the *Journal des Débats* and in the *Revue des Deux-Mondes*,\* that a rapid increase in the population of a country is a cause of weakness on account of the poverty which is the necessary result. M. de Molinari arrives at the same conclusion in the *Journal des Économistes*† which he directs.

Do facts justify such a conclusion?

First, we cannot see how sterility profits France.

If our country was surrounded by a Chinese Great Wall, which forbade entrance to every foreign element, we would feel more at our ease on a sparsely peopled soil; the diminution in the population would increase for each the share in the natural resources and the work at hand.

But such is not the case. The voids brought about by our low birth-rate are immediately filled up by the flow of immigrants from abroad. The surplus population of all our neighbours—Belgians, Germans, Swiss, Italians, Spanish Basques, etc., filters into France more and more.

\* Issue of October 15, 1882.

† Issue of December, 1886.



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In 1851 we had 379,000 foreigners among us; in 1861, 499,000; in 1872, 799,000; in 1876, 801,000; in 1881, 1,001,100—that is to say, one foreigner for every 73 French people. “It is an important fact,” says M. de Foville, “this rapid infiltration of the foreign element into a population which would otherwise be almost stationary.”\*

France is the country where the rate of emigration is lowest, and immigration highest.

Those writers who are in favour of a low birth-rate know this; but far from being alarmed, they are elated by the fact, and declare it to be a cause of economy for France, which is thus receiving a host of workers whose education costs us nothing.

“Let us suppose,” says M. de Molinari, “that instead of importing 1,000,000 adult workers, who came to fill the gaps in our population, France had had to educate them, what would they have cost us? To obtain 1,000,000 of men twenty years old, 1,300,000 children have to be brought into the world. Now, the average cost of rearing a million children up to adolescence is 3,500,000,000 francs. France has therefore saved a sum of three *milliards* and a half (£140,000,000) by importing educated workers instead of herself educating a like number; and has not this saving contributed to the increase of public and private wealth? Is it not obvious that if France had received *free* from the neighbouring countries 1,000,000 oxen, destined to provide for our deficiencies, we would have benefited by the whole expense incurred in Belgium, Switzerland, etc., in breeding them and bringing them to a productive state?”†

For this reasoning to be just, there is only one thing lacking: that is, that men should be oxen.

What results from the fact that men are not oxen?

\* *La France Économique*, p. 27.

† *Journal des Économistes*, issue of December, 1886.

This: that our few children—not being given the rough training which is the lot of children in large families—not being from a tender age accustomed to the idea that they must take care of themselves in life, and that they must not reckon on a forthcoming portion or wife's dowry—it being taught success is for the most painstaking, the boldest and most enterprising—those children consequently do not become men. Moreover our only sons, spoilt and tied to their mothers' apron-strings as they have been, when once they are brought into competition with the more strongly nurtured offspring of large families, are always and everywhere shamefully beaten and ousted. Our own merchants and engineers prefer German or Swiss clerks, and Belgian or Italian workmen to their own countrymen, because they find them more obedient, more diligent, more thrifty, and less exacting. Those foreigners save money on wages which our workers vote insufficient. Without them our production would be twice as dear, and we should be still more powerless than we are to cope with foreign competition. Thanks to their wholesome minds and vigorous bodies they save our industry and our agriculture.

But they do so at the price of our energy and lowered moral sense, at the cost of our force of expansion, of our colonizing power, of our prestige in the world, of our very nationality which is being gradually submerged under the invasion of the foreigner.

## CHAPTER II.

## OUR MODE OF EDUCATION COMPROMISES THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF FRANCE.

## I.

IT is a favourite utterance on the part of many people that our time is "the Century of Money." Some rejoice at it; others complain of it.

The fact is that financial undertakings and speculations have assumed in our time unheard-of proportions.

This is no mere fortuitous circumstance; nothing in this world is the work of chance.

It was the discovery of coal which gave money the extraordinary power which it now has. Coal gave the impulsion to innumerable undertakings, which, requiring considerably more capital than is at the disposal of one family, could only be carried out by means of joint-stock companies.

The first of such undertakings is the working of the coal mines. This product is not to be found in veins like the metals, but in enormous layers which furnish an almost unlimited supply. Hence arises the necessity for vast concerns employing large numbers of workmen.

Besides, there is every advantage in doing the work *en grand*, as coal feeds all other industries, and is sure of a vast and constant market.

Such an undertaking obviously requires considerable capital, which only financial association can furnish.

Coal has not only furnished a new kind of mine-working;

it has transformed the whole of industry. To the small workshop of the past have succeeded the larger works of our epoch. Indeed, such a motive force as coal yields increases industrial production and consequently the number of work people tenfold and even a hundred-fold. Such industrial development, requiring enormous capital, involves the formation of many financial corporations.

But coal does not only provide the "bread of industry;" its effect has been to transform the means of transport, by procuring the motive force of railways and steamboats. Such undertakings require co-operation, even more than the foregoing; most of them are worked by companies.

It is coal, too, that made possible many large industries undertaken by joint-stock societies, such as the manufacture of gas, the various appliances of electricity, the opening of the Suez Canal, the railways, etc.

Moreover, the advent of coal has enabled the Governments of the different States to undertake large works of public utility. The development of those States themselves has been increased thereby. The budgets of nations being insufficient to deal with such considerable works, they had recourse to loans, and thus constituted corporations of shareholders even larger than any of those before named.

So it was that money assumed suddenly an enormous power, unheard-of until then, and characterized by the fact that it produces a revenue by itself without any necessary exertion on the part of the owner. What formerly was the exception became frequent: the class of persons living on their incomes, which formerly only comprised the wealthier families, now include a host of people of the humbler sort, all those who penny by penny succeed in putting by the smallest of competencies.

That is what coal has done; and it is sufficient to show us that we are in presence of a purely natural transforma-

tion, resulting from natural forces against which the strength of man is powerless. There would be madness in attempting to resist it; failure would be certain.

The causes which made the public inclined to rush for personal property of the kind just alluded to are not less positive.

First, such property is easy to acquire, as it is essentially divisible. It is within reach of the most modest "capitalist." Then it yields a revenue without necessitating any work, any obligation—an inducement which is fascinating for all. Then your income comes to you—when it comes—with a periodic regularity and punctuality which the exercise of agriculture, industry, or commerce certainly do not afford. How could such advantages be resisted?

But that is not all. There is another attraction about this kind of property: it offers the alluring prospect of a possible bonus, or considerable prizes. It is wealth coming to us whilst we are asleep!

People reckon on such chances the more sanguinely because for a long time shareholders realized large profits. They greedily quote the famous example of the Anzin shareholders, whose small outlay brought each of them a fortune. The Suez Canal shares are named with bated breath, and so are those of the Paris Gas Company, etc. At a time when every one of these enterprises was in the incipient stage, when everything was yet to be done, and competition was but little developed, many of the concerns yielded unhopèd-for profits. The astonished public rushed, and they still rush, to the distribution, like larks to a mirror. When failures occur they pass unnoticed amidst the loud acclamations of success.

Moreover, Stock Exchange values, owing to the facility in purchase and re-selling, and owing also to the fluctuations in prices, offer the seduction of speculation which

appeals to many minds. In addition to the easiest way of administering one's fortune, there is a most satisfactory prospect of seeing it suddenly increase to indefinite proportions.

We have thus summed up the causes which lead the public to invest in this kind of security.

As a result, the public seem to have lost their heads. The cult of money has thus been developed to its present point. We have all been taught to entertain prospects of sudden access to fortune. Financiers find themselves at the top of the tree: they are the kings of the day.

But there is another side to the picture.

Never was the representation of Fortune on her wheel truer than it is nowadays.

Personal property is essentially *unstable*.

It is at the mercy of all the fluctuations of the market, which itself is at the mercy of all the hazards of politics and speculations. It is not our business here to rewrite the history of the ruins consummated on 'Change every day.

But at some periods the financial crisis is so intense, and so many are struck at one time, that it deserves the name of a catastrophe. Something like a tremendous subsidence takes place, and we have what we call a "*krach*."

Then the clamouring is general; all the wounded interests rise up in arms. The losing parties vie with each other in their passionate invectives against financiers, brokers, etc., invectives which they often deserve themselves. People are willing to get dividends, but unwilling to run the necessary risks; both of which, however, are inseparable from the system. Stock Exchange "securities" imply insecurity as the apple-tree bears apples and the vine grapes. Here are two natural laws of the same order.

The question is to know whether the instability inherent



in Stock Exchange securities, and the domination of the Stock Exchange are two evils that cannot be obviated.

We shall see presently that they can, and, indeed, that they *are* obviated in some countries.

## II.

The extension of Stock Exchange values in our time has not produced everywhere the same results. It is a remarkable fact that the countries most shaken in their credit are not those where speculation is most rife. In other words, some countries can bear, without showing any ill effects, a dose of speculation which would seriously upset others. That is a phenomenon analogous to the capacity of the American vines, as compared to the French vines, for resisting the assaults of the *Phylloxera bacillus*.

A whole library might be formed with the different works recently published in France on the subject of the dangers with which the Jews and speculators threaten society. Calm reason is not precisely what shines most in these books; indeed, they are the expression of violent passion. Most of them overstep their goal, which is the wrong way of getting there. They all see only the surface of things, and propose impossible or inefficacious remedies. But, at any rate, this rising in arms is a characteristic symptom of the *malaise* which French society is now experiencing.

This does not arise from the French having shown more eagerness than other nations in investing in Stock Exchange securities; the latter are viewed with quite as much favour in England, Scandinavia, Germany, and the United States.

The difference lies in this: the people who have best protected themselves against suffering too much by the

instability of that kind of property all employed the same means: they did not invest their *all* in such securities, but only part of their savings.

The French, on the contrary, give up everything; they bring to the Bourse both capital and savings. It is therefore a common utterance that France is the country where money is most abundant. So it is, and the fact is due to the general tendency, on the part of the French, to make money of everything they possess, to make it all "liquid," as the (French) phrase goes. The ideal of many a Frenchman is to hold all his fortune in his pocket-book.

This is the reason why most financial issues from any part of the world have their birth in Paris. France is the great money market, in this sense, that Paris is the place in the world where a skilful financier can make the best haul. French money thus flows abroad through a thousand streams—which do not all turn back into France. It has flowed in Turkey, in Honduras, in the Argentine Republic, Peru, etc.

We all know that the two greatest undertakings of modern times, the excavating of the Suez and Panama canals, have been executed mainly through the means of French capital. This does not mean that these undertakings will remain in French hands. Suez is already in English hands; Panama is very likely to pass into the hands of American citizens. Always the Anglo-Saxon's ready hand! The French pay their money, but they do not reap the fruit. They run the chances, and somebody else gathers the profits.

It is, then, an established fact that France is the country where fortunes are most generally invested in personal property.

What is the cause of this fact?

It comes from the French neglecting more and more the

three great sources of public wealth: Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce.

There is no need to repeat here with what persistence Louis XIV. attracted the great nobles from their estates to the Court. The upper classes in France have been gradually detached from agricultural interests; they are now part of the urban population. France is the country where the large land-owners are the greatest absentees, and give the least attention to their rural estates. Hence all the money which ought to have returned to the land in the shape of improvements has been invested in different funds.

Those capitals might have gone to industry or commerce; but owing to a stupid prejudice, these occupations are looked upon in France as *infra dig.* by all persons who consider that they belong to the upper classes. As for the men who do follow these occupations, their only idea is to make a fortune as soon as possible, so as to be able to retire early—and start their sons in those careers which the so-called superior classes do not disdain, namely, the administrative careers. To be a member of the civil or military Administration is the dream of nearly all Frenchmen. It is the means of gaining recognition, of marrying well, and of penetrating into Society.

The Frenchman is therefore a *fonctionnaire*, or a prospective *fonctionnaire*. In the first case he receives a salary. What is he to do with the money he saves on his expenditure? For the reasons just stated, it will never occur to him to utilize it in some agricultural, industrial, or commercial undertaking. That would be a forfeiture of his dignity. Besides, these occupations are quite foreign to him.

His money, therefore, goes to the Stock Exchange: that is the readiest outlet for it—an attractive one for such as do not wish to work with their own capital, or have not the capacity to do so.

One last circumstance comes to swell the sum total of the money which finds its way to the Stock Exchange. French families, as we have seen, have few children; that money which would be employed in bringing up the children is free. Systematic sterility, which means a loss of social strength in the near future, is at least in the present a cause of increase in the available capital of families.

Now let us realize the consequences of a financial crisis to persons whose whole fortune is invested in Stock Exchange securities. Such a crisis for them spells irreparable ruin.

Is it so in the Anglo-Saxon world?

### III.

Among the Anglo-Saxons, agriculture has been abandoned neither by the upper classes nor by the mass of the nation. The English lords own vast estates and reside there; when they do not cultivate the whole of their lands, they always farm at least a part themselves. In this way they remain well posted in all agricultural matters. A French landowner can hardly believe what amount of money a great English landlord is willing to embark in agricultural improvements.\* This use of wealth is the principal title of an English gentleman to public consideration.†

What else is done by the English emigrants to the United States, to Australia, New Zealand, etc., but building up rural estates? To own a rural estate, and run it, is their proudest ambition; that is why they become colonists, settlers, squatters. A very great many young Englishmen thus go abroad every year, and when a man finds such em-

\* *Vide* L. de Lavergne, "Essai sur l'économie rurale de l'Angleterre."

† *Vide* Taine, "Notes sur l'Angleterre."

ployment for his spare money, there is not much left for Stock Exchange investments.

The few Frenchmen, on the contrary, who go abroad, do so generally in an official capacity, and do a good deal more harm than good to the cause of colonization.

Agriculture is not the only opening for individual activity. Industry and commerce, even in the upper classes, are in equal favour among the Anglo-Saxons. The sons of a peer who do not start a rural estate abroad establish themselves in England as manufacturers or in some line of business. No one thinks this derogatory. The prodigious development of industry and commerce in England and America can be in no other way accounted for. Now, all these enterprises require considerable capital, which would otherwise be turned to Stock Exchange speculations.

These families are the more disposed to adopt agriculture, industry, and commerce as their professions, because bureaucracy is much less developed than in France. In England, the number of officials is reduced to a minimum. Private activity is therefore directed towards the useful professions.

The more so, because such businesses are not, as in France, subjected to the laws of division amongst the children. The head of a family, being absolutely master of his property, can found durable concerns that will survive him.

It will now be clear to the reader that families whose care is to use their fortunes in personal undertakings, are by the very fact free from the instability of fortunes invested in Stock Exchange securities. When they do make such investments it is only in the way that a tourist in the Riviera might make up his mind to risk a few hundred francs at Monte Carlo: if he wins, so much the better; if he loses, his loss is limited; his fortune is not affected.

You should read M. de Rousiers's "La Vie Américaine," Chapter XIII., especially par. 3: "In New York and Boston, I came across professional men who employ in agriculture, or otherwise, part of their capital; but they are thoroughly acquainted with the undertakings which their money promotes; not in general large associations, but private firms. So as to keep a perfect control over their funds, they take good care not to disseminate them, as is the custom in France, with cautious heads of families; they do not mind putting all their eggs in one basket, if I may use a metaphor often employed by our *rentiers*, because they have their eyes on that basket and make sure there is no hole at the bottom. Thus the American papers, so full of practical information, do not all publish lists of Stock Exchange prices as ours do; the great majority of their readers would take no interest in such matters. If they have any money at command, their own business activity generally points to ready use for it. Instead of falling asleep over their title deeds, they start businesses worked with their own capitals."\*

Consequently, all Stock Exchange dealings are done with ready money; all purchases made on 'Change are settled by cheques payable next morning. Every one who goes in for any speculation is bound to obtain actual possession of the deeds thus purchased. Such methods are singularly instrumental in checking speculation, and make Stock Exchange operations a good deal safer.

It can therefore be affirmed that if a general break-down of Stock Exchange securities were to occur, the Anglo-Saxon world would suffer considerably less than we should, because their fortunes are invested differently.

It is this way of investing our fortunes which makes France the Promised Land of financiers. The Jew, for

\* "La Vie Américaine," p. 398.



one, is a plant which only develops in favourable surroundings. Why does he not prosper so much in England, in Scandinavia, in the United States, in Australia, etc., as in France? Because there all fortunes have not been invested in public funds; because each man there employs his own capital on his own land, and his own industry, or in his own trade. Where there is nothing to gain, where every one knows how to take care of his own, the Jew subsides; at least he drops his noxious character.

## CHAPTER III.

HOW ANGLO-SAXON EDUCATION PREPARES CHILDREN FOR THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE. TYPES AND CHARACTERS.

## I.

IN May, 1892, I received from England invitations from two quarters.

The first was addressed to me by the British Association for the Advancement of Science, which was to hold its seventy-second congress in Edinburgh, from the 4th to the 10th of August. It ran: "The Committee hope you will honour them by being their guest as long as you will stay in our city, and you may rest assured that they will do all in their power to make your stay here as pleasant as possible." How could any one resist so engaging an invitation?

Almost at the same time I received another letter from Professor Geddes, founder of the Summer Meeting of Edinburgh, asking me to come and deliver before that body a series of lectures on Social Science.

And this is how, on August 2, 1892, I arrived in the lovely city of Edinburgh—and returned there during four consecutive years.

A very remarkable and eminently British institution is that Summer Meeting, or Summer School of Science and Art. It deserves to be well known.

Under the denomination of University Extension Lectures, a whole system of public classes has been organized in different parts of Great Britain, and in the districts of

the Universities. A small fee is charged to each student, and both sexes are admitted to the classes, which generally take place during the holidays, last one month, and include many different subjects.

This institution is a success over there, because of the large public always on the watch for anything that may help their improvement through their own personal efforts.

In many towns of England the number of students reaches hundreds. In the United States such classes are attended by thousands.

## II.

I was certainly the most astonished man in the world when, in opening my lectures at Edinburgh, I found myself in the presence of an audience of some sixty or seventy people. For lectures delivered in the French language, such a number was certainly unexpected.

I wished to know the composition of my audience, so as to draw from it some social as well as educational inferences. It included a few large land-owners; several schoolmasters and pressmen; the principal of a school of social studies in London; a certain number of students, amongst whom were some who had attended our Paris classes, and who had had the happy thought to come to Edinburgh; young ladies simply anxious to increase their field of knowledge; a few people particularly interested in questions of popular education and improvement; finally, Board and National schoolmasters and mistresses.

This last group is by far the most numerous. I told one of the mistresses that in France persons of her calling would never dream of employing their holidays in attending classes—especially if they had to pay for it. She looked much surprised, such a use of a holiday seemed quite natural to her. The fact is that for similar lectures which take place

near the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, etc., the paid admissions amount to as many as six and seven hundred.

The great number attending can only be explained by the keen desire of each individual to acquire a high personal value. We have said how this feeling is promoted by English education.\*

I visited a farm, not far from Edinburgh, and found among the agricultural classes the same tendency to rise.

As we alighted at the R..... station we found the farmer, who had come to meet us. I assure you you might have taken him for a banker, a diplomatist, or a rich *bourgeois*; in one word, he looked a perfect gentleman. His jacket was of excellent cut; from head to foot he was dressed like a man who goes to a good tailor. These small details—and the following—are not useless; you will by-and-by appreciate their importance.

The farm is within a mile of the station, and the farmer's dwelling-house is close to the farm-buildings. A well-kept avenue, with flowers on either side, leads to it; I noticed also a flower-bed opposite to the door. The dwelling presents the exterior aspect of a comfortable English house. We enter: there is a carpet in the hall; the stairs, too, are carpeted, and so is the landing. We are now in the drawing-room, where we are welcomed by the mistress of the house; she does so without the least embarrassment, as a lady will do. The conversation does not flag, and embraces the most varied subjects. The lady speaks very tolerable French, which denotes a good education. Tea is brought in, and very nicely served. The servant is *not* a heavy, awkward, country wench, dressed as a peasant girl promoted straight from the stable to the parlour; there is a certain style about her; she wears a pretty, white, well-

\* *Vide*, in *La Science Sociale*, "Mon séjour dans une petite ville d'Angleterre," by M. Bureau, t. IX., pp. 151, 256.

starched apron, and on her head is the smart little cap worn by maid-servants in all respectable English households. These details point to a good middle-class way of living, for all this has evidently not been improvised on our account.

I am trying all along to analyze my impressions and compare everything I see here with the things of the same kind which I have observed elsewhere: I can thus best give each thing its relative value. Consequently, as I behold this British farmer, his home and mode of living, my mind naturally reverts to the types of farmers which I have had opportunities of observing in different parts of France.

We must go to the north of France to find the superior type of farmer: a well-read man, sometimes a B.A.; settled amidst comfortable surroundings, dressed in a morning-coat or jacket—not in a *blouse*; in short, a man who has the appearance and leads the life of a well-to-do land-owner who manages his estate himself, lives well, and keeps a good table and good wine.

But the average type is very different. I do not mean the farmer of the south or centre of France, nor even the Breton farmer, whose way of living does not differ materially from that of his labourers; I select the farmer of Normandy—a rich country. I have in mind a Norman farmer whom I visited several times; he works an estate of three or four hundred acres—precisely the size of my Scotchman's estate. He is a rich man, for he gives his only son a portion of one hundred thousand francs (£4000). He might therefore live in comfort; however, he has not the least idea, the least wish of doing so. He dresses like our peasants, in a blue blouse, save on market days, when he goes to the town, and wears clothes patched and dirty enough to please the most fastidious. In style his wife matches him, washes her own linen at a public fountain,

and in costume, manner, and conversation, does not differ from the maid in the farmyard. The inside of the dwelling is in harmony with the inmates. The whole of the family life is spent in a large room, whose floor is on a level with the farmyard, and overlooks it; the walls, badly white-washed, are bare. The only furniture consists of a long straight table, in appearance like a plank placed on a couple of trestles; masters and servants eat at this table, without a table-cloth. Round the table are a few benches in keeping with the table. There are three or four odd badly stuffed chairs. The kitchen-range is in this room, and so is the sink. That is all. I do not give this description as an isolated one; it is, on the contrary, that of the most common French farmer type, and every one of my readers has been able to observe it a hundred times. Yet this sort of thing does not shock our feelings, because we consider this mode of life quite natural. It seems to us that a tiller of the ground cannot and ought not to live differently, and that agriculture implies for the agriculturist lack of comfort and no lack of dirt.

But perhaps you think my British farmer is an exceptional type? So I thought, too, until we visited the dwellings of his labourers.

You know how a farm-labourer is lodged in France. When he does not sleep on the straw in a shed, or in a poor bed in the stable, he has but a most miserable room to which to retire. I asked therefore the R..... farmer to let us see the lodgings of his labourers. I was shown, within a hundred yards from the farmhouse, half a dozen cottages in a line along the road; they were the labourers' houses, and we repaired thither.

The exterior aspect is pleasant. In front of each is a small flower-garden intersected by well-kept little paths. The kitchen-garden is behind—and every cottage has its



own. As we came up, we saw before one of the cottages a young woman dressed like a middle-class person, pushing a pretty baby carriage containing a child carefully dressed in white. The vehicle was on four wheels, and of the sort we call "English" (a perambulator), which is generally a rather expensive affair. M. Poincard, one of my collaborators on *La Science Sociale*, who was with me, asked the farmer whether this was a person come from the town on a visit; as you may well suppose, we were astonished to learn that she was the wife of the farm labourer living in the cottage.

The farmer asked her permission for his visitors to go over the house. She complied willingly, and did the honours herself.

There was a cocoanut-fibre mat before the entrance door, and another inside the narrow hall for wiping one's feet. The existence of a hall is most favourable to the cleanliness and comfort of a dwelling: people do not enter the place direct from the outside, and it means as well protection against the cold. A little room, on the right, where things are washed (the scullery, unknown in French dwellings of the same class), allows of more neatness in the combined kitchen and dining-room: this is a large room about five yards square and furnished quite comfortably. The range, half hidden in the wall, which is habitually the case, is perfectly well kept; the brasses are resplendent. This is no matter for astonishment, as English housewives are certainly better cleaners than cooks; they are almost constantly rubbing and scrubbing, employing in turn lead or copper-wash for the range, and hearthstone for the steps, etc. It seems as though an English housewife spent more time on her knees than on her feet.

I shall give you an idea of the care bestowed by these people on the furnishing of their houses by relating the fol-

lowing characteristic detail. In the dining-room is a stylish article of furniture on which are disposed in brave array a whole collection of *bibelots*; and we are in a farm labourer's cottage!

Let us enter the bedroom. The iron bedstead is adorned with brass balls, also beautifully polished; beside the bed, a chest of drawers; opposite, a sofa; then a toilet and washstand, and—make a note of this—on the stand a series of bottles and boxes of different colours; round the looking-glass, a gay-coloured gauze artfully disposed, and framing it. I think this slight detail very suggestive: it betrays a naïve effort towards the beautiful in the arrangement of the home.

This desire to make their homes comfortable is general here among a whole class of workpeople. There is in this neighbourhood a coal-mine, as I have before stated. I noticed that a great number of the colliers' cottages were kept with the same care as I have just described: small front flower-garden, whitened steps, pretty white or coloured curtains at the windows, etc. On the other hand, I noticed that some of the streets inhabited by work-people were composed of dirty and ill-kept houses, and that everything that could be seen of the inside presented a sordid aspect; the children went in rags and with bare feet.

The manager of the works explained to me the cause of this contrast: "Irish workmen," he said, "do not care for comfort, and pay no attention to the proper keeping of their habitations; so we let them our oldest houses, for which we charge them a lower rent, with which they are quite satisfied; but for our Scotch work-people we built these new dwellings, which they embellish as much as they can."

The farmer confirmed this statement. He also employs Irishmen, especially at the gathering of the crops, and

houses them anyhow; the question of the lodging is nothing to them.

We can therefore register here the difference in the aspirations of the Anglo-Saxon Individualists and of the Communistic Irishmen, in regard to comfort in their dwellings.

I had another proof of this during a visit I paid to the neighbouring little town of Penicuik. We went and had tea at the house of a mechanic. The cottage belongs to him; it consists of the ground-floor and one storey. We were served with tea in a room combining the uses of a dining-room and parlour. I noticed a sofa, a piano, a carpet covering a greater part of the floor, and under the table a more common carpet (a rug) as a protection for the other carpet. This detail is an indication of peculiar cleanliness and *tenue* on the part of the mistress of the house. The meal is laid on a large square table, with something approaching to luxury; tea-cloth of fine linen, pretty china set, five or six different plates of bread and butter, toast, cake, and biscuits. I accept another cup of tea, and before being refilled, my cup is rinsed in a basin specially reserved for that purpose. I do not believe I am mistaken in saying that in France the second cup is generally served without this ordeal; at any rate that is how it is done in my own house and among my acquaintance. So this plain workman enjoys in this respect a refinement which would constitute a novelty in most of our houses.

I inquired of the R. . . . . farmer about the wages paid to his labourers: he pays them ninety-five shillings a month, and in addition to this, they have the cottage rent-free, a two-acre kitchen garden, a large provision of potatoes, other vegetables, and bacon; all of which ensures them the better part of their food. The wives seldom do any outside work; it is with his own resources that the

workman manages to procure all the comfort we have just described.

Moreover, it has not been demonstrated that order, cleanliness, and good housekeeping are more expensive than disorder, uncleanness, and the public-house.

It should be added that the English workman, unlike the French, saves but little; he spends about all he earns. To better his position, he counts less on his saving power than on an increase in his returns through promotion to a higher grade in his calling. He is, indeed, most keen in seizing hold of any opportunity to improve his position. To this effect he has no hesitation in expatriating himself, as is proved by the multitude of Anglo-Saxon emigrants. In the matter of providing for the future, the English do not do much besides insuring their lives, so as to leave some resources—in case of death—to the widows. This accounts for the development and wealth of insurance companies in Great Britain and America.

We are therefore once more led to conclude that such a social formation develops in the individual an extraordinary ability to rise. But there is something more characteristic: it is that among them, even in quite inferior ranks, the individual lives better, more comfortably, with more dignity—more respectably, as the English say—than on the Continent. Upon the whole, acquaintance with the English workman—whether in town or country—leads one to feel that there is little to add to him to make him a gentleman, exteriorly and perhaps morally. He is a gentleman in a rudimentary state, at least he has the appearance of one, being more anxious to live generously than to meanly save his money.

Among us, on the contrary, the ruling faculty is economy and foresight; we do not rise or progress in any way except by dint of restricting our needs and reducing our expen-

diture. We are therefore content with situations which Englishmen would disdain. Our officials, our teachers, our clerks, our workmen are less highly paid than in England, and yet many of them succeed in saving something out of their pittances. In England, they employ their money in getting as much comfort as possible, and if there is a surplus, why! they put it into some business—on their own account.

Habits of economy, a way of living meanly, leave their marks on the individual; these stick to us—for nothing is as tenacious as a habit—even when we have achieved fortune. We are content with a modicum of comfort and just a little surface luxury—except when we act like the rich farmers of Normandy, of whom I have been speaking, and who, in spite of their wealth, live miserably.

Men of our inferior classes can rise to wealth by means of economy; but they are not apt to rise socially—that is to say, they do not know how to enjoy an affluent home life.

### III.

I have just driven from one of my lectures to lunch with a family in the environs of Edinburgh. This visit is particularly interesting to me, because these people are subscribers to *La Science Sociale*. This is a good opportunity of judging of the impression wrought on English minds by our social studies.

The home is a luxurious mansion. The family is composed of the young husband, wife, and, if I rightly remember, three children. They live the whole year in the country, about four miles from Edinburgh. On our way I see a large number of houses, which I am told are inhabited all the year round. This permanent residing in the country, even during the winter months, is characteristic of English



life. A young lady who is on the point of being married tells me she, too, will live in the environs of Edinburgh, although her husband has his business in town. To my surprise, she adds that the arrangement is more pleasant, and that they feel more independent and more comfortable than in the town. These two words, "independence" and "comfort," really sum up the Englishman's ideal in this world. He can put up with relative isolation and a very limited circle of acquaintances, and this faculty is, for a race, an enormous source of strength.

I am welcomed with a cordiality which moves me, as a friend whose ideas they know and whose opinions they share. No doubt social science does not appeal to an English mind in the same way as to a French one. To characterize this difference I should say that a Frenchman seeks in it a rational system for the general direction of society; whereas an Englishman studies it with a view to improving his own practical conduct. These two attitudes are representative of the respective "formations" of the two nations; we are inclined to dabble in general ideas, they are disposed to practical applications.

Indeed, that is the way this young couple apply social science; they seek in it a rule for personal conduct. The family own large rural property, which at the present time is tenanted; but the lease is to expire within a year. The lease will not be renewed, as my host intends to settle there and direct his estate himself. Meanwhile, he is practically preparing himself for the work. He spends his days on a neighbouring farm, in order to coach himself up for his prospective duties, not only by means of books and theory, but far more by daily practice.

I have noticed that Englishmen, even business men, who spend most of their time in town, are better prepared for an agricultural life than our own business men; they are



not thorough strangers to such matters, and can more easily take to them. A young friend of ours, M. Bailhache, who has accompanied me here, was received in the house of a farmer who used to be manager of a branch bank. The bank having closed, this gentleman hired a rather large estate and turned farmer; I don't think we could find many such examples in France.

This predisposition to agriculture seems to me to proceed from the semi-rural education given to most English boys, much of which is owing to residing in country houses surrounded with gardens. We may add that their instinct, as members of a Particularistic race, consists more in studying the things than the persons around them. From early life they find themselves in contact with nature, and form a notion of rural life which harmonizes well with their ideas of self-sufficiency. In their young days they have raised plants, grown vegetables, or taken care of fowls or animals. All these interests, which amongst us are the exclusive business of country people, are here made to penetrate the minds of a great many people through the ordinary process of education.

One of my collaborators, M. Bureau, who, in view of his social studies, went last summer to the United States, was much struck by this side of education, even in town schools. The Natural Sciences, and particularly, the study of plants and animals, form much larger share of their work than in our schools: these subjects are studied in a more practical spirit, not only in books, but also from nature, and as much as possible from living specimens. The pupils are required to bring for next class, say a leaf or a branch of some tree or other, which afterwards serves as an actual subject of study, so as to bring home to them vivid notions by sight and contact of the thing itself taken fresh from its natural surroundings. Under such conditions, the teacher's ex-

planation must be singularly more effective and suggestive. The pupils can be asked, Where did you pick such a plant? On what kind of soil? Did you notice its outward appearance, its conditions of growth, etc.?

Such a method, however, is only possible if the boys live in or near the country, or have some contact with the country, such as the possession of a garden or free access to one.

Taine has mentioned this love of the English for all things pertaining to the country and country life. In a drawing-room, says he (I am quoting from memory), the conversation will run on agricultural topics. Details or examples of the best methods, the rotation of crops, etc., will be discussed; all present, even the ladies, take an interest in such subjects.

No wonder the wife of my host is quite as willing, quite as ready as her husband to go and settle in the country on their own farm. This lady talks the matter over with me at length, as one who has made up her mind after coolly weighing the pros and cons.

If her husband stood in need of encouragement and support she would give both. This assistance on the part of a wife is a source of great strength to a man. In France, several friends of mine who own estates, and experience some difficulty in finding good farmers, are quite disposed to undertake working their own properties; the great obstacle to this is the wife's resistance. With us, women are still more estranged from rural life than men; they find it harder to do without their numerous acquaintances, the visiting, the worldly side of life. Women are, perhaps, owing to the prejudiced way in which they consider it as an inferior profession and *infra dig.*, the principal stumbling-block to the renaissance of agriculture in France. A young man can marry better—I mean he can find a better dowered bride—if he be in the army or in the administra-

tion. We are told that the clergy still have some influence over women; I would rather believe, for the sake of the clergy's good name, that that is a mistaken notion.

I did not lecture on Saturdays or Sundays, all business being suspended on these days, and every office and workshop closed from Saturday at twelve o'clock till Monday morning. A paradoxical mind might here indulge in demonstrating that the English are of all people those who work most and least at the same time. The fact is, nothing is comparable to the working power of an Englishman, unless it be his resting power.

The following will perhaps formulate more exactly the actual fact: Englishmen produce, in the shortest period of time, the greatest amount of work, so as to be able to take afterwards the longest possible spell of rest.

In London I saw few shops open before 9 a.m.; and they close considerably earlier than in Paris. It is the same in offices and all business places. Upon the whole, their day's work is shorter than ours. It is therefore easy for business men to go home to the suburbs, sometimes very far out, as they seldom reside in the business quarters of any town. I am told that in Edinburgh many shopkeepers also live in the suburbs, and thus make every morning and evening a somewhat long journey. In France, on the contrary, most shopkeepers have their dwellings behind their shops or on the floor above. They can thus open very early and close very late. Moreover, many do not cease work on Sundays, and none do so on Saturdays. It would seem from this that the French work harder than the English.

In this case, however, we ought not to count hours, but weigh them. By the weight, I mean that the amount of work turned out by the Englishman proves larger—that is, he does more work in less time. He allows himself barely

sufficient time for a hasty lunch in the middle of the day—a meal which he often takes standing in his office and without interrupting his work.

I spent my Saturday morning in visiting a coal-mine situated in the neighbourhood of H,.....

I made there the acquaintance of a young man, cousin of the superintendent, who works a sheep-run in New Zealand. He comes home every other year to spend two months in the old country. He is much pleased with New Zealand, and is fixed there for good. "That's real life," he said to me. I asked him what fascinated him most in that kind of life. "The independence of it," he answered without hesitation. You see, the need of independence is what actuates the whole life of an Englishman; on whatever side we examine the subject we are bound to come to this conclusion.

I asked him the best way to be successful in new countries. "The best way is to begin at the bottom as a sheep-boy." So he began himself, although he belongs to an excellent family. But among these people there is no foolish calling, except the calling that does not pay.

Well, that of sheep-boy does pay, as such an apprenticeship is the only way to learn all about the country, and—in its smaller details—all that concerns a sheep-run. The roughest part of such a *début* is the contact with rude and uneducated men; "but if they have to do with a gentleman," my ranchman went on, "they soon find it out, and treat him with due consideration. Besides, you can always avoid promiscuity by electing to live apart from them." When our settler feels he knows something, he looks out for a good opportunity of purchasing a run, which he now can do with some experience. On the contrary, any one who would wish to begin everything by establishing himself at once, would fall a victim to the agents, who would

not fail to foist upon him unprofitable land and damaged flocks. I fancy few young French gentlemen would relish such a way of entering a profession; and yet that is the right way to do it, it is the way which leads on so many young Anglo-Saxons to success.

#### IV.

I spent several afternoons in visiting some large residences. These families have their principal dwelling in the country. The fact is apparent through the abundant number of family pictures and the treasures of art accumulated in these houses. Some of them are combined palaces and museums, of which many a large town might be proud.

I am told, however, that a certain number of these large land-owners are in embarrassed situation, and find themselves compelled to sell their land. Such is the case with one family whose castle and park we visit. The family belongs to the old Scotch aristocracy of Celtic origin. From all I hear, it seems they were subjected to the same evolution as most of our old French families. They kept away from work, and only preserved their status, until now, thanks to the law of primogeniture, to which may be added the advantage received by the system of entail. In spite of these artificial means, many of these families are nowadays on the road to ruin.

The English aristocracy is evidently not a product of the Anglo-Saxon social state. Societies of a Particularistic formation do not produce such an institution. No hereditary superior class is to be found among people of this type, if pure and isolated from foreign influence, as in Norway and certain parts of the Saxony plains. There the land-owning farmer has maintained himself without admixture of another class. Neither is there any hereditary



aristocracy forming in new countries where the Anglo-Saxon type prevails, such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, etc.

Nor need we wonder. It is a matter of course. What indeed is the most essential constituent of the Particularistic formation? It is the establishing of each child in full independence, through his own exertions and without the assistance of the family.

That is what the English sum up in these two phrases: Self-help and the Struggle for Life! No doubt the English aristocracy, with their primogeniture and law of entail, rest on a totally different basis; their principles are those of Communistic races, namely, the establishing of the first-born with the assistance of the family group,—an arrangement which reduces to a minimum the activity required of the young man, and dispenses with the need of helping himself or struggling in any way for existence. The eldest child, in the English aristocracy, is placed under Communistic *régime*.

Whence comes English hereditary aristocracy? It was imported from outside. It hailed from the Continent and came with William the Conqueror.

We now know that the Norman conquerors belonged to the Communistic formation; they were recruited in a good many places, with promises of booty, which attracted into their ranks disreputable men, mostly outcasts, or men who had nothing to attach them to the soil. Historical documents leave little to be desired in the way of information as to the composition of William's army; the history of the establishment of the Normans in England is well-known. They simply placed themselves above the population, and shared the great estates, the best lands—but without fixing themselves firmly to the soil after the Saxon fashion, that is to say, after the fashion of emigrants of a



Particularistic origin. The Saxon, oppressed by the Norman, went on tilling the ground for the latter. The struggle between Norman and Saxon is really a struggle between two absolutely opposite social formations.

If the Normans did not plant themselves firmly in the soil, they at least planted themselves as deeply as they could in the essentially Communistic system of an hereditary aristocracy. This system is still extant, and it can be said that it has succeeded in grievously deforming for centuries the Anglo-Saxon, or Particularistic type in England. I have not now to explain how the latter finally won the day, thanks to its extraordinary resisting power and infinitely superior vitality. Its triumph had as a result the reduction of the kingly power to its simplest expression: the English at last obtained self-government—an essentially Particularistic boon—at the very moment when France, a prey again to Communistic State formation, was meeting with autocracy at the hands of Louis XIV.

But there has remained in England something of the Norman excrescence: the hereditary aristocracy. This, like monarchy, has been reduced to a merely honorary condition, except for a few political prerogatives, such as recruiting the Upper House. This privilege has not yet been seriously contested, because the people have found in it hitherto more advantages than otherwise. I will explain. The Englishman—I mean the average Englishman, who partakes of Particularistic origin—is naturally inclined to adopt a lucrative profession; he is naturally drawn towards business, from the necessity in which all young people find themselves, of creating for themselves a situation, instead of relying for it on paternal finances or a wife's dowry. Moreover, he is drawn in that direction by the very business capacity which is developed even from childhood by the certain prospect of such a necessity.

When this tendency is once well understood, we can easily find out what kind of advantages the English could appreciate in the hereditary nobility enforced upon them: they shrewdly saw a chance of causing to be fulfilled by others (most elegantly, and in a manner most gratifying to their *amour-propre*), the unavoidable functions of politics, which have no particular fascination for themselves. There is no doubt whatever that their aristocracy has furnished them generations of superior politicians.

On the other hand, this aristocracy has not been—at least for the last hundred years or so—very troublesome, thanks to the stout and continuous resistance of the Particularistic or Saxon spirit.

The Particularistic influence has acted in two ways.

First, this influence induced more and more the younger sons of the nobility to give up idle lives, the Court, and those administrative and military functions which were the only refuge offered to our cadets—and led them, like their elders, not only to ruin, but to impotence. The English younger sons have been drawn into the great current of active life which characterizes Particularistic societies. Consequently, when circumstances, such as the extinction of the direct branch, called any of them to the peerage, they infused new blood into it—that of men trained to practical business by the exercise of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce. These men thus periodically revived an institution which—if left to itself—would have speedily fallen into decay. Moreover, the vitality of the peerage was strengthened by elements drawn directly from an Anglian source with the creation of peers of a Saxon origin.

Particularistic influence also acted in another way. It gradually suppressed, on the part of the nobility, as well as on the part of the kings, every temptation to touch individual liberty or trifle with the rights of citizens. If the

individualist does not care for politics, if he has no wish to make a livelihood out of politics, he is most impatient of any hindrance to the free working of his initiative in building up his own fortune. He allows no putting of spokes in the wheel of Agriculture, Industry or Commerce; he means to be handicapped neither by an arbitrary government nor by any excess of taxes. His constant tendency is therefore to confine the powers that be to the maintenance of public peace, without which no business is possible. The tendency in Communistic societies is, on the contrary, to disturb as much as possible the public peace, in order to ensure for one's self or children, by the triumphs of one's party, some cosy administrative sinecure, since the ideal of all shrewd people is understood to be to live on the budget. There was no other reason for our several revolutions; there is no other reason for the revolutions which are of daily occurrence in Southern America.

Thus the practice of self-government has had as a result the removal from the English nobility of all objectionable or troublesome privileges.

Although the hereditary nobility is in England an imported article, it has nevertheless exerted very real influence on the social type. It has seriously deformed it; and upon the whole its influence has been more noxious than useful.

The Particularistic formation rests essentially on the idea that a man has no value but his own individual value enhanced by his power of work, energy, and perseverance, and that a man's place in the social scale is determined by his possession of these qualities. The introduction of an hereditary superior class has grafted on to this the Communistic notion that a man has independently of himself a value derived from his family, group, or clan. This, I repeat, is a serious deformity, a modification in the very basis of the social type.

Such a conception is not too shocking to us on the Continent, because we are all more or less imbued with the Communistic spirit, and therefore look upon the family or clan hierarchy as a matter of course. But it is not so in England, at least with the mass of the population, where the Particularistic formation is firmly established. Often have I come across the expression of this feeling, which is brilliantly depicted in a celebrated sketch by Thackeray, "The Book of Snobs," the aim of which is to cover with ridicule the British infatuation for the nobility. A snob is a man who admires and imitates everything that is said or done by persons belonging to the nobility; who by every possible means, endeavours to creep in among them, or to have something in common with them; who does not appreciate men or things through his own judgment, but through the opinions known to prevail amongst those select few.

"We have cause to be surprised," wrote Thackeray, "at the dimensions and importance attained by Lordolatry." (Do not forget that this was written in 1848, when the vice was more rampant than now.) "In this, our 'liberal' country, the worship of the Peerage is flourishing like the Biblical green bay tree. Every Jack—and Jill—of us is lord-stricken; we all, more or less, grovel in the mud, at the feet of some Presence. I believe the influence of the Peerage on Snobbishness to be most direct and extensive. . . . The preservation, progress, and increase of Snobbery are boons for which we may thank the nobility."

After thus introducing the subject, Thackeray causes to file past us a whole series of snobs belonging to different classes of society, and whose grotesque characters he depicts in indelible strokes.

Mark that snobbishness is quite as common in France as in England. We, too, are all more or less snobs; but there is the great difference that this failing is with us the

natural result of our social state, whereas, in England, it is but an artificial increment which can easily be corrected.

This improvement is actually taking place. There is no doubt but that this influence on the part of the peerage is on the wane; it is already much less perceptible than at the time (not so distant) when Thackeray wrote. The position of the British aristocracy, of the peerage, does not seem so secure—a fact made evident by the decreasing importance of the House of Lords. The question of its suppression is even openly discussed, and such an event would in no way shake or damage the Constitution, to whose machinery it is but an arbitrary addition.

There would not result any lack of a superior class in England, as the Particularistic type does produce such an organism although in different conditions. In fact, this organism exists in England, and has never ceased to be at work; it is represented by the gentleman. The gentleman differs from the lord, or the noble, in this—that his position is not hereditary, but purely personal; not consecrated by the public powers, but by opinion. People will say, “So-and-So is, or is not, a gentleman,” and by this qualification is implied an *ensemble* of qualities and virtues which can hardly be defined, but which I fancy could be summed up in the English word “respectability.”

There are gentlemen in all walks of life, in all professions; but public opinion often refuses this title to a man of high birth whose life lacks dignity.

The gentleman is the Saxon form of a superior class, as the noble is the Norman form.

The movement which tends to free England from snobbery is strengthened by still another cause.

Amongst us, a man's social status is determined by his trade or profession! like the Hindoos, who are also divided into castes, we profess to believe that there are pure and



impure callings, callings which are genteel and callings which are not. The army, the liberal professions, the Administration, belong to the former; the latter comprise industry and commerce, and, we may add, agriculture, whose practice we leave to our farmers, or managers. We do not see many "society" young men going in for colonizing work. Thus the spirit of caste, of which snobbery is but a ridiculous manifestation, is strengthened in us by the exclusive exercise of some professions and the repugnance to others—which draws a definite line between the castes, and at the same time labels each.

This line of demarcation does not exist, or at least is dying out in the Anglo-Saxon world. In the United States, where the Particularistic form is more free from any Norman influence, this division of trades and professions has almost entirely disappeared, and the man's value is estimated chiefly in proportion to his energy, endurance, and power of initiative. In England an evolution is taking place in this direction. This is a consequence of the extraordinary impulse given to the commoner professions by the rise of larger industries and the increased rapidity of transport—which themselves are consequent upon the discovery of coal-mines. This new state of things, whose rapid event made the Communistic societies giddy, gave, on the contrary, a tremendous impulse to the Particularistic societies, which were prepared to adapt themselves to the new conditions.

Thus England, long hindered and somewhat smothered by the traditions and institutions imported by the Norman invaders, is gradually taking possession of herself again, and returning to her Anglo-Saxon social constitution, to her Particularistic formation. Nothing henceforth can stop this unavoidable evolution.

And if you would see where this evolution leads to, con-



sider the American society in the States, where the Anglo-Saxon type is now re-forming in all its purity and power, thanks to the large extent of territories opened to individual enterprise, thanks also to the absence of an hereditary superior class imposed on the people by conquest.

## CHAPTER IV.

## HOW HIS MODE OF HOME-LIFE CONTRIBUTES TO THE ANGLO-SAXON'S SUCCESS.

THE great difficulty which confronts those who would find the right bearings and lead society towards a better state, is how to make out—not only what the final goal ought to be, but also the way to get there. What is the good of knowing the end if we cannot reach it? Moreover, through not knowing exactly the way, we may get to an end totally different from that intended.

To fix a starting-point, and show what the first stage ought to be, is therefore putting the reader on the right track.

During my different sojourns in England I was much occupied with the grave question of the evolution of the social types. The country was a singularly good one for observations of this kind, for there is not perhaps on the surface of the globe another where are to be found, in close association, so many varieties of the Communistic and Particularistic formations.

A very varied scale is to be found in the United States, too, but I fancy in conditions less favourable for observation. There indeed the different types appear outside their native sphere, having been uprooted, so to say, from a hundred spots in old Europe, so that their origin is at times doubtful; their evolution takes place amidst fresh surroundings, and they are still subjected to a process of social fermentation which keeps them—if I may so say—in a state of suspense.

In England, the fermentation has long been over. The Communistic Celt and Particularistic Anglo-Saxon are fixed into their natural social forms, to the great convenience of the observer. In Great Britain, we come across specimens of the whole series of social types, from the pure Celt of the Scottish Highlands or of Ireland, to the Saxon of the South and Midlands, with all the intermediate varieties. How interesting it would be to be able to classify them in series, so as to determine the different stages of the evolution of a Communistic Celt, into a Particularistic Saxon!

Great Britain is indeed like a gigantic still in which, by a process of continuous distillation, the Celts are being gradually Saxonized in virtue of this law—that when two social types are brought together, the more resisting tends to assimilate the other. Here, the more resisting is undoubtedly the Saxon.

England is therefore the best place for conveniently examining the initial manifestation of that evolution towards the Particularistic State. At what point of his social life does the Celt begin to feel Saxon influence? What perceptible phenomenon announces that a Communistic subject is actually entering on his evolution, and therefore already constitutes a Particularistic variety—if I may so say—in the first degree?

I do not think I am mistaken in stating that the first manifestation of the evolution is to be found in the mode of a man's home-life.

I had a first perception of this fact in the environs of Edinburgh, whilst visiting the coal-mine and the farm, to which I have before alluded. I mentioned the contrast\* presented, even at the first glance, by two kinds of dwellings: the first, inhabited by Scotch workmen of the Low-

\* *Vide* preceding chapter, p. 117.

lands, and kept with extreme care; the other, occupied by Irish (Celtic) workmen, dirty and miserable-looking.

This contrast called my attention to the importance of the home as a starting-point in the social evolution.

This is indeed the starting-point, for these Scotch workmen of the Lowlands still partake of their original Communistic formation.\* But the most obvious point in which they part from it, and are to be distinguished from the Irish pure Communists and the Highlanders, is the instinctive desire to form a comfortable home. These Scotch workmen are Communistic subjects on the way to become Individualists in the first stage of the evolution, and their mode of home-life is what essentially distinguishes them.

Thus was I brought to realize that the first step in the evolution towards the Particularistic State is the transformation of the home.

## I.

Many economists, sociologists, and philanthropists have clearly seen and pointed out the social importance of the home. Le Play saw it better and more clearly than any other writer, and described the phenomenon at length, bringing to bear on it a wealth of facts.

The *stability of the home*, the *ownership of the home*, the *integral transmission of the home*, have often been pointed out as essential reforms towards the improvement of individuals, families, and societies.

These three points, indeed, would constitute important reforms, and often are evidence of perceptible improvement in the social state. But they have no effect in aiding the evolution from the Communistic to the Particularistic form.

Proof positive of this is to be found in the fact that

\* See the articles of M. de Calan on the Scotch Highlanders and Lowlanders in *La Science Sociale*, tomes XIX. and XX.

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numerous examples of the three points (stability, ownership, and integral transmission of the home) are to be found indifferently in the two social states. We may therefore be allowed to say that such examples are neutral phenomena.

If we look closely at things, we may be led to state that these three points are at times more accentuated among Communistic populations than others.

There cannot be under heaven any homes more stable than those of the Russian, Bulgarian, or Servian peasants; these homes have been transmitted from father to son, or at least from community to community, since time immemorial. In France, the home is most stable in Auvergne, in the Cevennes, in the Pyrenees, in the Alps, and in Brittany. Now, these populations are precisely those which in our country preserve best the Communistic traditions.

It is also to these populations, or to populations of the same type, that we must turn to find the most general practice of the principles of ownership and integral transmission of the home.

In order to clearly realize the distinction, we should recognize two quite distinct notions of the home, the one proper to Communistic races, the other peculiar to Particularistic races.

The first considers the home as a *material* thing.

The second considers the home as a *moral* thing, an abstraction.

Without this distinction, which has never been made before, we could not account with any exactness for the two fundamental forms of home-life.

In societies of a Communistic formation, the idea of home is represented by a property—whether dwelling or estate—and a group of persons, which includes relatives, friends, and neighbors. The people are attached most to the *place* and the *persons*; the more so because in their social

state they are inclined to lean on things and persons rather than on self.

There is a popular saying in Auvergne and in the Pyrenees, which goes, "The house must go on smoking." Indeed, to keep the chimney-pot smoking, they are capable of any sacrifice. The younger sons accept reductions in their lawful shares of the patrimony; uncles and aunts remain single in order not to prevent the chosen heir preserving the house and estate, where perhaps they shall be granted shelter, and where at any rate they may find help.

Upon the whole, their idea of home seems connected with such a house, such and such a particular place—which explains the hardship they experience in having to leave it: they seem attached to the soil and to the very stones. Hence the strong love of those peasants for the paternal house and the family property, hence their desire to preserve it and transmit it from generation to generation.

In this way do they hold for the stability of the home, for its ownership within the family, for its integral transmission. They are attached to it as ivy is attached to an old wall; and, as a matter of fact, they are in a way supported by the house, as the ivy by the wall.

But—mark this well—in this traditional home, on this family property, Communistic populations seek or find little comfort. Nothing could be more striking for the close observer than the contrast between the extraordinary stability of the home and the very rudimentary character of their installations.

Enter the home of a Russian peasant, or that of a Bulgarian, an Auvergnat, a Pyrenean, a Provençal, or a Breton, and question the man. Nine times out of ten he will tell you that his family has occupied the house for generations. Here is the stability of a home with a vengeance! Indeed, the man loves his home with a love that cannot be uprooted.



But look at the interior of the house. Why, it is like the encampment of some family who have had no time to fix themselves—a few ill-kept articles of furniture in a kitchen and one other room; both rooms dark and dirty. Very often there is but one room—kitchen, dining-room, and bedroom combined—for the whole family. Sometimes the stable is close to the living-room, barely separated from it by a mere plank partition, through which a peculiar smell betrays the undesirable vicinity. So these people, who are so fond of their homes, do not seem to care for comfort within.

The fact is, they do not love the home for its own sake, but for the support it will offer them, for the good name it helps them to keep. They are proud to belong to such and such a family, which has been fixed so long in the country, which has owned so long the same patrimonial estate and is connected by marriage with other families whose homes are as old and as stable.

If they own a fine chest of drawers, choke full of linen and clothes—as is often the case with these peasants—that is because this personal and visible luxury is but another means of shining out-of-doors, and giving the neighbours or strangers a high idea of their position. This is of more moment to them than to enjoy real comfort inside their house. Upon the whole, the Communist lives more out-of-doors and for others, than at home and for himself.

This tendency is quite perceptible among the *bourgeois* in our large towns, although as a rule the stability of the home has then disappeared.

The characteristic type of the Parisian home is the large house composed of many stories and numerous flats (*apartements*). When beholding from the street these five and six-storied palaces, a stranger might be tempted to think, "Here are grand establishments! These people

must be sacrificing everything for home-life." But go inside: entrance is easy enough. The house is composed of compartments, with as many families as there are stories, sometimes more families than stories. The place is crowded. Well, enter one of the *appartements*. You will see first the drawing-room and the dining-room; these two rooms are rather large, well decorated, and generally overlook the street. The bedrooms you will find at the back of the house—small, very small rooms, overlooking a courtyard, which is more like a huge well, admitting no air and no light. Such is the home of the family—the bedrooms, *not* the front rooms, which are reserved for show, and are called the "reception rooms."

The *bourgeois*, like the peasant and the workman, in this social type—has no notion of comfort in the home.

Comfort in the home is, on the contrary, the first consideration developed by the Particularistic formation.

That is because man here does not lean on the community, on his family or circle of connections; he relies on himself alone, and provides a home for himself. He settles himself—he does not *camp*. He gives less to out-of-door life, and more to home-life. He has a way of looking upon his home as the citadel of his independence. He names it by a name which expresses much more than his house, and which, as it has no equivalent in French, I cannot translate—*Home*.

This Saxon word evokes an idea less material and definite than our own word *le foyer*, "the hearth." It means rather the interior arrangement, the comfort of every-day life, which is characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon home, whether in the farmhouse, town dwelling, or workman's cottage.

I am not praising this form of home. I am only endeavouring to realize its import and to describe it. Two utterly different forms of society start their respective evolution

from this point, and in contrary directions. Surely we must do our best to see things as clearly as possible.

These two different notions of the home bring forth two facts which shed a good deal of light on the subject.

1. *In the Particularistic form the dwelling assumes less importance than in the Communistic form of society.*

The Particularistic dwelling *par excellence* is what goes in France by the English name of "cottage," which we understand to be a small country house, comprising just the number of rooms necessary for an ordinary family. This house is generally completed by a garden whose size corresponds to the financial position of the family.

In England, these houses are scattered all over the country, being thicker, of course, in the neighbourhood and environs of large towns; for your citizen is fond of living *extra muros*. Even within the towns a little house for each family is the rule—an arrangement well representative of the idea of home amongst the Anglo-Saxon race. This explains the large area of English towns in proportion to their population.

On the other hand, the Communistic dwelling is a large house with large rooms, devised not for one, but for several families living in a state of community. Such are the Italian houses; such are, in our provincial towns, many large dwelling-houses in which the smaller families of later days appear as lost; such are also our country *châteaux*. How many families, unless they follow the wiser course of cantoning themselves in one wing of these enormous buildings, nowadays go to ruin, solely through wishing to keep up these white elephants!

Compare these large buildings and *châteaux* to the little English houses, and you will clearly see one of the characteristic differences between the two social forms.

2. *In the Particularistic form of society, families find it easier to shift their dwellings.*

Communists are, as we have seen, deeply attached to the family dwelling; their stay-at-home propensities are natural enough when we think that they draw the greater part of their strength from that material framework.

The Particularist, on the contrary, finds it extremely easy to change his surroundings. He shows no hesitation, when opportunity offers of bettering his position, in changing his residence, even from one end of the world to the other. That is because he looks more to the future than to the past, because he relies more on his own individual enterprise than on any traditional or family institutions. Indeed, his origin is responsible for the little country house in which he lives, for man is less held by a small dwelling than by a large one: he is master of the house, not the house of his master. He is not attached to the stones, nor the stones to him.

Is this, then, the instability of the home?

Not so. The Particularist's home is as stable as that of the Communist, although in a different way. To understand this apparent contradiction we should remember the distinction already drawn between the character of the exterior of the dwelling and that of the interior. With the Communist, the stability of the home refers to the exterior dwelling; with the Particularist the stability concerns the interior installation. The Communist always looks as if he were only encamped on his traditional habitation; the Particularist seems as though he had been fixed for centuries into his transitory dwelling. His installation is always comfortable, even if it be but for a few days at some hotel (the English, as is well known, have caused all the hotels on the Continent to be improved), even if it be but for a few hours in a railway carriage—a fact that has won them the reputation of making themselves always comfortable (*ne pas se gêner*)! What is paramount with the English-

man is comfort—and who would contend that comfort within the home is not as important as the beams and the very walls? Who will tell us that a man's comfort is not closely connected with his daily life, or that it does not exert the strongest influence over his social life?

There are two kinds of stability: one material, and the other moral; the first is much more important than the other. *Quod est demonstrandum.*

## II.

It must be so, since a proper and comfortably furnished home is the first phenomenon exhibited by men who are beginning their evolution towards the Particularistic form. At first blush, the cause of this transformation is not quite clear to the observer. The cause must be elucidated.

I perceive three social consequences of such a mode of home-life. It will be seen that these consequences tend to endow the man with the qualities essential to the Particularistic formation.

1. *Such a mode of home-life develops feelings of dignity and independence.*

Represent to yourself as exactly as possible the shabby shelter of the Irish workmen just alluded to, or the no less rudimentary hovels of most of our own labourers or workmen; try to call to mind some such examples which you may have seen. Imagine people brought up from childhood amidst such surroundings, and living day by day in what is often little better than a wigwam. Evidently such surroundings can hardly foster feelings of independence.

A man is more or less what he looks. A good many people have no other dignity than that conferred upon them by the clothes they don—whether the magistrate's gown, the soldier's uniform, or any of those plumes, laces, and



decorations which appeal to mankind, and under which men take themselves so much *au sérieux*. Such influences are not to be disdained.

The influence of a proper dwelling is most powerful, being exercised, as it is, over the most intimate portion of a man's life, and being of a permanent effect.

No doubt the labourer whose abode I visited at H. . . . ., and the Penicuik mechanic who gave me tea, were directly and powerfully influenced by the tidiness and comfort in their homes. The relative affluence of their circumstances gave them a higher opinion of themselves and a keener notion of their own dignity and independence. Whenever either entered his bonny cottage, he felt a responsible member of society, and conscious—as the English have it—of his respectability.

Now, a man who is conscious of his respectability is naturally inclined to increase it; for the first step of the ladder is the most difficult to climb, and those men had already climbed it.

2. *Such a mode of home-life encourages exertion.*

Populations accustomed to simplicity of living and to scanty accommodation in their homes, are satisfied with little; small profits are good enough for them. Their ambition is limited and easily contented. Mediocrity, not necessarily golden, is the fashion among them. Not so here. A more ornate way of living, a certain fastidiousness in the appointment of his home, provoke the man to exert himself, and keep him up to it.

He is the better kept up to it because the result of his work is always near at hand. I can well fancy my Penicuik mechanic anxious to acquire a side-board, a piano for his wife, or a large carpet to adorn his parlour; of course, his anxiety to get these objects is a stimulus: he'll work the harder and puzzle his brain to find out how he may increase



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his returns. The thousands of workmen who in England and in America attend and pay the fees of the University Extension Lectures, are living proofs of that tendency to exert themselves: they do not shrink from this overtime study in order to improve their positions.

You may tell me that the passion of economy which distinguishes part of our working population is also a stimulus to work and exertion. True; but it is not such a powerful stimulus. If you save for your children, you are working for others who will gather the fruits of your efforts only after your death. This requires almost heroism—an attribute by no means common in human beings. If you save for yourself, with a view to investing the money, you will soon be discouraged, especially if you are a workman, owing to the largeness of the sums needed if the increase in the income is to be at all perceptible. It wants a great many days' work for a workman to put by one hundred francs, which only means an increase of three francs in his yearly income. This result is too feeble and too far off—not worth the exertion. Indeed, with all the institutions founded to promote thrift in the working classes, how small are the results! Without any encouragement on the part of the Government, the Anglo-Saxon workman succeeds in investing in comfort considerably larger sums.

That is money spent, not saved, you will say. Spent, yes; but not wasted. Indeed that money has been invested at a very high interest—not three per cent., but a hundred per cent.—it has been invested in the increase of his work-power.

This man, who bought a side-board, a piano, a carpet, enjoys his money's worth, the fruit of his work, *immediately, integrally, and daily*. Place side by side the enjoyment reaped by a man who, having put by £4, has the satisfaction to receive one half-crown interest every year, and the

enjoyment secured by a man who having put by £4 immediately purchases the object he wants, or the greater comfort of his home and his own daily enjoyment.

Such a satisfaction encourages and incites him to fresh efforts in order to procure a larger and more comfortable residence, or of improving his present position. Every improvement in his home is an inducement to make it still more complete, more beautiful, more refined; he becomes more and more fastidious, and as his work is the only means of providing for his increasing wants, he is the more inclined to greater activity.

And as aptness for continuous effort is one of the essential traits which accentuate the difference between the Particularist and the Communist, this man is therefore gradually evolving into a Particularist. So the mode of home-life marks the genesis of this evolution.

You may be curious to know what would become of that man in case of illness, and what would become of his family if he died. In order to provide against these two contingencies, he insures (you know the prodigious development of Assurance in Great Britain and in the United States); then, feeling safe against the worst, he is at liberty to pursue his improvements in domestic installation.

### 3. *Such a mode of home-life refines the individual.*

I wish to call the reader's attention most particularly to this consequence. It is, perhaps, most characteristic of the Particularistic form, and distinguishes it best from the Communistic. As yet no light has been shed on it, for its discovery proceeds from the foregoing observations on the Anglo-Saxon home.

The Communistic formation naturally produces an essentially narrow hierarchy; the limits of rank and classes are definitely fixed, and passage from an inferior to a superior class is very difficult. The workman is at great

pains to become a *bourgeois*, and if he succeeds in doing so through sheer wealth, he remains a workman in manners and bearing in his habits, his tastes, and his way of living. He is not easily fashioned into a gentleman; he is not inclined to refinement. This is to be explained by the fact that his social rise is generally due to the saving power whose cause I have mentioned. Now, the instruments of such economy are principally a narrow, mean way of living and all kinds of privations; saving is practised in the dwelling, in the clothing, in the furniture, in recreation. The men who most rapidly rise to fortune are those that save most—*i.e.* the men who live most like beggars. And when such men have acquired wealth, they go on living like beggars, for habit has made such a life a necessity and a satisfaction for them.

I have been enabled to study a most representative example in the case of a provincial manufacturer. This man began forty years ago as a pedlar; he used to sell whips and sundry light articles of saddlery which he hawked from place to place. When he had realized a sufficient sum of money, he purchased a small foundry with hydraulic motor, and began to manufacture for himself the bits and different metal articles pertaining to his trade. When I knew him, towards the end of his life, he employed about forty workmen, and had bought with his savings a country estate of some two hundred and fifty acres, besides three or four neighbouring houses, and considerable stock in his foundry. He died a short time ago, and so did his wife, without leaving any children. His fortune, valued at 400,000 or 500,000 francs (between £16,000 and £20,000 sterling), was divided amongst his nephews and nieces. Well, this man lived to the end like a workman—(a pretty use of fortune!); he had preserved the language, manners, and dress of a workman—and I mean here the language of a vulgar work-

man—vulgar manners, and careless dress, to say nothing more. I often saw him filing his own goods like one of his hands. This man had achieved wealth, and yet had not succeeded in rising in the social hierarchy.

Why? Simply because he had not imbibed from childhood, in his father's house, a habit of dignity, nor the need of a comfortable life, with the manners that accord with it.

Among the different types met with in French society there is one, the Auvergnat, who is gifted with a remarkable aptitude for trade, and a no less remarkable tendency to economy. It is not my business here to investigate the causes of these qualities. The Auvergnat, who by dint of saving halfpence often succeeds in acquiring a certain amount of wealth, never succeeds in rising above the position of a retailer, and succeeds even less in refining himself. He persists always in his habits of the peasants of Auvergne, who—I appeal to all who have visited Auvergne—are hardly distinguished by *tenue*, cleanliness, or good manners. The dwelling of an Auvergne peasant is the most primitive and—to call things by their names—the dirtiest you can imagine. We know (M. de Rousiers and myself) how difficult it was on our part to partake of a few meals amongst them, and how hard we found it to surmount the repugnance natural to civilized man. We were in need indeed of all the will-power inspired by a scientific desire to closely observe social phenomena.

Notwithstanding their sobriety and habits of thrift, such a home training is what nullifies in part the commercial abilities of most Auvergnats, and decidedly disqualifies them for any social progress. This phenomenon is exhibited most strikingly in the monograph, *l'Auvergnat brocanteur à Paris*.\* “Second-hand dealers may be classified into two categories: the Auvergnats and the Normans. Both

\* “Ouvriers des Deux Mondes,” t. iv., pp. 311, 312.

kinds are abstemious and thrifty, and keep apart from the Parisian workmen, whose habits of dissipation they dislike (I should think so!). . . . The Auvergnat buys old clothes, and especially old hats and shoes; but he is not so good an expert as his competitor, and always shows distrust of him whenever they are called together in a house to conclude a bargain. The Norman is *shrewder and more polite*, and, thanks to his better manners and *outward appearance*, inspires more confidence; he is *better dressed*, and *speaks more civilly*; his superior skill enables him *to triumph over his competitor under nearly all circumstances*. In consequence, the Auvergnat, in spite of his tenacity and perseverance, is yielding to the Norman the lucrative trade of second-hand clothes, and falling back on rags, bones, old iron, and rabbits' skins."

This mere detail is a good indication of how a rude home training prevents a man from rising even in trade, which does not require a very high education. No doubt a certain amount of comfort in these people's homes would be a safe investment.

That is precisely the investment which lies in the Particularistic home of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Let us return to our workmen of the environs of Edinburgh. They have been brought up, and bring up their children, in homes which, if modest, at any rate impart to them a certain dignity in their modes of habitation, costume, language, and manners. They are, perhaps, not yet refined men, but they have passed the first process of refinement, and are ripe for further progress. Let their opportunity of improvement only arise (their aptitude for work soon brings that to pass), and they can do full honour to their new position. At any rate, they have not within themselves an obstacle to their own progress.

In short, such a mode of home life, even among the work-



ing classes, makes men fit to become gentlemen who will not be out of place when brought into any superior positions they may in the future be called to fill.

I am almost tempted to write—the fact strikes me as so obvious, and my experience has been so general and conclusive, that the Particularistic formation does not admit of an hereditary inferior class, as is the case with the Communistic formation. That is precisely why Particularist populations are more advanced towards the solution of the social question, and particularly of the Working-Class question (*la question ouvrière*).

I will only state three topical indications of that tendency to rise.

The first is found in the small number of domestic servants produced by the Anglo-Saxon race. In England, and in the United States, these inferior situations are generally filled by persons of a Celtic, German, or Latin origin. There are the Anglo-Saxon governesses, of course—but that is a superior and refined domestic occupation—and some actual servants, whose Anglo-Saxon origin is not doubtful; but most of these are workmen's daughters, who go into service for a time only, with the aim of learning house-keeping in a higher sphere, before starting a home of their own.

The second indication lies in the fact that so many thousands of men, although sprung from the working classes, and having themselves exercised a manual trade, reach the highest positions without appearing out of place, and figure quite decently in the characters of gentlemen. This fact was presented in *La Science Sociale*, when treating of the leaders of the Working-Class party who have seats at Westminster, and who are themselves workmen.\* It is known

\* *Vide La Science Sociale*, Oct., 1893, Dec., 1894, and July and Nov., 1895.



that Mr. Cleveland, late President of the United States, commenced life as a grocer's boy; he had to sweep the rooms, split wood, light the fires, etc. Lord Glasgow, Governor of New Zealand, at the age of thirteen, was a cabin-boy on board ship. The illustrious Benjamin Franklin began as a workman. What surprises us is, not that these men rise from low places to very high ones, but that there are so many of them, and especially that their modest origin does not leave the indelible stains visible in our own self-made men. I declare that this is an extraordinary phenomenon, and that the explanation of it is to be found in the Anglo-Saxon mode of home life, even that of the working-man.

My third fact is most characteristic in its own way. You know that many railway trains in England have no second-class carriages attached to them, because the public have fallen into a habit of leaving them untenanted. On the other hand, the number of first-class passengers, according to statistics which I have before me, is, in proportion to the traffic, considerably less than on the Continent. Moreover, even as I am writing this, I hear that one of the principal British railway companies is considering the advisability of suppressing first-class carriages all over their system, and that the appointed committee of inquiry has approved the measure, on account of the small number of passengers that avail themselves of the first-class accommodation. *À propos* of this, people mention the case of the Duke of Cumberland, a relative of the Queen, who always goes third class.

Economy is not the reason of this, for the English and Americans are generally given to liberal expenditure. On the other hand, the French, who are not so rich and of an essentially saving temperament, furnish a proportionately larger percentage of first-class passengers. We must there-

fore look for another reason. The only one I can see is the difference in the bearing and manners of the Anglo-Saxon lower classes, as compared with the same classes on the Continent. We object to travel in the company of people whose dress is poor and manners vulgar or offensive; whereas the greater dignity displayed by men of the lower class belonging to the Anglo-Saxon race makes this contact unobjectionable. Here is a very striking proof of what I have advanced: the French companies have been induced to issue mixed tickets; second class for the part of the journey made in France, and third class for the English part.

We may add that the English, although they travel mostly third class, do not renounce their habits of comfort; for the companies, thoughtful of public wants, have made the third-class compartments much more comfortable than our second class—on some lines, in fact, almost as luxurious as our first. Their carriages are, besides, kept cleaner.

From these facts we may conclude that comfort in the home does, as a consequence, fit individuals of modest positions for higher situations, in which their bearing and manners shall not make them appear out of place. Its tendency is therefore to suppress an hereditary lower class—the blot of Communistic societies.

But this statement implies a practical consequence on which I must say a word.

### III.

The social problem is not solved by tendering assistance to individuals any more than the secret of life consists in keeping ourselves alive by dint of swallowing drugs. Neither assistance nor drugs are a natural or a normal means of sustaining life. It is true wisdom to manage without such artificial aids.

There is no other solution to the problem than to place individuals in a position to sustain *themselves* and to rise by themselves. Social salvation (as I have said elsewhere) is like eternal salvation—an essentially personal affair; every one must shift for himself. This maxim of mine does not agree with the views of politicians and other gentry who make a living out of the general incapacity, and whose interest is that individuals should be maintained in a perpetual state of inferiority so as to be the more easily led. But science takes no account of such considerations; she ignores them, and follows the straight path traced by facts.

We have just ascertained that a more satisfactory mode of home-life is the first condition necessary to develop the aptitude for progress in Communistic races, when in contact with Particularistic populations.

There is no such contact that we may avail ourselves of in France; but it is not difficult to supply this deficiency by an exact knowledge of facts. What is unconsciously realized, with the help of mere example, by the *élite* of Scotch or Irish workmen in Great Britain, and by the best class of emigrants from old Europe in America, can be done by ourselves, consciously, and with the help of scientific resources.

It is for our middle classes, our *bourgeoisie*, to begin this evolution by themselves—and for their own sakes. They spend at present a good deal of energy and money in living outside their homes and increasing their circle of everyday acquaintances. They feel a deep aversion to living in the country, because the relations of exterior life are there more difficult. In their homes, they spend all their cares on the sumptuous furnishing of the reception-rooms, and consider as superfluous any comfort in the rooms used for family life. They make the home as forbidding to their

children as to themselves, by not consecrating to them a special room—the nursery, where they would feel “at home” and go through their first early apprenticeship of independence. The children are the principal victims of the French home system.

It would seem that our homes are really organized more for strangers than for ourselves.

This must be changed. Our course of action must be reversed. We must fall back on private life, make it our fortress, and an exceedingly comfortable fortress. Private life is an unrecognized but formidable power; no social recovery is possible unless this be realized.

Our *bourgeoisie* can go through this evolution by themselves, provided they have the will, and each man must decide for himself. But the working classes cannot do it; they cannot proceed on scientific principles. They are, besides, too far off the goal; and not having the stimulus offered by the contact just alluded to, they are in need of help.

Here I would address more particularly those persons who are given to good works. Most often they assist and patronize the workman very much at random, and when they do not end merely in paralyzing the workman's capacity to rise by himself, their efforts as a rule end in very poor results. Every kind of assistance which does not enable the poor to assist themselves becomes a curse.

Our problem is, therefore, to enable the working classes to rise by themselves, by encouraging among them a better mode of home and private life.

I have been watching lately with keen interest an attempt of this kind undertaken by a friend of mine. There is, in the immediate neighbourhood of his estate, a factory which employs about fifty hands. A score of families are lodged in the vicinity of the works, in dwellings which they hire

at rentals of 50 to 60 francs per annum (£2 to £3)—and certainly they are not worth a penny more: they are absolute hovels. The doors and windows do not properly shut, which makes dwelling there horrible in winter; and at all seasons the dirt in these dog-holes is most repulsive. I do not mention the furniture, whose scantiness and filthy state beggar description. The worst is that part of this population, as too often happens, is given to drink.

Such is the *materia vilis* on which my friend undertakes to experiment, and you will acknowledge that our problem is there in all its intensity. The fact makes the experiment the more interesting.

Owing to his presence in the vicinity, and to the isolation inseparable from country life, a spontaneous contact or understanding was established between those people and my friend. It first came about in connection with some drugs which were asked of him for sick children. His wife was led to enter these homes, where she was gratefully received. She came back much concerned at their miserable state, and above all, with the state of the children, who lacked the most elementary attention in the matter of cleanliness and hygiene.

Her first care was to distribute some clothing, on the express condition that it should be taken good care of, and that the children should be washed and combed every day.

Relations with this population became more intimate by the organization of a daily lunch, to which all the workmen's children were invited. Decent dress on the part of each guest was *de rigueur*.

I have already described the appearance of the dwellings, the access to which was very bad. After the least rain, the path became a pool of water; at all times there was no other sewer than the path. I can assure you you could have met there with singular specimens of ragged humanity. Within



a month, the path was re-made, re-paved, its level raised and a gutter added on either side. At the entrance of the dwelling, my friend planted shrubs and flowers. This diminutive grove stands there as a "*leçon de choses*," and teaches the people better than a lecture, that the entrance to a habitation should be kept as attractive as the home itself. The people would seem to have taken it to heart, for several among them volunteered forthwith to keep the flower beds in order and well watered. This was not much, but it was sufficient to rouse and flatter their self-respect—a great point.

The question now is to deal with the dens of these poor people and transform them into respectable homes calculated to develop a feeling of dignity, homes in which the inmates may feel the blessings of comfort, and which they may be tempted to improve and beautify. I am aware that therein lies the great difficulty.

Owing to a favourable circumstance, a change of direction in the works, the workmen's dwellings are to be put—as the phrase goes—"in a thorough state of repair." That will be a useful thing towards instilling into these good people the wish to improve their mode of home-life. My friend follows this evolution with interest; he will help according to his means, and he will note carefully the results obtained. Phenomena are best observed on a limited scale.

Some may believe that the chief difficulty will be found in the scanty means of a working population. This opinion is not justified by facts. Among these families, there is one whose miserable condition is more appalling than the average: their home is of the shabbiest, their children—six of them—are the most ragged, they are always short of money, and ever drawing advances from their employer; in short, they are overwhelmed with debts, and part of



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their salaries is stopped by creditors—a practice which is not lawful in England. The wife, after a day's work at the house of my friend, begged to be paid at once the two francs due to her, as she had not a penny at home. To advise people so situated to go to any expense towards improving their domestic surroundings, would look like a joke. *Prius est vivere*—and indeed they find it hard enough to do that.

Now, from the director's pay-book, this is what this family receives every month from the works in the way of salaries:

Father	...	...	...	...	90 francs.
Mother	...	...	...	...	60 „
Eldest son (19)	...	...	...	...	70 „
Eldest daughter (18)	...	...	...	...	30 „
Total per month ...					250 „

So this family of eight—four of whom work—live miserably in the country, with a yearly return of 3000 francs (£120)! Yet they only pay 50 francs (£2) rent, which includes the use of the garden, where they might raise vegetables. This pitiable state is the more extraordinary inasmuch as this family have never been out of work: they have been connected with the factory for the last fifteen years; and if, through the successive births of the children, their charges have been gradually increasing, so have their salaries.

We cannot explain such a state of things unless we agree to a fact which I should like very much to demonstrate some day—*i.e.* that the social question is not merely a question of salaries, as is often said, but also a question of conduct. If it were but a question of salaries, it would be beautifully solved by this family—which is pretty far from being the case.

It is misconduct, and principally their inveterate habits of intemperance, which condemn those people to poverty. And the case is more frequent than is supposed. There are as many holes in workmen's budgets as in the budgets of the middle class.

Our *bourgeois* live meanly, either to satisfy their taste for society and dress, or to be able to save for their children. Our workmen live miserably, in order to satisfy many useless, illusory, or sinful desires.

It is not so much that they lack money as the want of knowledge how to use it.

The most judicious use of money—all this tends to prove it—is to form for one's self first of all as pleasant and comfortable a home as is consistent with our means. Money thus spent is money safely invested.

Such a use of money does not only obviate other and much heavier expense, but develops man's dignity in the highest degree, a feeling of independence, the habit of exertion, and a progressive tendency.

When a man possesses these fundamental qualities, he has resolved the social question on his own account, and becomes his own master and independent of others.



## BOOK III.

### THE FRENCHMAN AND THE ANGLO-SAXON IN PUBLIC LIFE.

THE contrast we have just drawn between the French and Anglo-Saxon types, in the School and in private life, is also to be found in public life. The following essays point out—and explain—this further contrast.

We shall make clear the principal causes of the actual superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race in triumphing over the difficulties of the struggle for existence. At the same time, we shall show what we ought to do to hold our own against the threatening expansion of that race.

## CHAPTER I.

THE POLITICAL *PERSONNEL* IN FRANCE AND IN ENGLAND.

## I.

VIEWED from outside, all legislative assemblies are more or less alike. The spectator who from a gallery beholds the German Reichstag, the English House of Commons, the Italian Assembly, or the French Chamber of Deputies, has a pretty uniform impression.

If he were to judge from that outside impression he might conclude that the respective Governments of these countries are about the same; that all enjoy about the same parliamentary institutions; that the principal difference lies in the varied proportions of the divers parties.

Our spectator has seen "those things that can be seen," as Bastiat would say. But there are also the things that are not visible to the naked eye—and these things it is essentially important to know.

What is not noticed, not being apparent to the eye, is the different social categories from which national representatives are chosen, and the proportion of the different professions represented in Parliament.

Now, this is an all-important element of information. It is indeed obvious that every man owes to his profession some special ideas and abilities, and a particular manner of looking at things. The farmer, the manufacturer, the physician, the soldier, the official, have been through different trainings; they do not consider things from the same standpoint; they do not represent the same interests. On

the other hand, these interests are not all equally important from a social point of view; at any rate, they do not manifest themselves in the same way; they may even lie in totally opposite directions.

As a result, the elements of a country's national representation may be quite different from those of any other country, and as a rule they depend on its social state, on the prestige or influence of such or such professions in that country.

Another result will be found in the way of thinking and in the acts of a nation's representatives, which acts are sure to be influenced by the different professions which may be in a majority within the House.

We shall realize this by analyzing the different elements which compose our own Chamber of Deputies.

It was not until I had been through a long and laborious task that I was enabled to ascertain this composition, which nobody as yet had been at pains to sort and group with some method. I had to study one after the other the biographies of our deputies, and to note their essential traits, so as to finally establish a classification by professions.

Here it is:—\*

Professions.	Left.	Right.	Total.	Grand Total.	Recapitulation.
Country land-owners	8	17	22	72	Agriculture, 72
Agriculturists ...	13	37	50		
Manufacturers ...	27	14	41	41	Industry, 41
Merchants ...	14	3	17	22	Commerce, 22
Bankers ...	2	3	5		

\* I had to renounce classifying 43 deputies, who seem to be without any definite professions. Among these are six workmen who ought to appear under the head Journalists. Of some deputies I could not succeed in getting any information; but this will not modify the general classification. The Chamber elected since I first



Professions.	Left.	Right.	Total.	Grand Total.	Recapitulation.
Teachers attached to the University ...	12	0	12	12	Liberal professions, 270
Physicians ...	47	3	50	53	
Pharmaceutical chemists ...	3	0	3		
Civil engineers ...	5	2	7	7	
Journalists ...	54	5	59	59	
Professors of Law ...	5	1	6	139	
Solicitors ...	14	3	17		
Attorneys ...	9	0	9		
Barristers ...	81	26	107		
Clergy ...	1	1	2	2	Clergy, 2
Army officers ...	1	2	3	6	Army and Navy, 6
Navy officers ...	0	3	3		
Magistrates ...	12	11	23	95	Officials, 95
Officials ...	39	33	72		
No profession ...	22	21	43	43	No profession, 43

Let us reduce these figures to a graphic representation which may make them more easily realizable, and show more clearly the proportion in which each profession is represented. The table that follows is divided from top to bottom by dotted lines: the numbers inscribed at the ends of these lines indicate the numbers of members.

When looking at this table one is first struck by its irregularity, which comes from the considerable disproportion between the professions.


What strikes one next is the fact that the commoner professions—agriculture, industry, commerce—have but a scanty representation; whereas the liberal professions and public officials constitute the greater part of the national representation.

These two facts will be the more striking when compared to the similar table which we furnish of the English Parliament. This study, presents about the same composition. Representatives of the liberal professions are even more numerous: 286 instead of 270.

ment. The latter table gives very fairly the proportional representation of the different professions in Great Britain.\*

The majority of representatives attached to the agricultural profession † would be even larger in the English table, if we had taken into account the House of Lords, which is almost exclusively composed of agricultural land-owners. In France, on the contrary, the Senate has about the same composition as the Chamber of Deputies.

### COMPOSITION OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.



Now that we can see at one glance the *ensemble*, let us take one by one each profession.


\* I drew up this table from "The New House of Commons," *Pall Mall Gazette* Office, London. I completed it from personal information.

† Read in Taine's "Notes sur l'Angleterre" the remarkable pages in which he explains why the English find in the landed gentry their most "natural representatives" and accordingly send them to Parliament, pp. 216-224.

## II.

I placed agriculture, industry, and commerce at the base of the table—so to say, at the base of the pyramid—because these three commoner professions represent the essential work, which procures the daily bread, and upon which all other work depends. When these three essential professions suffer, the whole social body suffers; when they de-

## COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.



cay, the whole social body decays likewise, as is the case with the human body if it cease to be nourished.

A society may, if absolutely necessary, live on without barristers, without journalists, without solicitors, without physicians, without officials; but it cannot live on without the farmers, who provide the food; nor without the manufacturers, who fashion the objects of essential use; nor without the traders, who distribute all indispensable goods in the spots where a demand exists or arises.

Now, what does our table reveal?

It shows us that the three essential professions are very scantily represented. This is serious; but it will appear

more serious still, if, going further into our analysis, we examine separately each of the three professions.

Agriculture should be considered as the base; it is more essential to the nation than industry and commerce, not only because it provides men with food, but because it is the most stable of all professions.

It is as stable as the very soil. It is not, like industry and commerce, subject to sudden changes. It is stable even to routine; indeed, we are in the habit of saying that the farmer is *routinier*.

At any rate, this stability makes of agriculture a strong base for a society; it forms a substratum of populations firmly attached to the soil and traditions of a country. It brings forth elements of order and duration.

Now, this substratum is far from being represented in our Parliament in due proportion to its social importance. Agriculture only counts 72 representatives, which seems very small when compared with the 270 representatives of the liberal professions.

Moreover, this small total must be still further reduced.

Indeed, I had to classify under agriculture the large land-owners who exercise no other lucrative profession. But they do not all occupy themselves with agricultural matters, nor do they all take an interest in agriculture, otherwise than to pocket their agricultural returns, or to make a great fuss about the agricultural crisis.

Of these deputies, 22 at least are agriculturists by name only. They reside in Paris; they sojourn but for a very short period each year in the country, and would be much embarrassed if any one were to question them on any farming subject, such as the best methods, the yield per acre of any portion of their land, the relative value of natural farm as compared with chemical manure, fattening processes, etc.

I had, therefore, in order to be precise, to distinguish

these by some peculiar sign; their proportion is shown in the table with a dotted line.

There are really in the Chamber but 50 agriculturists, and I do not even guarantee that every one of these has a full right to the title, or could successfully bear a close investigation.

It is not natural that a profession so important socially, and whose adepts are so numerous, should be so scantily represented in Parliament.

To explain such a result, so different from what is the rule in other countries, there must have been some powerful cause at work for a long time.

This cause is the desertion of agriculture by the large land-owners, and their giving up of their country for town residences. This general exodus, which was commenced two centuries ago by the great and noble land-owners, who came to be crowned under the Versailles roof, and transformed into courtiers, has since been continued by the country gentry.

There is no country perhaps where agriculture is so forsaken and discredited as it is in France. A French father cannot make up his mind to make a farmer of his son, unless he deems him incapable of undertaking any other career. To live on one's estates is considered the gloomiest exile. A Frenchman will prefer holding some small office at Barcelonnette to living at home in the country! In 1871, the Republican press, wishing to discredit a portion of the National Assembly, found it sufficient to call their adversaries "*les Ruraux*."

This ostrangement from the country and country life is so prevalent amongst us, that one of our bishops, who had been at one time a *curé* in Paris, said one day to a friend of mine, a member of his flock: "How is it that you subject yourself to living in the country and working your es-

tate yourself? You could so well, with your fortune, live in Paris!"

When such ideas are accepted by men of position, no wonder agriculture is not only insufficiently but badly represented in Parliament.

The large landlords have only themselves to thank for the discredit into which they have fallen in the eyes of the country electors, who in preference to them vote for physicians or lawyers, as we shall see.

I shall never forget a scene at which I was present at the house of the late M. Le Play. On the morrow of a general election, a large land-owner of the centre of France, an unsuccessful candidate for the Chamber, came to see him. This gentleman felt his failure the more keenly because his grandfather, his father, and himself had until then uninterruptedly represented the constituency. He therefore vented his grievance in bitter recriminations, blaming the ingratitude of the electors, the perversion of ideas, the progress of revolutionary tendencies, etc. Le Play interrupted him: "My dear count, where did your grandfather reside?" "On his estate; he very seldom came to Paris." "And your father?" "My father, after his marriage, was settled principally in Paris." "And yourself?" "So am I." "But, then," said Le Play, with his wonted bluntness, "your complaint against the electors does not appear to me to be justified. Consider that they remained faithful to your father and to yourself until this day, although you had ceased to reside among them, to busy yourself with their interests, to spend in the country the money you draw from the country. They got tired of this at last, and made choice of a man whom at least they see every day, and to whom they can go whenever they are in need of assistance or advice. This man has taken your place because that place has been deserted for the last two generations."



I do not remember again seeing that unsuccessful candidate at Le Play's after this.

His case is that of a great many others. Probably it will be also one day the case of the large land-owners whom the Western provinces still send to Parliament. If they have not been discarded yet, although most of them have deserted the country for Paris, that is because their fathers kept up longer than others the tradition of living in the country.

Industry and commerce, which are after agriculture the two most essential elements of national prosperity, are even more insufficiently represented in Parliament.

We find there only 41 manufacturers and 22 merchants.

Why is a class which employs so many men, and holds in its hand such large interests, so little represented in the Chamber?

They cannot, like our large land-owners, be accused of having deserted their profession. Industry and commerce require, even more than agriculture, the assiduous attention and presence of the master. If he goes away, or relaxes his attention even for a time, he is soon out-distanced by his competitors, and runs the risk of being ruined.

But this very necessity of constant attendance to business is incompatible with the system of our Assemblies.

In a centralized country such as ours, where all interests, even the most insignificant, are administered by a central power and debated by Parliament, the sessions are prolonged during the greatest part of the year. Their duration is made still longer by the character of the sittings, which—from causes to which I will allude further—are always subject to interruptions, idle digressions, personal recriminations, and frivolous or mischievous waste of time. All this makes it necessary for the Assembly to sit almost permanently.

Would you have manufacturers and merchants thus di-

vert their whole time from their more immediate concerns? They can hardly feel any hesitation in wholly abstaining from politics.

They are the more inclined to steer clear of politics because the position of a candidate for parliamentary honours is one fraught with little pleasantness for serious men accustomed to treat important business seriously. Such a position implies violent and unfair attacks, insults, and calumnies, on the part of the adverse press. It is indispensable, moreover, that a candidate should attend public meetings in which calmness and common sense are conspicuous by their absence. To be able to hold his own in presence of such audiences, a man must be accustomed to public speaking; he must be skilled in the art of flattery, prodigal of even the most impossible promises, and capable of the rankest declamation.

This is a *rôle* for which the management of large industrial or commercial concerns is no preparation. A good business man has no skill in, and no taste for, such antics.

Those business men who dare confront the ballot-box are generally men who have already made their pile and safely invested it, and thus are materially detached from industrial or commercial interests. Or else they are men who, having been hitherto unsuccessful in business, have not much to lose in giving it up.

And that is how the three essential and really national professions—agriculture, industry, and commerce—are, as it were, unrepresented, or at least but partially and poorly represented in the Chamber.

But, then, how are we at all represented?

## III.

If you will look again at the table of the Chamber of Deputies, you will see immediately above the three commoner professions an enormous rectangle, which widens the table out of all proportions.

The fact is, the liberal professions fill about half the national representation. They furnish 270 members—that is to say, twice the number furnished by agriculture, industry, and commerce *together*. In this group physicians, journalists, lawyers—and especially barristers—are in the majority.

Let us penetrate this mass and try to analyze its elements. Of physicians and chemists there are 53—nearly as many as agriculturists, and far more than manufacturers and merchants.

Can it be that the medical profession develops peculiar capabilities for curing the social body? Hard as we may try, we can see but little connection between medical and social therapeutics.

We are not aware that social prosperity is in direct proportion to the number of physicians in a community, as it is in direct proportion to the number and worth of agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants.

Do, then, physicians suffer more directly than the three commoner professions from the effects of political disorders and social revolutions? If it were so, physicians might be supposed to be more ready to avert public dangers.

But the contrary is the fact. Whilst the commoner professions are hindered and sometimes quite stopped by political crises, the medical profession is in no way affected. It lives on the physical miseries of human nature, not on social good order.

This great number of physicians in Parliament is the

more astonishing because the exercise of their art requires the strictest attendance. A doctor cannot absent himself without risking the loss of his *clientèle*. Patients do not wait.

Consequently medical deputies are most often physicians without patients. Those who have a numerous *clientèle* are too much interested in preserving it to compete for the suffrages of their fellow-citizens; they do not risk safe and lucrative positions for an uncertain and always precarious office. These physicians are not, therefore, the *élite* of the profession; and so do not make up a strong element in the national representation.

Why, then, are so many doctors sent to Parliament?

To explain this fact, we must first note two other facts.

First, most of these physicians have their seats on the Left. It is a remarkable thing indeed that out of 53 physicians and chemists, 50 belong to the Left, and only 3 to the Right.

The tendencies natural to the profession are not sufficient to account for such a disproportion. If the whole medical fraternity be considered, no such predominance of the Democratic element can be observed. From necessities inherent to their calling, physicians—in order to keep as wide as possible the circle of their clients—are rather inclined, as a rule, to keep away from politics.

You may tell me that this does not apply to physicians who are deputies, who are not the *élite* of their profession, and who generally have few patients. I agree to this. You may tell me, too, that they are soured by their inferiority, that they bear a grudge to society on that score, and consequently rush to the Opposition. I do not see why they should not range themselves on the Right side of the Opposition—which quite as much as the Left is at war with the social state. They would even then be able to accuse

the Government of being responsible for their professional failures. Besides, a proof that this is no cogent reason lies in the fact that the proportion of briefless barristers seems as large on the Right as on the Left of the Chamber.

What, then, is the explanation?

This is where our second fact comes in.

Most of these doctors are elected by rural constituencies.

You may wonder what this has to do in the matter. You will see that presently.

We know that large land-owners residing in the country are relatively few in France, and also few in the Chamber. The population, seeing nothing of them nowadays, becomes—very justly—disaffected; they will have nothing more to do with them. They feel that spending in towns the incomes drawn from the country does not constitute a sufficient title to parliamentary honours.

Now, these large country land-owners are essentially conservative: figures show this. Indeed, out of 72 deputies connected with agriculture, 51 have their seats on the Right, and only 22 on the Left. Mark well this proportion.

When these land-owners leave the country, they lose their influence; they lose it quite naturally to the advantage of their political adversaries of the Left, who are elected in their stead.

Now, who are these adversaries?

In other words, who are the men who in rural constituencies can substitute themselves to the failing landlords? What are they but physicians or lawyers?

Men of these professions obviously have wide influence. They see many people, have hold of family secrets, are able to render services—whether through gratuitous advice, or as money-lenders. Moreover, in the absence of the landlords, they represent the intellectual *élite* in the country.

It is therefore a logical sequence that they should get the suffrages.

That this explanation is true—and the only true one—is shown in the fact that the lawyers and physicians sit side by side. Out of 17 solicitors, 14 belong to the Left, and only 3 to the Right; of the 9 attorneys, all belong to the Left.

It is, then, quite true that men of these professions have only entered Parliament through the defection of the landlords. In those parts where the landlords have kept their action and influence, physicians and lawyers go on attending their patients—or the widows and orphans. Every one fares the better for it.

I shall not linger over the case of the civil engineers. There are only 7 in the Chamber—a small number, which is accounted for by the fact that their profession does not offer them ready means of captivating public opinion.

On the other hand, journalists are numerous. I count 59 of them, nearly as many as agriculturists, and many more than are returned by industry and commerce.

Yet I do not think it can be contended that journalists are almost as essential as the agriculturists, and more essential than manufacturers and traders put together, for the good of the country.

Moreover, journalists do not seem to be so directly interested in the right order of things, the peacefulness of the public mind—in short, in the public order—as agriculturists, manufacturers, and traders.

The newspaper lives best on *incidents*. In troublous times the circulation increases; so those items of news which are most likely to arouse public uneasiness are printed in big letters; circulations go down as soon as times become calmer. Even then there is the resource—often resorted to—of provoking incidents and magnifying indefinite-



ly the most trivial events. The public mind must be kept awake, and a fillip given to agitation; the newspaper cannot live without it. See the increase in the number of newspapers in times of public trouble. Unless we are blind, we are bound to acknowledge that what makes the prosperity of agriculture, industry, and commerce is poison to the newspaper.

Perhaps it will be urged that pressmen, treating daily of political questions in their papers, are the better qualified for parliamentary debate.

If this means that journalists are ready to talk on all subjects, I agree. But they are ready to treat those subjects as they are treated in a newspaper.

A journalist is necessarily obliged to think, judge, and write at full speed. Hardly is his thought formed when it has to be printed; he never has leisure for ripening it. The most eminent journalists know this and regret it; the less eminent dream of no such thing and retain a high opinion of themselves; they say—without smiling—that they exercise “sacerdotal functions!”

Moreover, in order to be heard, to enforce attention on the part of the public, the journalist is obliged to raise his voice: that is a necessity of the trade, a condition of existence; exaggeration is as easy to him as eating or sleeping to ourselves. If he happens to say that such or such a man is a scoundrel, that only means that he does not agree with that man’s opinion. His clamour is of no consequence. The acoustic conditions of the newspaper Press require that a man should scream out if he would be heard, just as at the fair—where the only way to attract the crowd is to make a deal of din at the entrance of each booth. That is what we call “*la parade*.”

Can any one suppose that such qualities are desirable in politicians? To discuss great national interests, to be fit to

govern one's country, a man requires wisdom, reflection, maturity of judgment, tolerance, common sense, and a practical knowledge of public business. Some journalists assuredly possess these qualities, but up to the present they do not seem to have been the virtues most displayed by the French Press.

It must be recognized that journalists, as members of our Chamber of Deputies, have not contributed to promote calm wisdom in the deliberations.

The only reason why they are in such large numbers at the Palais Bourbon is because they dispose on their own behalf of the power of the Press, the great electoral instrument.

But their numbers are quite disproportionate to the party division of the Chamber. Out of 59 journalists, the Left has 54, and the Right only 5. Whence this inequality?

It arises from the fact that the Left relies mostly on the workmen, and the Right on country voters. Now, the workmen read the newspapers considerably more than country people. Thus Republican journalists are more directly connected with the mass of town voters than Conservative journalists with the mass of country voters.

If the country people were to read newspapers, we should probably have twice as many journalists in the Chamber as we have now.

Whilst the invasion of doctors, solicitors, and attorneys is due to the absenteeism of the large land-owners—the natural patrons of country people—the invasion of journalists is due to the negative action of employers of labour, who by ceasing to exercise any patronage over their workmen, have left them an easy prey to the wiles of the Press.

In both cases, the "*patrons*" are responsible for the results.

## IV.

Among the deputies belonging to the liberal professions, the majority is composed of lawyers: 139 members, with whom I do not count magistrates and men attached to the administration. Whatever affinity they may have with lawyers, they deserve to be classified in a special category—that of officials.

Of the lawyers, let me mention only in passing the professors of law, and the solicitors and attorneys of whom I spoke before. We immediately go on to the big number—that of the barristers; there are 107 of them. And I do not mean any but those who have actually been called to the bar, and who are supposed to exercise their profession; for the number of law graduates in the Chamber is probably above 300.

There does not exist, nor has there ever existed, any society producing so many lawyers as French society actually produces in the nineteenth century. It is an invasion, an inundation.

They are the real masters of the national representation, the real masters of France. No profession ever took such a hold of our parliamentary machinery.

And how could it be otherwise?

The bar is one of the professions that can most easily be left and afterwards re-entered. When giving up this profession for a time, the barrister leaves behind him no capital in sufferance; his whole stock-in-trade is his office, which most often is part of his lodging. A seat in the Chamber is even a means of advertisement, by making evident any eloquence which he may possess. There is such a thing as the tribune at the Palais Bourbon, and that is higher than the bar of any tribunal: thence a man's voice

is heard farther. The function of deputy is therefore advantageous to the barrister; it may bring him briefs, if he has none—there are *some* briefless barristers—or at least it may increase the number of his clients, if he has any.

The necessity of making speeches at the meetings and in the Chamber, which may be a drawback for so many agriculturists and business men, is but another inducement for the barrister. His business is to make speeches. This circumstance therefore gives him an invaluable advantage over his competitors.

But if the Bar makes men fit to enter Parliament, does it also make them fit for the management of public affairs?

Let us notice first that this profession does not suffer from any of the calamities that may assail the public weal as is the case with the commoner professions. On the contrary, the Bar draws profits from such circumstances. Barristers live by lawsuits, and we know that lawsuits are most frequent when business is bad; political lawsuits arise mostly in troublous times, and of course family dissensions are a consequence of disorganization in the families.

Barristers therefore do not find any warning of political misdirection in the bad state of their own affairs; rather the contrary.

It might be supposed that, being in the habit of discussing the law, they are the more fit to make laws.

It is true that they know, professionally, the long series of our laws and the numerous systems which lawyers' interpretations have created. So far, they bring a useful element into Parliament. Unfortunately, they cannot help having a lawyer's inclination to place the purely theoretical aspect of the law before the positive interests, which thus escape their handling.

Living as they do amidst texts of law, they are inclined to look upon them as a general panacea; they are naturally

tempted to believe that human societies are led with laws—plenty of them, and thus minimize the importance of the spontaneous force of private life and of all useful callings. It is this professional tendency which made the lawyers formerly the most active instruments of royal absolutism against individual and local freedom. The lawyers, even in this century, on the Right as on the Left, were the most indefatigable adepts of political centralization. They intruded everywhere the heavy hand of the State—although they knew well how to protest when that hand was at the service of their adversaries. They are chiefly responsible for the development of the French bureaucracy, which ruins our finances and sterilizes every initiative on the part of individuals.

Moreover, their share of responsibility for the discredit in which the parliamentary *régime* has fallen is a large one. Accustomed to improvise speeches, they are naturally inclined to prolong brilliant and sterile discussions, rather than the useful and practical deliberations in which special knowledge is required. Public opinion may be heard clamouring for a business Chamber, for a business Cabinet.

A business Cabinet! Why, barristers occupy the principal places in our ministries.

It is indeed the misfortune of our legislative *régime* that it requires on the part of our ministers a greater command of speech than of business, and qualities more brilliant than solid.

To speak, it is necessary to ascend the tribune; members do not speak from their places in the *Chambre des Députés* as they do in the House of Commons. It is therefore necessary for each speaker to utter a complete speech with exordium and peroration. This formality causes a waste of valuable time in useless sentences and ornate declarations. Moreover it keeps out of the discussion all the deputies who



are not adepts at public speaking, and who often are the most capable, the most skilled in business. This is made evident in the committees, where these gentlemen exercise the ascendancy and influence which ought to be theirs in the public sittings. It is a well-known fact that the hardest-working deputies are those who speak least in the tribune. Our theatrical arrangements condemn them to obscurity, and thrust forward the fine speakers.

The barristers, thanks to their special knowledge, might be of great benefit to the national representation. Unfortunately, their number—quite out of proportion to their social importance—makes them masters of the Chamber, and gives it a disastrous direction.

Though the barristers have invaded Parliament, the same cannot be said of the clergy and the army.

The clergy of different persuasions is represented by only two members. This very low number is due either to the difficulty ministers of religion have in confronting electoral contests, or to the fear of ecclesiastic domination on the part of the public.

If the army only counts six representatives, that is because the law closes the Chamber to all officers in active service. We can therefore form no conclusions from the smallness of this number.

## V.

At the top of our table the State officials are to be found.

After the liberal professions, officials have the most numerous representation.\* We find, indeed, 23 magistrates and 72 officials, from the different departments; that is 95 officials, a total *much superior* to the total of agricul-

\* It is understood that I am classifying as officials the members who held office before their election, official functions being by law incompatible with the position of deputy.



turists, or to that of manufacturers and merchants *together*.

Most deputies of this category are downright lawyers, who by virtue of their profession are most reverent of State action, and skilled in all practices capable of assuring the triumph of such action.

Now, from their situation, are officials well-chosen representatives for the advantage of the country? Do they deserve to fill such a large number of seats in the Chamber? Are they good judges of the public interest?

But what is the public interest?

Public interest is first that the country should be governed cheaply.

The interest of officials, on the contrary, is that the government should be as expensive as possible. The more the total of the Budget is made to swell, the more places are there at the disposal of the State, and therefore the more offices open for occupation.

Every year at the time of the Budget discussion, in face of the increasing deficit, there are a few shy attempts at economy. But as gradually the different articles are discussed, as the chapters are reviewed, the feeling in the Chamber changes. The 95 officials, to whom the budget is the goose with the golden egg, rise in a unanimous and irresistible movement: they fight for the patrimony on which they have lived, and on which they are to live again if they lose their seats as deputies.

And in this movement of resistance they are naturally supported by their colleagues of the liberal professions, every one of whom hopes—if his salary as a deputy were to fail him—to eke out of the Budget some nice little competency, like the rat of the fable in his Dutch cheese.

And as in Parliament the professions which feed the Budget are less represented than the professions which live

on the Budget, the funds are voted in the end—and economy deferred to the Greek calends.

But as it is not sufficient to vote expenses in order to get money, recourse is had, in spite of all electoral promises to the contrary, to new taxes and fresh loans. Thus the deficit increases year after year.

Another side of the public interest is that there should be little complication in the public services, and no indefinite multiplication in the machinery, so that confusion may be avoided, and a good and rapid working of the services maintained.

But the officials have an interest in maintaining the complication in the services. The fact is, they do maintain it successfully against all attempts at reform, and in the face of every protestation of public opinion.

They have an interest in it because this complication presents the triple advantage of making them necessary, augmenting their grants, and preventing all control. They are thus made all-powerful and irresponsible at the same time.

It is of public interest, again, that the services of the State should not invade the departments of private life and of local affairs, that they should not interfere with the free working of individual enterprise, that we should not be met by State interference as by an irresistible wall whenever we want to move, whenever we wish to manage for ourselves the most ordinary business or the most sacred duty.

But if such is the public interest, such is not the interest of the officials.

Their interest is to be allowed to invade everything, every division of the country: the *département*, the *arrondissement*, the *commune*, the family itself. As they go on encroaching, they go on increasing the number of offices; and of course an increase of officials follows each increase of offices.

This state of things is the more alarming because it is general—that is to say, it is promoted by Right and Left alike, without any distinction of parties. Out of the 95 officials who have seats in the Chamber, 51 are on the Left, and 44 on the Right. The love of Budget is the one feeling in which we are least divided.

It may be contended, in order to justify the extraordinary number of officials in the Chamber, that precisely because they hold in their hands the complete direction of the country's affairs they must have been trained in the practice of public business, and therefore are excellent representatives.

The truth is that officialism makes the very worst public men.

Official life indeed smothers in man initiative, independence, and the sense of responsibility, all of which are essential qualities in a statesman.

If their party happens to be in power, they are but the faithful lieges of the Government; their independence is cramped by the wish to preserve or be given a post.

If they happen to be in the Opposition, they are systematic adversaries, demolishers at any price of the established *régime*; their very situation makes revolutionaries of them.

Indeed, what should we do if we were in their places? The question for them is—to live or not to live. Officialism has not fitted them to carve out for themselves independent positions; they therefore see no assurance of a livelihood except from some comfortable official berth. How could they help yielding always to a fixed idea; Carthage must fall—that is to say,—Let us destroy the Government of the adverse party.

It is therefore important that the officials of the State should be upheld by a strong majority, representing really the great interests of the country.

## VI.

This majority should be recruited mostly from the professions we placed at the basis of our table: agriculture, industry, and commerce.

We have seen, however, that these professions are little or badly represented, and this is the great fault with our governmental system.

There is no equilibrium in our Chambers.

They are unstable because the majorities are made up of the liberal professions and officials; 365 against 135 belonging to the commoner professions.

The table of analysis gives an impression somewhat similar to that produced by those enormous old Celtic rocking-stones which rest on narrow bases, and which at the least shock oscillate in all directions. But at least these stones *are* stable, with all their oscillations, amidst the passing generations. It is not so with *our* national representation: it oscillates at the bidding of the four winds of public opinion, and falls wheresoever it is pushed, now on the Right, now on the Left, crushing with its fall the three great interests above which it had been towering and which it now annihilates, although they *are* chief in the public interest.

What a difference from the figure presented by the table of the English House of Commons.

We have here no rocking-stone, but a structure like the pyramids of the Pharaohs, with broad and powerful bases. Here the law of equilibrium is respected. Each social element is in its place, and shows the proportions required by public interest.

Thus maintained within proper limits, the liberal professions are no longer a public danger. They are what they ought to be—a social ornament, a valuable element of intel-

lectual and moral elevation, a useful counterpoise to the bias which might be engendered by a too exclusive practice of the common professions.

The harm lies in the fact that we no longer have any *natural representatives*.

What, then, is a natural representative? Re-read attentively this beautiful page of Taine's:

"We admire the stability of the British Government; that is because it is the ending and natural blossoming of an infinity of live fibres holding to the soil, over the whole surface of the country. Suppose a mutiny, such as the Gordon Riots, but better conducted and fortified by Socialist proclamations; add to it—to complete the impossibility—a successful Gunpowder Plot, the sudden and total destruction of the two Houses and of the royal family. There is but the summit of the Government carried away; the rest remains untouched. In every borough, in every county, there are families round which all the others group themselves; men of importance, gentlemen or noblemen, who will take the lead and assume the initiative; men whom they trust and follow, since they are pointed out in advance as leaders by their rank, their wealth, their past services, or their education and influence. These men are the captains and generals who will rally around them the scattered soldiers and at once reconstitute the whole army, contrarily to what could happen in France, where the *bourgeois* and the workman, the nobleman and the peasant dislike and distrust one another; where the blouse and the coat jostle each other with rancour and with fear; where the only leaders are strange, removable, provisional officials, to whom exterior obedience is given, but no personal regard, and who are suffered but not accepted. So their Government is stable, because they have natural representatives." \*

\* "Notes sur l'Angleterre," pp. 217, 218. "The town is not in

Happy are the nations which, supported by their natural representatives, find the just measure in which to represent the different social elements.

England, as it is with us, the favourite place of residence. Except large manufacturing cities, all provincial towns (such as York, for instance) are inhabited by hardly any people but shopkeepers; *the élite, the heads of the nation are elsewhere, in the country.* London itself is now only a great business meeting-place."—Taine, "Notes sur l'Angleterre," p. 190.



## CHAPTER II.

WHY THE ANGLO-SAXONS ARE MORE HOSTILE TO SOCIALISM THAN  
THE GERMANS AND THE FRENCH.

## I.

LIKE the different floras, social phenomena have their geographical zones; they do not occur or develop equally in all countries; likewise they are subject to peculiarities of position and environment.

Socialism has not escaped that law. It is important to realize this first, if we would understand its nature and evolution.

Socialism is essentially a product of German origin and manufacture—its centre of formation is in Germany; it is from Germany that it permeates the world.

That Germany is a focus of Socialism is unanimously acknowledged by all writers who have treated the subject, and by Socialists themselves. "A remarkable thing," says the member of the Reichstag, Bamberger, "is that socialistic ideas have found nowhere a better welcome than in Germany. Not only do these ideas fascinate the work-people, but the middle class cannot resist them, and we often hear persons of that class saying, 'Why, indeed, perhaps everything may go on better thus; why should there not be a trial?' Moreover, Socialism has reached the *upper classes*; it has a seat in the *Academies*; it speaks from the lecture-chair in the *Universities*. The pass-word now repeated by workmen's associations has been spoken first by *savants*; *Conservatives* have led the attack against

Mammonism, and have been the loudest in uttering the grievance against Capitalism. We do not see anything like this out of Germany." \*

Another German, the Catholic member, Joerg, said in the Reichstag: "Socialism has established its general quarters in Germany, and gone through its philosophical and scientific education among us." †

It may be said that all the *genera* of Socialists are to be found in Germany—Revolutionary Socialists, Conservative Socialists, Evangelical Socialists, Catholic Socialists, and Professorial Socialists, who lecture in the very Universities. Such a general and varied blossoming is proof enough that this plant has found in Germany the most favourable soil for its growth and efflorescence.

See how it blossoms at election-time: Revolutionary Socialists make up an important part of the Reichstag, and their candidates polled at the last elections nearly one and a half million votes. If we take into account the representatives of other sects of Socialism, we can realize that the Socialists form the majority of the German Parliament.

The different sects, of course, do not agree as to their programme and claims; but all agree on one thing, the essential point and characteristic trait, the Socialist trademark—namely, the necessity of having all social questions resolved by the action of the Law, or State. All dream of a society in which the State should regulate and organize more or less labour, property, salaries, and should take upon itself to make happy one and all by playing the *rôle* of a great universal employer. The State is the new Providence found by Socialism.

This fact will be made more patent by reviewing rapidly the different sects.

\* E. de Laveleye, "The Socialism of To-day" (The Leadenhall Press, E. C.).  
 † Ibid., Introduction.

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The Revolutionary Socialists are undoubtedly the most logical among them: they accept the ultimate consequences of their theories. We may say that all the other sects are working for them, as it is natural for the human mind, having entered a precipitous pass, not to stop until the bottom is reached. This also explains the increasing ratio of their progress.

From this sect sprang the great doctor of the science of contemporary Socialism, the man who furnished the most complete theory of Socialism, and whose influence is felt more or less by all other sects, including the Conservative Socialists, and even the professors. We mean Karl Marx, whose doctrine is embodied in his celebrated work, "Das Kapital."

This is a book, "as abstract as a treatise on mathematics, and considerably more fatiguing in the reading," founded solely on the series of deductions drawn from definitions and hypotheses. In his first argument the author destroys contemporary society; in his second, he rebuilds it on new bases.

According to Karl Marx, "Labour alone is the real measure by which the value of all goods can ever be estimated and compared." Capital is therefore produced by labour alone; consequently, the labourer is the only producer. Hence, capital, such as it exists now, is the result of spoliation. Capital ought therefore to be restored to its true owners, the workers collectively, under State control. Thus, in a succession of reasonings, the author is led to consider the State as the universal employer entrusted with the direction of all labour, and the equitable distribution of the proceeds of labour.

These theories were formulated into a programme by the Revolutionary Socialists in 1877, at the Gotha Congress. Here are the principal parts of this programme: "Labour

is the source of all wealth and civilization. As all productive labour is only made possible by social organization, the total product of labour is the property of the Community, that is to say, of all its members, they possessing equal rights, and each receiving according to his reasonable needs, all being expected to work.

“In contemporary Society, all the means of production are the monopoly of the capitalist class; the resulting dependence on the part of the labouring classes is the source of poverty and servitude under all their forms.

“Emancipation requires all the means of production to become the collective property of the State; the State regulating all labour, disposing of the capital for all works of general utility, and distributing all the proceeds of labour.”

This socialization, or collectivism, would work in the following fashion: each labourer—and each man would become a labourer in some sense—would be paid for every complete object as many times the price of an hour's work as there are hours required for the production of that object. He would be paid in labour-tickets exchangeable for goods. The goods would be kept in public or co-operative distributing stores, where goods could be exchanged for tickets and *vice versâ*.

On the other hand, as all capitalized property would belong to the State, and as each man would have to live by his trade or function, the power of accumulating would be consequently much reduced, and inheritable property limited to personal property.

The three most conspicuous leaders of Socialism are at present Herr Bebel, Herr Liebknecht, and Herr von Volmar. The first is a retired journeyman turner, the second belongs to the middle class, the last is a descendant of one of the oldest families of Bavaria; who was an officer in the German army and in the Pontifical troops. This triumvi-

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rate is fully representative of German Socialism, whose roots spread down amongst the popular masses, and whose branches penetrate through the middle classes, up to the highest society. Germany is tainted with Socialism from top to bottom.

It should be acknowledged, however, that the ranks of Revolutionary Socialism are chiefly filled by the popular classes. The middle class and nobility adhere mostly to the more moderate sects, on which a few words ought to be said.

I mentioned the group of *Conservative Socialists*. "These two words," says M. de Laveleye, "seem to clash. Does not the one wish to destroy what the other wishes to preserve? Yet there is a party which assumes this denomination, and there is no rashness in stating that Prince Bismarck is its most illustrious representative."\*

This group does not aim, like the preceding group, at placing collectively in the hands of the State all the means of production. However, they call themselves Socialists because they, too, seek the solution of social questions in stricter regulations and in the State's direct and absolute intervention. With them, too, the State should have charge of the direction of labour, the regulation of wages and the different means of production. This group is chiefly composed of middle-class men who are afraid of Revolutionary Socialism, and hope to conjure its advent by throwing the whole of society into the arms of the State. "Let us do ourselves what they want to put us through, and we shall be saved," is what their policy comes to. We know how eagerly the young German Emperor, who deems no question outside his province, answered this appeal: he issued a series of manifestoes, which—albeit sterile—were

\* E. de Laveleye, "The Socialism of To-day" (The Leadenhall Press, London, E.C.).



none the less noisy. He is actually the real chief of the Conservative Socialists.

The group of Evangelical Socialists is thus named because its leaders are the clergy of the established Church. It was constituted, like the preceding one, in order to strengthen among the people the monarchical feeling, and to extend the action of royalty under cover of Socialism. This group also seeks to solve the question of augmenting the powers of the State, by promoting its increased intervention, and urging it to become the great collective employer.

Here are a few extracts from its programme: "The Christian Working Men's Social Party has for its foundations the Christian faith and loyalty to Sovereign and Fatherland. . . . It claims from the State the creation of distinct trades' bodies throughout the Empire, with compulsory action and strict regulations for the admission of apprentices. Arbitrating committees to be formed, and their decisions to be considered as law. Compulsory creation of provident funds for the widows and orphans of labour and for disabled workmen. Length of the day's work to be settled by the State according to the nature of the work. National and local land property to be worked for the profit of the workers, and to be increased as much as is possible economically and technically. Progressive (cumulative) income-tax. Very high sumptuary taxes. Legacy and succession duty proportionate to amount of legacy and to degree of relationship." The social ideal of this group is the proverbial reign of the kindly despot whose sole authority ensures the general felicity.

The large group of *Catholic Socialists* was chiefly organized subsequently to the publication of a book by the Bishop of Mayence, Monsignor Ketteler, entitled, "The Labour Question and Christianity," which made a great sensation in Germany. This book quotes extensively from the works



of Lassalle the Socialist, and concludes, like Lassalle, in favour of creating co-operative associations of production, whose end is to place Capital in the hands of the workers, and thus resolve the question of wages. The programme of the party was mostly drawn up and introduced into the party by Canon Moufang, of the Cathedral of Mayence, and a disciple of Bishop Ketteler. The following are its principal points.

Wages are inadequate; the State must intervene. The State's intervention confirms the regulations issued by the trades' bodies, and makes them compulsory. The State must fix the length of the day's work. The State is to fix the rates of wages, and regulate the relations between apprentices and masters, between workmen and employers. Moreover, the State is to advance money to the labour associations. A collectivist tendency is here apparent. "I am no partisan of the Louis Blanc system of National Workshops," says Canon Moufang; "but when a labour association is in need of assistance, I do not see why the State should not render it." In short, the State is to set limits to the tyranny of Capital; but the programme does not say how. "I do not attack wealth or wealthy people," says the Canon; "what I condemn is the way in which nowadays millionaires and 'billionaires' are made."

Between this programme and that of the Revolutionary Socialists, there is but a difference of "more or less;" and of course there is the difference implied in the religious affirmation. They do not indeed go the length of claiming the transfer of the land to the community, to the State; but they are not far from this, and must be logically led to it, for they do claim the nationalizing of Capital, in behalf of the labour associations. At any rate the State is clearly required to assume the *rôle* of labour employer. This group, therefore, accept the socialistic doctrine such as we

have seen it defined, and rightly assume the title of Socialists. The last group, the Professors, are also adepts of this doctrine. They are, however, far from agreeing together, and the whole gamut of opinions is to be met with amongst the professors of Political Economy, from the shyest to the most exalted Socialism, even including Herr Wagner's Socialism, which claims the limitation of private property and extension of collective property. But all of them are agreed as to the fundamental point, which is the solution of the labour question by stricter regulations of labour and more direct interference on the part of the State.

In recalling these facts, my intention is merely to make good the statement that Germany is, from top to bottom of the social scale, a hot-bed of Socialism.

Before I proceed I must state the cause of this phenomenon in a few words.

The labour movement burst in the world at the very moment when Germany was going through the same social evolution as Spain under Philip II. three centuries ago, and France under Louis XIV. two centuries ago. This evolution consists in erecting an absolute central power over the ruins of provincial and local life. We all know how the kings of Prussia commenced this evolution, and how since 1870 the German Emperors have busied themselves in improving and completing it.

At the present time, Germany is entirely in the hands of Prussia, and Prussia in the hands of the State.

In fact, the Prussian State has long been applying the principles of contemporary Socialism. The great social barracks, the intricate and encroaching bureaucracy which form its ideal, are in many points very much like what Socialists dream of, and which they call the Society of the future. As is well known, the Prussian State takes hold of the man from infancy, keeps hold of him at school, then

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in the barracks, so as to fashion him according to its requirements. But there is more than this: the Prussian civil code already confirms part of the Socialist programme.

This is, indeed, what you can read in the *Preussische allgemeine Landrecht*, Title I, Second Part: "(1) The State is to furnish food, lodging, and dress to the citizens who fail to obtain the same by themselves, or cannot procure it from those whom the law charges to do so. (2) The unemployed shall be given work fitted to their strength and ability. (3) Men who from laziness or any vicious disposition fail to secure means of livelihood, shall be compelled to execute useful works under the supervision of the authority. (6) The State has a right, and is obliged to create institutions by which the destitution of some and the prodigality of others may be effectually prevented. Everything whose effect may be to encourage habits of idleness, especially in the lower classes, or anything that may turn men from work, is absolutely forbidden in this State. (10) Every borough, or district, is obliged to keep their pauper inhabitants. (11) They must inquire into the causes of destitution, and communicate their reports on the subject to the superior authorities, so that remedies may be found."

One may understand now, how populations submitted to a political system which proclaims so loudly the right of labour and the tutelary rôle of the State, whose interference in the acts of private life is so arbitrary, found themselves quite naturally prepared and fashioned for Socialism. We can understand how naturally they were led to seek a solution to the labour question in the assistance of the individual by the community, the collective State—in fact, in a general re-building of society, *not* in private and local initiative. Upon the whole, the Socialists have done no more than formulating as social reprisals measures which the Prussian code had already made law, and which the Ger-

man Emperors acknowledged and applied, in the interest of their absolute power.

The middle class and nobility were quite as well prepared for accepting this solution as the people themselves. The Prussian system, indeed, by developing à outrance militarism and officialism, first crushed them, and then instilled in them a disposition to consider the State as the unique source whence everything in social life emanates.

This disposition does not exist to any such extent in France among the same classes, although we, too, are pestered with militarism and officialism; for the State, shaken by numerous revolutions, has lost much of its power and prestige. Those who now hold the reins cannot hope to be left as unchallenged as in the time of Louis XIV.

This is how Germany, being backward by more than a century as compared to the West of Europe, happened to find herself in those natural circumstances most favourable for making her the focus of Socialism.

This fact will appear more vividly, if we consider that it is mostly from Germany and by Germans that Socialism is propagated in the rest of the world.

This phenomenon may be verified by observing what is taking place in the different countries.

In France we find that, in 1886, Socialism was but imperfectly constituted. One of the principal organs of German Socialism, the *Sozialdemokrat*, notes it with regret: "The progress of Socialism is real but slow." \*

From that epoch only did the Socialist group affirm its independent existence and develop rapidly. This development took place precisely under the conduct of the Marxist collectivists, whose two principal leaders are Messrs. Jules Guesde and Lafargue. They call themselves Marxists, because they are endeavouring to introduce into France the

\* Winterer's "Le Socialisme International," p. 149.

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theory expounded by the German Karl Marx in his "Das Kapital." It is known, besides, that M. Lafargue, late deputy of Lille, is the son-in-law of the celebrated German Socialist.

No wonder the success of the Paris Marxist Congress in 1889 drew a loud cry of triumph from the German Socialists! In that Congress M. Jules Guesde proclaimed—to the applause of his audience—that "his Socialism was no other than *German Socialism*." \*

So French Socialism borrows its doctrine from Germany, bears a German's name, and, in short, does not hesitate to proclaim frankly its German origin.

In Belgium, Socialism was at great pains to extricate itself from Anarchism and Radicalism, and for a long time was a prey to internecine divisions. We then find that two of the German leaders, Herr Bebel and Herr Bernstein, went expressly to Belgium, in 1887, in order to impress the right direction on this younger branch. This intervention must have produced some results, for one historian of Socialism ascertains that "Belgium Socialism, formerly disorganized and undisciplined, can now boast a certain organization *copied from that of German Socialism*." †

Socialism was recently introduced into Holland by ex-pastor Domela Nieuwenhuis. To show to what point the movement, here also, is led by the Germans, it will be sufficient to state that three years ago Mr. Nieuwenhuis repaired to Berlin "in order to learn from the Germans how to *make* elections." So they do not only lend their doctrine, but also their electioneering tactics.

We meet with the same fact in Poland. The delegate from the Polish Socialists to the Paris Congress of 1890 was a woman, Mme. Jankowska. She stated in her report that in Poland they were "endeavouring to *copy as much as*

\* Ibid., p. 174.

† Ibid., p. 122.



*possible* the German tactics, as well as their modes of propaganda and agitation." Here again it is Germany that leads the dance.

In Russia, until within the last few years, Nihilism and Anarchism were the only representatives of the cause of Social Revolution. There has been a change lately, however, as people heard at the Paris Congress. The old revolutionist Lawroff, who was one of the two Russian delegates, declared that the revolutionary movement was assuming more and more of a socialistic character, and that their party was rallying "*to the German Socialist theories and tactics.*"

Besides this, one of the leaders of Russian Socialism, M. Plechanow, has just published a book which is simply a reproduction of the whole Marxist theory. Moreover, the *Alliance of Russian Social-Democrats* has founded a newspaper whose name is precisely the same as that of the principal German organ, and which bears the same motto, "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" The Russian *Sozialdemokrat* made its appearance in Geneva in 1888, with the emphatically avowed aim of popularizing *German Socialism* in Russia.

Socialism in Roumania is but in its infancy. However, the agitator Mani tells us in his report to the Paris Congress: "Socialism is advancing, and is extending to the peasantry. The professors and students of the University of Jassy contributed principally to this result by translating the works of Marx, Engels, and Lassalle"—that is to say, of the three chief exponents of German Socialism.

"In Switzerland," M. Winterer says, "Socialism sprang from *German Socialism*; the two were always closely connected. Everywhere the Swiss Socialists are to be found side by side with the Germans: they attend the same gatherings, read the same literature, have *the same doctrine*,



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mutually help and support each other in their undertakings and struggles." After this, we cannot wonder at the Bâle Socialists celebrating, on September 4th, the anniversary of the death of Lassalle, the German Socialist; nor that they convoked for the next day a popular meeting with the object of hearing another German Socialist, Herr Liebknecht, sent to Switzerland to preach the gospel of Marxism.

Although the Swiss Socialists have their own organs, the direction is controlled by the German *Sozialdemokrat*. This sheet is the very soul of every Socialist circle in Zurich, Winterthur, Aarau, Bâle, Frauenfeld, Saint Gall, Schaffhausen, Coire, Zug, Neuchatel, Lausanne, Geneva, etc. Therefore Switzerland is also a prey to German Socialism.

In Italy, inspiration comes from the same source. It will be sufficient to recall the message sent to the Germans in the name of the Italian Socialists by the *Circolo radicale* of Rome, on the occasion of their success at the last election: "The *Circolo* . . . greets in the persons of German Socialists the pioneers in the new revolution for social justice. The Italian Democrats will ever remember with pride that Mazzini, in spite of his antipathy for the theories since expounded by Marx, predicted years ago that Young Germany and Young Italy were destined to solve the social question."

All these tokens are certain evidence of the fact that Germany is not only the focus of Socialism, but that the Socialist propaganda in other countries is directed from Germany.

This throws light upon another fact, namely, that Socialism does not find in all countries an equally well-prepared soil. Although the countries we have just instanced seem well disposed for receiving the seed, there are countries where the seed does not seem to germinate easily.

Such are Norway, Great Britain, the United States, and other countries inhabited by the Anglo-Saxon race.

Let us first make sure of the fact.

That Socialism does not spread in Norway was sorrowfully acknowledged in a correspondence published in the *Sozialdemokrat*. This state of things was bitterly bewailed, and assigned to the profoundly religious temperament of the population. This explanation is hardly satisfactory, considering the adhesion to Socialistic doctrines of a large number of German Catholics and Protestants, headed by their clergy.

But the historians of Socialism betray a most curious embarrassment when transferring their attention to England: they have nothing, or almost nothing, to relate, except the unfruitful efforts of Dr. Aveling, another son-in-law of Karl Marx (the hand of Germany again!), and those of the poet William Morris and Mr. H. M. Hyndman—a pair of faddists whom nobody listens to seriously. “The Year-Book of Socialism” (*Jahrbuch der Sozialwissenschaft*) of Dr. Ludwig Richter, which reviews the progress of Socialism in all countries, barely mentions England, and the all-sufficient reason given for this reticence is that “there is nothing to say.”

Another author, trying to explain the circumstance, writes: “The English are essentially Individualists. They want to be left to manage their own affairs in their own way. They object by temperament to any enrolment, to any surrender of their own personal rule of conduct to some common action. Such is, I believe, one of the reasons which makes them hostile to Socialism.”\*

If we now proceed to the United States, we find that there again Socialism has been unable to produce any im-

\* “Le Mouvement Socialiste en Europe,” by T. de Wyzewa, p. 209.

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pression on the Anglo-Saxon race. This race resists Socialism as the American vines resist the Phylloxera. In America, the adepts of Socialism are nearly all recruited from the Irish or Germans. M. Winterer, amongst others, says so. "Thus: This chapter on Socialism in America ought to bear the title, *German Socialism in America*; for it is still represented there chiefly by German immigrants. Among its leaders there are some ex-members of the Reichstag. Karl Marx had reckoned upon the New World. He had been instrumental in having the seat of the old International Association transferred to America. *His hopes were doomed to disappointment.*" \*

One of the leaders of German Socialism reflects on the American Socialist party as follows: "This party exists as yet only in name; for *nowhere can it yet affirm itself* as a political party. Moreover, it forms as it were a foreign element in the United States; indeed, until very lately it was almost exclusively composed of German immigrants, who still used their mother-tongue and spoke English but imperfectly. But these immigrants show a comprehension of the conditions of labour emancipation which is met but rarely amongst American workmen. . . ."

An attempt to convert to Socialism the Anglo-Saxon of America was made in sending to the States several German agitators, and amongst these Herr Liebknecht, and one of Karl Marx's daughters, Mrs. Aveling. German eloquence was of no avail: the Trades' Unions declined to go over to Socialism. A few Socialists then bethought themselves of gaining admission into the order of the Knights of Labour—which counts over a million members. "They thought they might succeed in obtaining a gradual prevalence of their theories; but they did *not* succeed." The Grand Master of the association even once expressed the wish to "purge

\* "Le Socialisme International," p. 233.

the Order of all those violent and radical elements." One resolution was repelled in the Convention of the Order by 151 votes against 52, on the plea of its revolutionary tendency.

The Socialists were not more fortunate with the Amalgamated Workmen's party: all sections convicted of Socialism were excluded in a vote of the Convention at Syracuse, N. Y. Moreover, they have not succeeded in starting one single Socialist newspaper printed in English in the whole of the United States. The ten daily newspapers which do exist are printed in German. This is a significant fact.

We can now easily understand why at the last Socialist Congress in Paris the only delegates from America were the representatives of *German Socialism in America*. The author of the Report, Herr Kirchner, had to make the following declaration: "If the class spirit is at last being roused among the working men of America, that is owing chiefly to the *German immigrants*. The latter are indefatigable in their task of enlightening and organizing the *still blind masses*."

Thus in the Anglo-Saxon world, as everywhere else, Socialism is propagated only by Germans. But with them (the Anglo-Saxons) the propaganda is a complete failure. This is the point in which they differ sharply from those before enumerated; they form a group, apart from the others, their peculiar characteristic—from our point of view—being that they are indifferent to Socialism.

What may be the cause of such an exception?

The cause of it is to be found in the essential fact that the formation of the Anglo-Saxon race is as deeply Particularistic as that of the German race is deeply Communistic. Whilst with the latter the public powers—the State—have assumed an importance which stunted private and local initiative, with the former, on the contrary, the public

powers never were developed to such a point, but were kept in check by the combined private and local forces. Germany is the greatest contemporary centre of Authority; the Anglo-Saxon world is the greatest centre of Self-Help and Self-Government. It is, therefore, quite natural that the former should seek a solution to the social question solely in State intervention, in never-ending regulations, and in making the means of production common property; while it is quite natural, too, that the latter should seek a solution in private initiative, and repel the new Communism, under whatever form it is brought forward.

It is not my business here to recall what causes have developed in these groups such different social states; this has been shown in *La Science Sociale*, and the reader may refer there.\* It was sufficient to ascertain here that the effects of this difference in the two social formations are to be felt even in the question which occupies us at the present moment.

Three points are now settled: Germany is the focus of Socialism; Socialism is propagated by Germans throughout the world; and, lastly, Socialism does not thrive among populations with whom private initiative is much developed and the action of the State restricted.

There remains for us to find out whether German Socialism affords a better solution of the labour question than Anglo-Saxon Particularism, and what the true solution may be in the future.

## II.

Consider first that Socialism is by no means a novelty, as its alleged inventors seem to think. It is as old as the hills, and has been tried before. We could find out exactly

\* *La Science Sociale*, t. I., p. 110; t. II., p. 116; t. III., p. 558; t. IV., pp. 131, 226.



what it would be likely to produce now, by examining what it has produced before.

If we free Socialism from the high-sounding words used in connection with it, and resolve it into its essential elements, we shall find that its tendency is merely to bring us back to the social systems of the peoples of antiquity. We shall examine later whether it is to be the *régime* of the future; but let us ascertain first that it *was* the *régime* of the past.

The Socialists, as we have seen, mean to place in the hands of the community—the collective State they now say—all wealth and the means of production—in short, the means of existence. The community is to take the place of the employers and distribute the products of labour to each one according to his work or to his needs. Socialist authorities are not agreed as to the mode of distribution.

But it seems to us that we know this social type perfectly well. Was it not the dominant type among the nations of antiquity? With some differences, all the old societies presented this common character—that they rested on the community.

With some, such as the pastoral nomads, the land belonged collectively to the inhabitants: tracts were abandoned for use to family communities or tribes comprising all families issued from one common ancestor. Such is the type of Biblical patriarchs, Arabs, Berbers, etc. When these nomadic peoples fixed themselves on the soil by agriculture, the family communities or tribes naturally took their places together and continued owning and cultivating the land in common. That was the case with all the nations of antiquity. Some even, such as the Hebrews, the Germans, the Slavs, etc., subjected the soil to periodical re-division. Others placed the collective ownership of the land in the hands of the sovereign, who thus became uni-



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versal employer, entrusted with the care—with which the Socialists would saddle the State—of equitably assessing labour, of providing for widows and old men. The Egypt of the Pharaohs was the highest and most complete expression of this last type.

It is sufficient to point out these facts, which are well known. For detailed descriptions, the reader may refer to different essays published in *La Science Sociale*.\*

But the communal system is not special to antiquity alone; it is still extant through part of the globe. It is almost exclusively that of the populations of Asia, of Northern Africa, and even of the whole of Eastern Europe. You know that in Russia, for instance, the *commune* (*Mir*) is but a vast community, which owns the land and distributes it among the family communities by periodical redivision, so that each family never has at its disposal more than a quantity of land proportionate to the number of its workers. As a consequence, labour is organized in common, like the possession of the soil.

It may thus be seen that Collectivism is no new solution, but as old as the world itself, and applied even nowadays by a great many nations.

Collectivism, somebody may remark, is all the better for this.

Let us ascertain whether that is the case by a closer observation of the facts.

I submit to the judgment of my readers two examples.

Of all the nations of antiquity, there was one that rose higher than the others, and finally subjugated them all—that is the Roman people. Now, it is remarkable that—

\* *Vide* in *La Science Sociale* the series of my own articles on “L’Art Pastoral” and on “La Culture en Communauté,” tomes I., II., III., X.; on “L’Ancienne Egypte,” by M. de Prévile, t. IX., pp. 212, 549; t. X., pp. 160, 338; t. XI., pp. 80, 252; t. XII., p. 69, etc.

owing to circumstances which social science can explain\*—the Roman people is that which succeeded best in shaking off the trammels of communal systems. They did not shake them off altogether—no people in antiquity could do that—but it was amongst the Romans that the principle of private property acquired most strength; it was amongst them that the man of the old world attained the greatest development of personality, amongst them that he was most responsible for his property and labour, and had to rely most on self. It was amongst them that arose the institution of *quiritary* (Roman citizens') property, which is the very counterpart of common property. Private ownership of land assumed an importance which in time obtained religious sanction; the very boundary posts were deified; there was a god Terminus, and the Terminal festivals. The post (*terminus*), when once laid, could not be removed. The idea is embodied in the legend which says that Jupiter once wished to have a temple raised to himself on the Capitoline, but could not succeed in expropriating the god Terminus. Whoever threw down the post or attempted to remove it was guilty of sacrilege. According to the Roman law, the husbandman whose plough-share knocked against a post was—with his oxen—vowed to the Infernal gods.

The one nation which rose above all others in antiquity was, therefore, at the same time, the least Communistic of nations.

That is our first fact. Now for our second.

In modern times the most Communistic societies are incontestably the most backward, the least rich, the least powerful; they are manifestly out-distanced in every way by those societies in which private property and individual action are most developed.

\* See an article by M. de Prévile on the Romans in ancient Egypt, in *La Science Sociale* of January, 1892, t. XIII.

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We really need only open our eyes to be convinced of this; we only need consider and compare Eastern with Western societies—the Communistic East, with the more or less Particularistic West. The former have been enwrapped in deep slumber for many centuries; in the latter, where the power of work and human worth have been raised so prodigiously high, is to be met the greatest superiority hitherto seen in the history of humanity. I will add that we were proud of that superiority without knowing the exact cause thereof, until social science had its say.

We may even go further in our examples. Of the societies of the West, which one is it which surpasses the others by its working power, by the agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity of its members? Which opposes to other nations the most redoubtable competition, and invades most rapidly the unoccupied territories in the whole world? Is there one that can be compared with that Anglo-Saxon race, which from their "tight little island" are flooding the whole world, and in America have begotten that prodigiously vivacious offspring, the United States?

Well, of all the Western nations, the Anglo-Saxon is by far the most Particularistic, the one farthest from the Communistic formation. It is the Anglo-Saxon element which has developed to the highest degree individual initiative, and has restricted within the narrowest limits the action of the public powers, the intervention of the State.

So the two social orders which dominated the others, the one in antiquity—the Roman State, the other in modern times—the Anglo-Saxon State, happen to have been farthest from the Communistic formation.

This is no fortuitous coincidence—chance does not come in—but a direct consequence of the anti-Communistic formation. We can easily account for it.

The whole question may be summed-up in this formula.

The more a man obeys an inclination to rely on help from others, from the community or the State, the less is his force of initiative developed, the less is he inclined to exert himself personally to make a livelihood. On the other hand, the more he is expected to rely on himself alone and his personal work, the more is his force of initiative developed, the more is he inclined to exert himself, not with the mere end of making a living, but also of rising higher and higher.

The *régime* of Communism places man in a general situation which may be likened to that of administrative clerks or officials—and we know that such situations do not develop the working power, for the good reason that they deaden any personal interest in the result of the work. If, therefore, such a *régime* be extended to a whole society, its effects are multiplied, owing to its generality; if it be practised by many consecutive generations, the effects are bound to be more accentuated, owing to the continuity of the *régime*. The working power decreases by a certain quantity at the first generation, by a somewhat larger quantity at the second generation, and so on—until we get to the thorough indolence of the Oriental, who reduces exertion to what is strictly necessary for avoiding starvation.

Turn as we will the facts of past and present, we are bound to come to this conclusion—that always and everywhere the Communistic system has resulted in confining within narrow limits the scope of human industry, in promoting impotence and maintaining inferiority. The community may be a convenient pillow for those societies which are content to slumber; it never yet helped the rise of any.

The rejoinder may come: "Well, let it be. We prefer our alleged slumber to the prospect of rising in the world. Our ideal in life is to rest as much as possible, not to work as hard as possible. Give us the sweet indolence ensured

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by the Communistic formation; we'll have none of the tormenting restlessness to which your Particularistic formation would condemn us."

I quite understand this reasoning: it is human in the extreme. There is but one flaw in it—it is impracticable, and for two peremptory reasons.

First, the very natural circumstances from which the Communistic formation formerly sprang and developed no longer act with the same energy or generality. The Communistic form\* was originally imposed on humanity by the necessities of pastoral life. It began in the Asiatic steppes, amidst those enormous tracts of grass land where humanity started its evolution. As men dispersed, their primary "formation" clung to them persistently, but was more or less modified by their surroundings. The whole of antiquity, as I have said, was under its influence, because their origin was not so remote, and the populations kept to regions that were not very distant from the great central plain of the globe.

Now, the world, especially the West, is no longer subjected to the influences of pastoral life: it is separated from these influences by both time and space. The chief agent of this change was the development of societies of a Particularistic formation, which took place in the West at the commencement of the Christian era, owing to special favourable circumstances which Social Science was the first to point out, and which do not concern us here.†

The natural causes which developed the Communistic formation being now no longer at work, it would be neces-

\* *Vide*, in *La Science Sociale*, articles above quoted on the Communistic formation.

† See *La Science Sociale*, t. I., p. 110 and following. A more complete and more up-to-date account is to be published shortly in that review, being part of my series of lectures, and based on the recent researches made by M. de Tourville.



sary to reconstitute the type by absolutely artificial processes—by compulsion, by dint of legal prescriptions; in short, through the intervention of the State, which would thus become the great patriarch of the collectivist society dreamt of by Socialists.

To accomplish such an artificial creation it would be necessary to work in a direction diametrically opposed to the nature of things; it would be necessary to triumph over the coalitions of all vested interests, since the question would be nothing less than dispossessing all those who hold any portion of the land or any of the means of production. Even if these owners were the most accommodating persons in the world, we do not see exactly how this transformation would come about. But Socialists do not puzzle their minds with such details.

Let us make the hypothesis that they have been successful—although I cannot see how they possibly could be—in establishing the collectivist system in the countries where its theories now exercise some influence. These countries would then have to face the second obstacle which I have pointed out.

What, then, would happen?

All the consequences developed in a Communistic *régime*, either in ancient times or at present in the East, would be produced anew amidst these collectivist societies, in virtue of the uncontested principle that the same causes always produce the same effects. And these effects would be singularly magnified, since the *régime* of the German dreamers leaves far behind it the communism presided over by the Pharaohs.

These societies would therefore be tainted with the same organic inferiority, the same impotence which made the nations of antiquity an easy prey to Roman domination. There are nowadays no Romans to be apprehended; but the Col-



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lectivists would have to face an infinitely more redoubtable foe—that Anglo-Saxon race which is actually conquering the world, thanks to the greatest development of individual initiative ever known in history.

Indeed, the time is well-chosen for inducing people to embrace Socialism!

At a moment when the very force which made the West superior to the East seems to have reached its climax, some wise spirits find no better advice for us than to urge us to adopt the Eastern *régime*—only made narrower and more restrictive!

Ay! the result would not be slow in coming. History guarantees that, and what is happening in our own days ought to teach us the same lesson.

What, indeed, do we see happening around us? We see the nations of the West establishing their dominion over the different nations of the East, founding on their territories colonies and markets, or merely annexing the land without ceremony. Really these good Communists seem made for the express purpose of being conquered. Now, in this gradual conquest of the globe, the Anglo-Saxon race comes easily first. If, therefore, we were cheerfully to embrace the social *régime* of the East, that would be increasing still further the enormous advance of the Anglo-Saxon race over us, and adding yet another prey for them to devour. Any struggle is vain between a race in which individual initiative is highly developed, and one in which it has been repressed, smothered, annihilated. The ultimate result of such a struggle is sure to be the crushing of the latter by the former.

Is this what the German Socialists desire? Are they so particularly anxious to play the part of Redskins *versus* Yankees?

## III.

Is, then, everything at the present time for the best in the best of all possible worlds? No, everything is not for the best, although certain economists seem to think so. The great mistake is in thinking that the solution to the difficulty lies in augmenting the action of the State and lessening individual activity. The obverse is the correct course.

In truth the facts proclaim what needs to be done. We must embrace the social system of those nations which always have risen above the others in the past, and do so in the present—not by the might of arms, but by the formidable might of the social constitution.

Now, it happens that this social system is at the same time the most favourable to the solving of the questions which at present divide the working world,—the labour question, to which the Socialists pretend, most unjustifiably, to have found a solution.

It is indeed in Particularistic countries that the two factors of labour, the employer and the workman, may find the best conditions in which to solve the serious questions to which the advent of vast industries has given rise.

Is there any need for me to demonstrate that the Particularistic formation naturally develops in the employers a bolder genius of initiative, a greater habit of self-reliance than is the case among Communists? Compare here again the East with the West. Now, the above-named qualities are indispensable for the successful direction of labour, in the new and very complicated conditions created by the increased working of the coal-mines. The prominent type of the great employer, capable and enterprising, has obviously reached a higher development among the Anglo-Saxon race than in countries of Communistic tendencies or origin. In-

deed, this is one of the reasons of the preponderance of that race.

But how, it may be objected, does this contribute to the amelioration of the labourer's condition (for that is of course the capital point)? We shall see presently.

It is obvious that if the workmen are to be sure of getting work—advantageous work—the first condition is that the employers be gifted with the capacity of making their industries prosperous. A *régime* which develops the ability of employers is, by the very fact, favourable to improving the workman's lot: prosperous employers can pay better wages; they are able to make certain sacrifices towards the welfare and protection of their *employés*—an impossibility with less capable or enterprising employers, who themselves only eke out a precarious living.

You will object that although able employers *can* so behave to their *personnel*, it does not necessarily follow that they do; it may happen—and often does—that they do not avail themselves of their success for improving the condition of their workmen, but solely for increasing their profits.

This objection is quite correct; this is precisely the point where the remarkable—if unacknowledged—superiority of the Particularistic over the Communistic form is most striking, not only from the employers' point of view, but from the workmen's—yes! the workmen's.

Need I repeat what the Communistic form does with the workman? It makes of him a man incapable of any initiative, of any personal action, any strength or continuity of effort. A mere instrument. Such was the workman of antiquity: such is the workman in the East; such is even, in a certain measure, the German workman. The latter is but a passive instrument in the hands of the leaders, who enrol him with astounding facility—under the various ban-

ners of Revolutionary, Conservative, Evangelic, or Catholic Socialism. The apparent power of the leaders of German Socialism has no other cause: they have to deal with a most malleable material, with a flock that is easily led. This explains the astonishment of these same leaders, when they went over to England and America to start a propaganda: they were amazed to find that the Anglo-Saxon workmen would not let themselves be enrolled or led. This was the surprise of the Communist who finds himself face to face with the Particularist. So one of these ring-leaders (Herr Kirchner) calls the Anglo-Saxon workmen "blind masses."

Are they so blind?

This is what an historian of Socialism writes: "There is no country in Europe *where the workmen have done more towards improving their material condition than England. There have the workmen's funds, assurances, and co-operative societies been multiplied: their Trades' Unions systems have made them capitalists. But all this has been done outside Socialism, and without any pretensions to changing the present system of society.*" \*

They have done all that without allowing themselves to be taken in hand by leaders, or politicians—and that is what the leaders cannot forgive them.

To appreciate all that the Anglo-Saxon workmen have succeeded in doing for themselves in England and in America, through their own exertion and initiative, without claiming—or even accepting—the aid of the State, one should read the history of Trades' Unions. Nothing could be more instructive, or more conclusive of the enormous superiority which the Particularistic formation imparts to the workman.

These Unions participate in the Particularistic character of

\* T. de Wyzewa, "Le Mouvement Socialiste en Europe," p. 211.

the race; they are not like the German associations, tending to become international, or even only national affairs with the ultimate aim of embracing the workmen of the whole world and undertaking to build society anew. They are, on the contrary, very Particularistic groups, each comprising only a category of workmen of one trade, and only united in view of one *distinct* and *limited* end. They do not form an immense machine placed in the hands of a few leaders, who work it for their own greater glory; but a multitude of separate associations, hardly connected together. This is surely not a race enamoured of centralization and authority, but rather one fond of autonomy and independence.

And facts bear testimony to this. "The Trades' Unions," says an historian of these associations, "were for the English workmen a source of moral discipline as well as a means of progress. They have remained animated with a spirit of professional independence, of *particularisme* (the word is there, printed in plain French!), which has resisted every attempt at a general federation or joining together of the activity and resources of all members. Attempts at absolute and permanent centralization have *all failed in the end.*"\*

The total number of Unionists in England alone amounts to one and a half million, and their income to £2,000,000 with a reserve fund of a like amount. Such is the formidable labour power which private initiative alone has produced. Let Germany show us as much!

The movement is equally strong in America, as we indicated above in describing the resistance of the American workmen against Socialism.

But the most remarkable thing is that this formidable power is not set up against what Socialists angrily call the

\* E. Castelot, "Les Unions ouvrières en Angleterre," *Journal des Économistes*, Dec., 1891. This article only summarizes Mr. Howell's "Conflicts of Capital and Labour."



"capital class," but has for its special object the practical improvement of the workman's lot, whether by opposing the lowering of wages, or by applying a considerable portion of their resources to an out-of-work fund for the relief of the compulsory unemployed quite independent of public assistance.

Indeed, in a recent parliamentary inquiry, most employers (*employers*, mark!) acknowledged that, as a class, Unionists are better-skilled workmen and more respectable men than non-unionists of the same trades. "In general," says the author quoted above, "they are content to aim, by legitimate means, at what the English call a higher standard of life, that is to say what Professor Marshall, of Cambridge, defines—a kind of existence which implies increased energy and self-respect. To reach this result, they asked nothing of the State, except Freedom; they solicited no help, no privileges. With the cool tenacity peculiar to the race, the Trades' Unions, which are composed of the pick of the English working classes, remained faithful, for close upon a whole century, to the proud and manly strategy which in the end commanded the esteem of even the most prejudiced minds."

So the Particularistic formation has been able to bring forth, whether as employers or as workmen, the men most capable of solving *for themselves* the social question.

Now suppose the case—and it frequently occurs—of a certain number of employers having nothing in view but their mistaken considerations of private interest, and undertaking to subject their workmen to an odious system of over-work and under-pay, considering them as mere tools that can be used and then thrust aside, employing no means to avoid the cessation of work, and making no provision whatever for preventing the destitution of workmen in old age—suppose this, and tell me whether the workmen of Par-



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ticularistic formation are not a hundred times better armed for the purpose of getting justice done than the workmen of a Communistic formation. They are stronger because their strength resides in themselves, and they can apply resistance directly and practically against the object to be conquered.

To a precise and definite exploiting they oppose precise, definite and practical claims—*not*, as the Socialists, declarations of principles, revolutionary speeches, newspaper articles and chimerical schemes for overturning society—whilst the workmen go on starving.

It may, therefore, be asserted that in England and in America the solution of the labour question has reached a more advanced stage than in other countries; more advanced for the whole category of labour in a decidedly Particularistic formation, whose most considerable nucleus is composed of the members of the Trades' Unions.

As a matter of fact, in these countries the problem really has not any importance except for unskilled labourers, or workers whose callings do not demand any special training, such as the London dock labourers. But it should be borne in mind that such workmen do not belong to the Particularistic formation, which is characterized by an aptitude for self-help. They cannot be classified as Particularists, whether because of their personal failings, or because of their actual Communistic origin, as in the case of the Irish, Highland Scotch, German or Italian immigrants, etc. These are the people that go to swell the number of paupers in England and in the United States; they are the chief element out of which Socialism recruits its adherents—and cosmopolitan revolution its soldiers.

The above simple facts again confirm the general conclusion to which this study tends, viz. the absolute inferiority of the Communistic formation.

The Future undoubtedly is for the nations which have been successful in freeing themselves of Communistic tendencies. It would be wise indeed to realize this truth, instead of wasting time in seeking a solution on old played-out lines the impotence of which had already been recognized in the time of the Pharaohs, and which nowadays is chiefly advocated by the most State-ridden nation in the Western world.

## CHAPTER III.

THE FRENCHMAN AND THE ANGLO-SAXON CONCEIVE A DIFFERENT  
IDEA OF THE FATHERLAND.

IF we really mean to control ideas by facts, and consistently refuse to be satisfied with mere empty words, it is important to realize exactly what there is behind such words as Fatherland and Patriotism—which so many people are wont to use at random, some with unquenchable enthusiasm, others with quite as exaggerated disdain or anger.

Whilst some endeavour to stimulate patriotism, others loudly repudiate any renewed form of the old *Civis sum Romanus*; the latter call “*la Patrie*” a callous, cruel mother, and patriotism an obsolete notion, out-of-date in our social state; they proclaim all men brothers, say the World is their Fatherland—and thus greatly scandalize their fellow-citizens.

Such are the two doctrines. They are irreconcilable, but both can be explained. It is necessary that we should define Patriotism, describe the trend of its evolution in human societies, discover its causes and consequences, and determine whether the idea of the Fatherland is now gaining intensity, or losing ground, or only being modified. Who is right, and who is wrong? The Jingo, or your citizen of the world? And if perchance both are right and wrong at the same time, where lies the error in each of them?

These are puzzling and most delicate questions, in dealing with which much calmness and freedom of mind are required both on the part of the writer and of his readers.

Let us clear our minds for the time of all party or even national spirit, and fancy that we are inhabiting another planet, whence we may impartially consider what is passing on Earth.

Our first statement will be that Patriotism attains very different and unequal developments in various human societies, and is in different places the result of various causes.

We can at least recognize four distinct varieties, which may thus be labelled: Patriotism founded on religious feeling; Patriotism founded on commercial competition; State Patriotism, founded on political ambition; lastly, Patriotism founded on the independence of private life.

## I.

The first variety, *Patriotism founded on the religious feeling*, may be particularly observed among the Arabs, the Touaregs, the Turks, and similar populations.

I have explained elsewhere\* the Social causes which place under the domination of religious brotherhood these peoples who have come from the great Deserts. In the present time, and indeed as far back as we can see in the past, is to be found a group of men whose obvious rôle is always that of the sole, uncontested, all-powerful ruler. This group belongs to no particular tribe, but counts its fanatical adherents in all the tribes, from end to end of the desert; its authority is as general as it is full. It is this group that has been encountered by all conquerors who tried to penetrate into the Desert; the same hitherto insuperable obstacle stands before the English on the Soudanese frontier of Egypt, and before the French on the Sahara frontier of Algeria.

\* *La Science Sociale*, t. XV., p. 315 and following, "Les sociétés issues des Déserts; le type des oasis et des confins agricoles."

These kings of the Desert are the religious brotherhoods; the members are the Khouans (Brothers); the leaders are the Khalifs, Sheikhs, etc., and at times of great religious fermentation, one of them may assume the name of Mahdi, or Envoy of God. At such times, woe to those who attempt to penetrate into the Desert.

These Brotherhoods (Zaiouahs) have branches in all oases.

Thus, in the oasis of Guemar, in the Sahara, which counts only seven or eight hundred habitations, there are yet as many as twelve mosques and four zaiouahs.

The Khouans, or Brothers, have their pass-words, their signs of recognition, and are ruled by an official hierarchy which starts from the grand master, or khalif, and ends with such subaltern agents as the messengers, banner-bearers, guards, etc. There are general assemblies, for the purpose of receiving secret instructions from the khalif, or for the initiation of fresh members, or again to promote the rising of the populations against some interior or exterior foe. These assemblies are patriotic gatherings; these men are the Jingoos of the desert.

This variety of patriotism inspired the societies, which formerly occupied the two large oases of Assyria and Egypt, at least during that first part of their history which extends over the time when, recently issued from the Desert, they still were under the more or less direct domination of the brotherhoods and priests of Ammon.\* Mahomet and his votaries also partook of this variety of patriotism, and so did all societies started under the inspiration of Islam, whether in the Arabian Desert and the Sahara, or at their

\* See in *La Science Sociale*, "L'Egypte ancienne," by M. A. de Préville, t. IX., p. 212 and following; and "Les Chaldéens—Originalité et importance de leur rôle préhistorique," by M. L. Poinssard, t. XVI., p. 206 and following.

two extremities, from Asia Minor to Spain. To these we may add the Turks, who sought in Islam a governmental system that could not be found within their own *régime* as wealthy steppe pastors.

It is sufficient to name these peoples to immediately evoke the idea and character of this variety of patriotism: absolute and pitiless towards its adversaries, because sanctioned by an uncompromising religious doctrine. But it is especially redoubtable because it not only directs the physical activities of the people, but also sways their minds and hearts. Not content with conquering the foe, they also impose their own faith: "Believe, or die!" This patriotism has been a pretext for infinite shedding of blood, and is associated in our minds with the commission of execrable crimes. Religion is no longer anything but religious fury, when it appeals to fear instead of conscience, when violence is its auxiliary. Such patriotism should be branded as an abomination, especially by believers, because it violates and disgraces the highest and noblest things—the religious feeling and God's own justice.

Patriots of this description are the worst of Simoniacs; for do they not, staff or sword in hand, barter holy things for the profit of their mystic passion, hatred, and ambition?

## II.

The second variety, *Patriotism founded on commercial competition*, was special to the divers populations of the shores of the Mediterranean, when that sea was a sort of closed basin. We know that in antiquity, a multitude of independent commercial cities were scattered along the coasts of Phœnicia, Asia Minor, Greece, Macedonia, Spain, and Northern Africa. The competition between them was of course desperate, as triumph over a rival was often for each



a question of life or death. Ancient history is almost wholly composed of such commercial rivalries.

These cities therefore found it a necessity to be organized in view of defensive and offensive warfare, as each formed a little world in itself, and could only rely on itself. Their constant care was therefore to train their young men in all bodily exercises. Strength, dexterity, suppleness, skill with the bow became the qualities most valued in a young man, and the public games which in all these cities assumed so much importance were but a form of that uneasy patriotism.

Patriotism was then local—of the city. *Civitas, Urbs*, these two words are all-important in antiquity, and fill the pages of ancient authors. All the beautiful deeds which they relate, and with which we still piously (and foolishly) cram the memories of our schoolboys, are manifestations of this kind of patriotism.

A city was as proud of its athletes as of its philosophers, because both kinds were a necessary and natural product of the social state.\* “Crotona,” says Strabo, “appears to have applied her energy to forming mostly athletes and soldiers. It happened once, for instance, that in the same Olympiad the seven conquerors of the *stadion* were all from Crotona, so that they could boast that the last of the Crotonians was yet the first of the Greeks.” The winners in these games were held in such esteem that the most magnificent honours were conferred upon them, and the most renowned sculptors disputed among themselves the glory of making their statues. There could be seen at Olympia the statue of the Crotonian Astylos, who had won the highest honour in three consecutive Olympiads. Philip, son of Buttaeos,

\* See on this subject, in *La Science Sociale*, “A travers l’Italie méridionale,” by M. de Moustiers, t. V., p. 245 and following; and “Les Ancêtres de Socrate,” by M. d’Azambuja, t. XIX.

conqueror in the Olympic games, and the handsomest Greek of his time, married the daughter of Telys, tyrant of Sybaris, and was after his death counted amongst the heroes. Phayllos had a statue in Delphi, after winning three prizes in the Pythian games: the inscription on the statue mentioned that he could jump 55 feet and throw the disc 95 paces. He was one of the heroes of the battle of Salamis. But the most celebrated athlete was Milo of Crotona. He won six victories in the Olympic, seven in the Pythian, ten in the Isthmian, and nine in the Nemean games. His reputation had reached the extreme East, and flourished at the court of the Persian king. Olympia had a bronze statue of him by Dameos, his compatriot. He took a brilliant part in the struggle of his own city against Sybaris.

To surpass the Olympic games was the ambition of all these cities. Thus we hear of Sybaris and Crotona instituting solemn games and offering splendid prizes in money; in the hope of attracting the Greeks of Italy, Sicily, and even of the cities of Asia Minor. This was the distant origin of the shameful fights of gladiators which were in after times to dishonour the Roman decadence.

Such were the forms of patriotism which the necessity of resisting commercial competition developed in the cities of the Mediterranean. It was a patriotism resting on the love of lucre, stained with cupidity, and essentially narrow. These armed contests and ceaseless struggles, which history describes in too bright colours, after all had for their end the ruin by brutal force of rivals that could not be beaten by commercial skill.

The pure love of the Fatherland, and a wish to sacrifice themselves for its sake, filled the minds of those ancient merchants less than is generally supposed. Indeed, when the cities were sufficiently wealthy, they no longer recruited

their defenders amongst themselves, but raised armies of mercenaries. "From 560 B.C." (a year marked by one of their defeats) "the Crotonians," says Justinus, "gave up their endeavours to attain military valour and skill in the use of arms. They abandoned themselves to the same indulgence in luxury and indolence as the very Sybarites." After Crotona came the turn of Tarentum, whose "military virtues were also lost in corruption and effeminacy."

Upon the whole, this much-vaunted patriotism may be reduced to a somewhat commonplace drama in two acts. In the first act, the cities endeavour to destroy each other in order to terminate their commercial rivalry; in the second act, the cities made triumphant by might are conquered in their turn by a foe of another social type.

### III.

The third variety, *State Patriotism founded on political ambition*, is more particularly developed in societies given to large public powers and to central administration, of which France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Spain are the most characteristic representatives in our own times. In the past, the Roman Empire belonged to that variety.

Here power is not represented by religious brotherhoods or commercial municipalities, but by military leaders, or leaders supported by military forces and a host of docile officials; these leaders rule vast territories, and wield enormous resources in men and in money.

Such State leaders are admirably adapted for waging war, since they hold in their hands all the live forces of a country, where everything is more or less subordinate to the State. Soldiers and officials have no will but that of the State which pays their stipends. The army is naturally more inclined to favour war than peace, and respect the head

of the State—whether monarchy or republic—in proportion to his exploits or victories.

These conditions are incentives to warlike government. War, to such a ruler, is often a means of supplanting a rival: hence the innumerable series of wars waged under various pretexts, but the real reasons for which are to be sought in personal or dynastic ambition. There is a great temptation in taking possession of a supreme power which victory suffices to sanction.

When once installed, however, the difficulty is to keep it standing; that, indeed, is no easy task, amidst the crowd of opposite interests, roused by an exorbitant Authority—whose work it is to think, speak, and act for all. His very omnipotence is bound to weigh on a ruler of this description, until he must succumb—if it were not that war again presents itself as a convenient diversion, and a means of distracting the public mind from interior difficulties. And this is the general cause of another series of wars most frequent in history.

If the sovereign is victorious, his power is still increased, and he then wages war, no longer in order to maintain his authority, but with the aim of exalting it, extending his domination, and perchance founding one of those huge empires which make the delight of historians and the misery of the people. Of such is made the whole category of so-called great monarchs who cumber the avenues of History, and whose reigns mark its principal stages.

But those enormous powers are so contrary to nature, they imply such misdeeds in public life and such calamities in private life, that they never can last long: they generally fall down with a great crash almost immediately after the death of the hero, and often before. Then comes another series of wars on the part of the successor—and so forth, for generations and generations.

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Most of these wars are undertaken in defiance of the public feeling; for the people have need of peace, as they cannot live unless they work—and war is the ruin of work. Yet public feeling finds expression with difficulty in societies of that type, all private activity being repressed by the administrative centralization. The mass of the population, given to useful, obscure, meritorious labour—the producers, the workers who alone feed the Budget—have been gradually reduced to impotence, and deprived of any social activity by the all-pervading public Power; they now obey the Government, they obey the officials, they obey the politicians. Could any one think of resisting the State under Philip II., under Louis XIV., under the Convention, under Napoleon, under William I.?

Now, those powers—remarkably organized though they be for satisfying the ruler's ambition—cannot be sure to be followed, nor to obtain the enormous sacrifices in men and money which they demand, unless they invoke the interest of the Fatherland and over-excite the patriotic feeling.

*They* are passionately fond of peace: at least they say so louder than any. War is the worst of all scourges, as they repeatedly proclaim. (Read the German Emperor's speech at the Kiel fêtes: the word "peace" is there a dozen times.) Yet their lives are spent in waging war—or in preparing for it. And this indefinite preparing for war is more ruinous to the country than war itself, and drains it of men and money.

The more ruinous this social *régime* becomes, the more necessary it is to appeal to the patriotic feeling. It were difficult to reckon to what degree of patriotism a ruined people can reach, or to what degree of ruin it can sink, through the very paroxysm of patriotism. We can form some idea of it, however, by studying the actual situation



of Italy.\* That country offers, from a scientific and social point of view, a most interesting spectacle: it shows us exactly where ends the road we are following at the present time. If you want a proof of it, in an identical case, look at Spain. Italy and Spain, Spain and Italy; they are the double example I wish to show up to the patriots of the two worlds. If you want more examples, take the republics of Southern America.

I forget who (but one of a singularly sincere mind) said: "You would shrink back with horror, if you were to discover what there is underneath the word *Patrie*." We can entertain no doubt that the greater part of the bloody deeds which disgrace history, and make of it such immoral reading, were committed in the name of patriotism.

I am fully aware that at this point of the present chapter I must have shocked the ideas of a certain number of my readers: their patriotism—or Jingoism—protests. I wish to address these specially, and ask them: "Frankly, are you such great patriots as all that?" I mean patriots in deeds, as I know perfectly well that the number of patriots in words is a large one. But here words do not count. I am afraid many are under a delusion.

Patriotism is principally expressed by two tangible acts: the paying of the tax in money, and the payment of the tax in blood.

You pay punctually the tax in money: the fear of the collector is the beginning of wisdom; besides, you cannot do otherwise. But you protest mightily against the increasing weight of public charges; and if any candidate promises a diminution in the taxes, you will vote for him.

\* By a cruel irony of Fate, the portico of one of the pieces in the fireworks at the last celebration of the anniversary of the Unity of Italy, opened on to the ruins of a quarter of the "Third Rome"—ruined before its completion.



I affirm that by acting thus you show yourself a bad patriot in the sense just ascribed to the word. The system which you uphold, and which I attack, can only be worked, as you very well know, with enormous expenditure of money. If you really were animated with patriotism, if that feeling were as much in your heart as in your head, instead of being only a sort of unreasoned attitude on your part, you would not bargain with the State over the money it needs for feeding that form of patriotism. Pay without complaining; the more you pay, the more triumphant your patriotism is, and the more you ought to rejoice.

I have a right to be dissatisfied, because I consistently seize every opportunity of protesting against the social system founded on such patriotism. You have *not*, and you cannot protest without contradicting yourself.

The other tax imposed by your patriotism, that of blood—how do you pay it, O Patriots?

It is a mystery for nobody that all Frenchmen, even the most Jingo, have but one great care—how to escape the three years' service, how to save their sons from it: they have no greater anxiety in life.

If military service is useful to the Fatherland, why try to escape it? If it is useless, why insist on maintaining it? Is there not a sort of contradiction in upholding it, and yet wishing to escape it?

Since the new military law has been passed, the schools that help young men to dispense with two years out of the three are filled to overflowing with candidates. Several of these crammers were in danger of being obliged to close; now they have pupils galore. At the *Ecole de Droit* (Law Schools) the test for entrance has even been made less crucial, which, of course, will also lower the standard of studies, so that it may be possible to deliver more of the diplomas the possession of which means two years less under

the military yoke. The professors remember that they are fathers, their paternal feeling is less uncompromising than their Jingoism.

Among the senators and deputies, how many are there whose sons go through the three years' service? Are there ten of them? So, we are willing to give our votes to three years' service, but not our sons.

Upon the whole, this variety of patriotism rests on the pursuit of political domination by means of war, and a disproportionate extension of the public powers. But it imposes such crushing obligations on the populations, that each man, after singing lustily the expected anthem, hastens to avoid its exorbitant charges. These charges then fall on the shoulders of the smaller fry, the weaker, the *naïfs*—in a word, on the people, whom they crush and ruin. And when driven to the last extremity, the people rise and rid themselves violently of the Louis XIVths, of the *Conventionnels*, of the Napoleons, only to succeed in falling within the clutches of other rogues of the same description, who, in such a social state as ours, are always lying in wait.

#### IV.

Now for the last variety—*Patriotism founded on the independence of private life.*

I classify under this head a whole group of societies among whom patriotism and the idea of the Fatherland are manifested under a form wholly different from the three preceding forms.

In this case, men consider that the Fatherland is the home, and that the abstract interest to be protected is the absolute freedom of the home and its inmates. To him the political Fatherland has no other aim than to facilitate the maintenance of private independence. He does not con-

sider, like the preceding type, that man is made for the Fatherland, but the Fatherland for man. He is less anxious to be a citizen of a great country than to be a free citizen. Indeed, he is a man before being a citizen.

This form of patriotism, so different from the Latin form, first made its appearance in the West of Europe in the fifth century of our era. It was imported into Gaul by the Franks, and into Great Britain by the Saxons. Franks and Saxons belonged to the same social formation, which social science designates under the name of *Particularistic formation*, because, contrarily to the tradition bequeathed by the Roman Empire, its participants make the individual (*le particulier*) predominate over the State.

The first effect of that predominance, in France and in Great Britain, was an indefinite parcelling out of the supreme power. There were really, in the Middle Ages, as many sovereignties as estates; each private person was a sovereign on his land: he conducted his own police and administered justice. A quantity of little *patries*\* took the place of the great Roman *patria*.

I have not to deal here with the various reasons why that form of society gradually disappeared in France to be replaced by the great centralized type of monarchy, and why, on the other hand, it was preserved in England. The fact is, we may nowadays observe it chiefly amongst populations of the Anglo-Saxon race—that is, in Great Britain, in its many colonies, and in the United States of America.

\* Even while disagreeing with the Author as to his notion of British patriotism, any critic must recognize that there is in Great Britain nothing that corresponds exactly to the French idea of *patrie*. There is no word in the English language to translate it with accuracy. The word "fatherland" is inadequate—and indeed is but seldom used by Britons in connection with their own country.—TRANS.

To make more precise this form of patriotism, it may be sufficient to recall a few well-known and characteristic facts.

The first is *the extraordinary facility with which the individual expatriates himself without any idea of return*—not to some spot in the neighbourhood of the frontier, but farther, considerably farther, to other climes, often to the antipodes. The Anglo-Saxon colonist is evidently imbued with the notion that he takes his *patrie* with him, that his own country is wherever in the world he may live in freedom. The second fact is the *independence of the colonies as toward the mother-country*. So long as they remain united to the mother-country, the colonies preserve great independence, inso-much that they administer their affairs and enjoy self-government. They do not consider that patriotism consists in allowing themselves to be hectored over or exploited by the mother-country. But even this union is but an ephemeral circumstance; it has not proceeded much beyond the period of formation and education: the English colonies, like young Englishmen, have a tendency to expatriate themselves. Thus England has already seen the United States separate themselves from her, and separatist tendencies are daily more and more visible on the part of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the South African Colonies. “The inhabitants of the English colonies,” says a contemporary traveller, “are proud nowadays to call themselves Australians, Canadians, Africans. A separate national feeling is growing fast, promoted by John Bull himself; every Englishman that settles in one of the colonies, after a few years is no longer an Englishman—he is a Canadian, an Australian, a South-African, and he swears by his new country. It is by mere courtesy to the mother-country that these Anglo-Saxons accept governors, and on the express condition that the latter shall keep as much out of politics

as the Queen herself and the other members of the Royal family." \*

A third and no less characteristic fact is *the complete repudiation of militarism*. England, "which counts four times as many subjects as all the other great Powers of Europe, has yet the smallest permanent army to lean on. Her regular army is composed of about 100,000 men." † This is one-sixth of the French, German, or Russian armies; one-quarter of the Austrian army, and one-third of that of Italy—these figures being, of course, on *peace* footing.

It comes perhaps thirtieth or fortieth, if we take into account the number of subjects.

But what follows shows even better how little these people are organized in view of war. "Conscription does not exist in England, and the Government is not able to raise, from among the people, the troops it might use in fighting against the will of the people. Every year the military forces would be dismissed, in fact, if Parliament did not vote their maintenance. In principle, the sovereign has not the right to keep a permanent army without the sanction of the Commons, which provide the necessary funds, and every year proclaim the Mutiny Act, which has been the base of the military code." ‡ Note that conscription exists no longer in the navy; the sailors are recruited, like the soldiers, by means of enlistment.

In the United States, the army is still smaller; it comprises, on peace footing, only 26,000 men—for their enormous territory and population.

The development of peace societies is another criterion of these anti-military tendencies. Such associations have not

\* Max O'Rell, "John Bull & Co."

† Elisée Reclus, "Nouvelle Géographie Universelle," t. IV., pp. 879, 881.

‡ Ibid., p. 879.



assumed any great extension anywhere out of Great Britain or the United States. According to a document which lies before me, the different French societies count about 1200 adherents, the one German society mentioned only counts 70, whilst five English societies have over 25,000 adherents, exclusive of *the* Peace Society, founded in 1816, which possesses several thousands. In the United States, one single society counts several million members. Societies of this description are numerous in the States, and constantly increasing.

Lastly, we may name, as another indication, *the tendency to settle international difficulties, not by war but by arbitration*. Since 1816, seventy-two arbitration treaties have been signed between different countries in the whole world. Out of this number twenty-three concerned England, and thirty-six the United States. All the other countries together have had recourse to arbitration only thirteen times. These figures prove that the patriotism of the Anglo-Saxon race is better expressed by arbitration than by the might of arms.

## V.

We may now pass a comparative judgment of these four varieties of patriotism.

*Patriotism founded on the religious feeling* is now confined to the Great Desert, where the Mussulman brotherhoods keep it alive with difficulty; at any rate it no longer has any action abroad. Among the Western nations, religion tends more and more to the practice of tolerance; proselytes use no longer force, but persuasion: religion nowadays only sways consciences, and no longer requires armed authority to recruit its adherents. This variety is therefore in general decline.

*Patriotism founded on commercial competition* has also had



its day. The causes which formerly gave rise to it in the Mediterranean Sea are no longer at work. The ancient Phœnician, Carthaginian, Grecian—and after them the Venetian and Genoese—cities no longer exist, or barely exist: their irremediable ruin and decay show what this kind of patriotism is worth as a social force. Nowadays, competition has become “the soul of commerce;” even whilst Governments do their best to weaken or limit it with custom-house duties, nations are brought closer together and upon the whole trade more and more freely from one end of the world to the other.

This is another form of patriotism with which we need no longer reckon, and which may be consigned with the other to the records of Ancient History.

Unfortunately we cannot say the same of the third variety.

*State patriotism, founded on political ambition, is not dead.* But it is in a worse decline than is generally supposed. It presents this unmistakable symptom, offered by most things condemned to an early end—that it can only be kept alive by artificial processes and more and more violent stimulants. Moreover it enforces on the populations exorbitant and ever-increasing charges. It is a probability that between France and Germany, for instance, the conquered nation will in the end be the one that succumbs first to the heavy taxation imposed by a peace that is more onerous than war. But when that time comes, the victorious one will not be in a much better condition than the other.

The real conquerors will be the societies which belong to our fourth variety.

This variety, possessing *patriotism founded on the independence of private life*, presents all the symptoms of things that grow and have a great future.

1. *This patriotism works naturally*, without any necessity for exterior and unceasing stimulants. It is the prod-

uct of a social state which develops in man a spontaneous need of independence and engenders dislike of all useless State-imposed constraints. To maintain that independence and absence of constraints, the individual needs but obey his most natural instincts. Such a form of patriotism is as easy as eating and drinking and sleeping.

2. *This patriotism develops wealth.* It does so negatively by economy, by the absence of all the ruinous charges imposed by militarism; it does so positively, by stimulating every energy in private life. Societies of this type are undoubtedly the wealthiest on earth—and are made so by their own work.

3. *This form of patriotism raises the moral standard.* I must insist on this point, because our *chauvinisme* has inculcated in us false ideas on this score. "Chauvin" says and repeats that War is a great source—perhaps the greatest source—of moral elevation, and that if there were an end of all war there would be a lowering of the ethical standard of humanity. This assumption may be useful for keeping nations ready to spring at one another's throats, but it is contrary to the most elementary facts.

The savages of Southern America and Africa are constantly at war for the possession of the hunting territories: they ought therefore to have attained long ago the highest degree of moral worth; as a matter of fact, theirs is the last degree. If we consult the history of civilized peoples, we find that periods of invasions, and wars, those periods when warlike patriotism reaches its climax, are at the same time those when man seems at the lowest ebb of morality. Then the historian has to deal with an accumulation of murder, fratricidal strife, and crime of all descriptions such as can hardly be classified under the head of "high moral standard." Prurient ambition, and the desire of conquest and domination are enough to account for the

leaders trampling under foot every moral consideration; on the other hand, the excitement and intoxication of the *mêlée* incite the soldiers to those acts of cruelty, violence, and debauchery which the common sense of the French language calls "*les actes d'une soldatesque effrénée.*"

It may be objected that the actual military *régime* does not imply such acts—at least, not in the same degree. This is quite true; but in our present state, the loss of moral feeling, if different, is none the less very real.

Nowadays, fortunately, the state of war is exceptional; the normal state for the soldier is armed peace. We are already far removed from the warrior whose life was spent in the midst of the fray: the present soldier spends his life in barracks, learning how to handle arms which in all likelihood he will never use. He is almost like a peaceful *bourgeois* who lives on his income in consols.

Now, we do not clearly see what life in barracks can add to the moral development of the individual—although we can very clearly see what such a life does to hinder it.

Comparative idleness and a life destitute of all initiative and responsibility, spent in a state of utter promiscuity, are not highly moral conditions. The re-enlisted man, who represents the soldier at his highest power, never was considered as a model of moral excellence. One of the most visible signs of a man's moral worth is his capacity to triumph over himself, in making the necessary exertions to surmount the difficulties of life—in short, in obeying the grim law of Work. Well, it is a well-known fact that military service does much to destroy this capacity in young men. The average pensioner is good for nothing but office work or police work; he finds it hard to return to his calling, whether that of an agricultural labourer or of a workman. He finds the old work decidedly too much for him. His passing through barracks has therefore perceptibly diminished his moral worth.

The officer, on the other hand, is influenced by his surroundings in a somewhat unfortunate way. There are hard-working officers, and these partly escape the enervating effects of barracks-life. In this, however, their situation is in no way different from that of the common herd of civilians who are also compelled to work if they would live. But there are also the officers who do not work—I mean, who merely go through the strict round of their military duties. The latter gradually yield to the temptation of spending their considerable leisure time in the *cafés*, in gambling, walking about, visiting, or in various distractions. I should like to know how far these different occupations can contribute towards making the officer superior to the “*pékin*” (as the French soldiers call the civilian)?

If we now examine the nations which have got rid of those two expressions of State patriotism—functionarism and militarism—we find that they thereby escape the causes of degeneracy inherent in these two institutions. The young people, not looking forward to the easy, ready-made berths of the administration and of the army, have to go in for the commoner professions, which require stronger exertion and more original activity, whilst offering less security and more responsibility. At any rate, the efforts they make in creating their own careers and providing for their families, impart to them an energy and moral worth which were never produced by an idle and easy life.

4. *This form of patriotism contributes to the speedier expansion of the race throughout the world.*

Whilst on both sides of the Rhine and of the Alps we are trying, by all possible means, to warm up a weakening patriotism; whilst we are passing reviews of our troops and celebrating military anniversaries, one adversary, whom we do not see or whom we despise because he is not, like us, armed to the teeth, is tranquilly furrowing the seas with

his innumerable ships, and gradually filling the world with his innumerable colonists.

The obsolete idea lingers with us—that the strength of a race is mostly derived from the force of its public powers. If this was the right idea, the Latin races would by this time be the masters of the world, whereas they are giving way on all points to the Anglo-Saxon race, whose public powers are reduced and peace-abiding.

If we understood this well, we should be in the best condition for taking on Germany that revenge of which we hear so much: we should seek our revenge, not in military predominance, which weakens the conqueror as much as the conquered one, but in social predominance—the only real predominance, because it is founded on work and the independence of private life.

The state of war, or the armed peace which is its corollary, is not an unavoidable necessity; it is simply a natural concomitant of the different types of societies which have prevailed hitherto, all of which were more or less founded on an exaggerated importance of the public powers. With those societies which have succeeded in shaking off such social conditions, war is but an occasional occurrence; each one still keeps a nominal army, so as to be able to defend itself in case of attack on the part of any of those backward societies which are still keeping to the old military system.

If, now, we wished to sum up the foregoing considerations in one brief formula, we might say—

That State patriotism, founded on political ambition, is but an artificial, spurious patriotism, which leads peoples to ruin.

Real patriotism, on the contrary, consists in energetically maintaining private independence against the development and encroachments of the State, because such is the only way of ensuring social power and prosperity for the Fatherland.



## CHAPTER IV.

### THE FRENCHMAN'S AND THE ANGLO-SAXON'S RESPECTIVE NOTIONS OF SOLIDARITY ARE DIFFERENT.

THE theory of the Solidarity of mankind is fashionable just now in France, and an ex-Prime Minister, M. Bourgeois, has recently made a special study of it.\*

He makes out that this doctrine is claimed as their own by very different people: by the Christian Socialists, by some economists of the German school, by a few philosophers—such as M. Fouillée and M. Izoulet—and by the Positivists, who call it “altruism.”

“But for all, although under different names, the doctrine is substantially the same, and comes to this fundamental idea: There is between each individual and all the others a necessary tie of solidarity.”

If this was the whole thesis, it would be as acceptable as inoffensive; in fact, it would only be a truism. But we must not be deceived by appearances. In reality, the partisans of this doctrine mean to solve the whole of the social problem by Solidarity.

The real question they put is this: *Either the individual is to be subordinate to society, or society is to be subordinate to the individual.* The lovers of Solidarity pronounce themselves in favour of the first part of the alternative. Obviously, then, the problem is of some importance, and deserves to be examined.

\* “Solidarité,” a pamphlet: Armand Colin, publisher, Paris.



## I.

According to M. Bourgeois—and this is his fundamental argument—man is subordinate to society, because he is a debtor. Moreover, he is not only indebted to his contemporaries, but “he is born a debtor of the human association”—that is to say, of the past generations; “for he takes his share of an inheritance accumulated by his own and other men’s ancestors.”

The author’s line of demonstration is immediately apparent, but we can quite as readily see our way to answer him.

“Men,” says he, “exchange mutual services in the course of their common life,” therefore they have solidary with one another.

True, you may answer, but they also exchange mutual blows and compete against each other; therefore, they are not solidary of one another.

“Even at his birth, man enters into the enjoyment of an enormous capital saved by preceding generations;” therefore he is a debtor.

Just so; but those anterior generations have at the same time diminished the sum total of natural products on which man subsists, and reduced the proportion of soil at the disposal of each: they have made the struggle for existence harder. Man is therefore a creditor.

We might continue such a dialogue for long, without advancing the question by one iota; it is a mere schoolboy game, after which each interlocutor remains convinced that he has silenced his adversary.

As a matter of fact, men have interests both solidary and separate; they are both debtors and creditors to society.

The difficulty ought to be cleared; and M. Bourgeois’s pamphlet offers us an opportunity of doing so.

Let us start from the idea which seems dearest to him, on which he repeatedly insists, and upon which he bases his principal argument in favour of the predominance of society over the individual. "Man is born a debtor to the human association: on entering it, he finds ready his share of an inheritance accumulated by his own and other men's ancestors . . . so that the most modest worker of our time is as much superior to a savage of the Stone Age as he himself is inferior to a man of genius. . . .

"The history of humanity is that of the conquest of the Earth and of the use of its forces, through exertions and sacrifices the number and magnitude of which are beyond any measure of calculation. And this our race has done in full knowledge and with the deliberate aim of allowing each member of humanity to find at his advent a state fit for the development of his activity and faculties, a state better and more satisfactory to his body, his intellect, and his conscience." \*

That is settled. Man owes society all progress accomplished by society; he owes to his society his actual superiority over "the Stone Age savage."

The question now, the only question, the whole question, is to know how all that social progress was accomplished. Was it accomplished by society's predominance over the individual, or the reverse?

In other words, was the progress by which the individual now profits, the progress for which you contend man is indebted to society (so as to subordinate him to the community), was that progress accomplished by collective exertion or by individual exertion—by societies where public action was predominant, or by societies where private action was predominant?

It is not indeed admissible that you should found your

\* "Solidarité," pp. 117, 118, 128.

theory on the progress accomplished by humanity, and yet wilfully ignore the social conditions in which and through which that progress was realized.

Reduced to the terms we have just set, the question becomes clearer. Indeed, any one can realize the following facts:—

Modern societies have contributed more to the social progress than ancient societies, and Western societies more than Eastern societies.

Now, modern and Western societies owe their social superiority solely to the increase of individual action and the diminution of collective action.

As we gradually proceed from the past to the present, or from the East to the West, the personality of the individual assumes a more original entity, and private action is more conspicuous than public action, the private man more conspicuous than the State. We pass from servitude to free labour, from labour in common to individual labour; from collective property to personal property; from the patriarchal family to the separate couple; from the tribe, caste, clan, and closed corporations to civil independence and political equality; from autocratic or absolute monarchies or republics to liberal and parliamentary monarchies and republics.

In short, in the social evolution progress follows exactly the ratio of the predominance of the private individual over the group or State. At present, if we consider only the races of the West, the first place in the evolution is precisely that taken by the most progressive, the most enterprising, which are also the most expansive and command the greatest wealth.

All this is so clear, so well-known, so proven, that I need not insist on it.

Besides, M. Bourgeois is really of the same opinion as

myself, and has well seen the weak point of the social system which lurks under his use of the vague but very safe word—Solidarity. He quite realizes that this system is bound to end in crushing the individual, and therefore in smothering that social progress which he invokes, for he tries to answer in advance the objection which he foresees.

“In the history of societies, as in that of species,” says he, “it is acknowledged that the struggle *for individual development is the primary condition of all progress*, that the free exercise of personal activity and faculties *alone* can impress the initial motion; and finally that the more this primary independence of individuals is increased and fortified physically, psychologically, and morally, *the more the social action is and ought to be increased in its turn.*” \*

No one could say this better. But immediately after the author weakens this affirmation so as to fit it to his argument: these individual forces ought not to be left to themselves! “The association of disciplined individual acts (disciplined by might, in *régimes* of authority; by consent, in more liberal *régimes*) alone could make possible and keep going any communities—families, tribes, cities, castes, Churches, or nations.” †

The best organization is, therefore, that “where there is an equilibrium between the units and the whole, so that the whole may exist for the units and the units for the whole; where the two simultaneous effects of progress,—the increase of individual life and that of social life—which had been believed to be contrary to one another, shall be really inseparable.” ‡

Theoretically, this mixture of private activity and public discipline is fascinating enough. The author obviously

\* “Solidarité,” p. 62.

† Ibid, p. 64.

‡ Ibid., p. 63.

wishes to satisfy everybody. But in what proportions is the mixture to be served? And who is to dispense it? Who indeed is capable of dispensing it—for this social chemistry is infinitely more complicated than ordinary chemistry. Will M. Bourgeois tell us that?

He makes the question the object of a chapter entitled, "Practical doctrine of social solidarity." The following is the most characteristic passage: "The formula which is to determine the social tie should take into account the nature and aim of human society, the conditions under which each member enters it in his turn, the common advantages and common charges he is to find; in short, it should recognize what each brings to the community and what each receives from it, and establish as it were each member's credit and debit account, so as to regulate from it each man's rights and duties.

"Positive legislation can then be but the practical expression of this formula of equitable division of the profits and charges of the association. Legislation is not to create rights between men, but only to acknowledge those created by their reciprocal situations; in other words, the Law's task shall be limited to recognizing these circumstantial rights and sanctioning them.

"By analyzing the necessary connections between the objects of Association, it (the Law) shall fix at the same time the necessary connections between the consciences of the members.

"The Law, therefore, shall not be made by Society and imposed upon Men—it shall be the Law inherent in the society of men."\*

M. Bourgeois apparently hopes that men shall become—in the distant future, no doubt—wise and enlightened enough to form a sort of social contract, a voluntary asso-

\* "Solidarité," p. 94.

ciation in which they will co-ordinate "hostile forces into results useful to each and all, and will prepare the advent of a *régime* of peace and contracts on the ruins of the *régime* of war and authority."\*

This is assuredly the vision of an accomplished philosopher: and such is the aim to which humanity ought to tend and might tend. But we find it the more difficult to follow the author into that distant future because we cannot see how his conclusion is constant to his premises. He pointed to two forces in humanity—individual action, and collective action; he acknowledged that the progress had been actually accomplished by the former, and yet concludes to the necessity of developing the latter; and it is from this latter force that he expects "the advent of a *régime* of peace and contracts."

I do not believe I am far out in saying that this contradiction is voluntary. M. Bourgeois is above all a politician; his chief care is to gather many clients and partisans, to keep them and increase their number as much as possible.

He feared he might frighten them away by saying:—My good friends, life is not all beer and skittles. Far from it. 'Tis a daily struggle against all kinds of never-ending difficulties. In order to triumph over these difficulties, you should rely on yourselves much more than on any one else. All that parents, friends, neighbours, or the State can do to help you is very little, compared to what you can do yourselves. . . . If you only set about it, etc., etc.

It may be granted that although such a speech would be very manly and capable of affecting favourably a few choice spirits, yet it is not of a nature to stir the crowd, especially those people who attach themselves to the fortunes of a

\* It strikes us M. Bourgeois has borrowed this idea from Proudhon. *Vide* "Idée générale de la Révolution au XIXème Siècle," by Proudhon.



politician and who count on his success to promote their own. Such people expect a good deal—if not everything—from the State, from the great Collectivity.

There is, therefore, a better chance of drawing them by promising them social rising through solidarity. Solidarity is a convenient if hazy formula—one that will be acceptable to all and stand in nobody's way, one, moreover, which changes nothing in the present humdrum. This sort of thing pleases the mass of voters, who thus are not asked to exert themselves, and who always find it more convenient to count on the help of others; it also pleases the politician, the sociologist, the philosopher and the philanthropist, who may then assume at little expense the attitude of men who can sympathize with human miseries.

But if that is sufficient for making a *clientèle* for the statesman, it is not sufficient for raising the condition of humanity: it tends to make it worse, for there is in solidarity a larger proportion of illusion than of reality. I will now try to show this briefly.

## II.

First, it is not sufficient to preach or proclaim that men have solidarity with one another, and that men ought to help each other so as to promote the reign of solidarity. The tendency to lean on the group and to subordinate the individual to society, develops itself in human societies, according to very precise laws, which observation reveals, and with which our readers are acquainted by this time. Where these laws exist, there does the tendency produce itself, without any need of preaching: it springs forth with the regularity and spontaneity of a natural phenomenon.

Unfortunately—and this is where the illusion of solidarity

is most striking—the more this tendency is developed and the individual made subordinate to society, the more the man falls into a habit of leaning on the community and the less he relies on self, the more passive does he become when opposed to the difficulties of life; his will, energy, and power of exertion are blunted. There is no other cause for the inferiority of the East to the West.

As individual capacity decreases under such influences, the patronizing power of society—which is but another expression for social solidarity—ought to increase in the same proportion. Unfortunately, it is the contrary that happens; and that this is so is easy to realize, since society, to which men are so fond of appealing, is, after all, but the result and the *ensemble* of the individuals who compose it. Society being composed of individuals, what weakens and impoverishes each individual also weakens and impoverishes the whole of society. I apologize for having to frame such obvious truths.

This comes to saying that the more necessary the appeal to solidarity is, the more difficult and unavailing it becomes.

This social system has, therefore, a double drawback; it brings forth incapables, and multiplies their number more and more, and at the same time it becomes less and less fitted to assist them.

Solidarity, social assistance, is upon the whole an unavailing, or at the best can only be a transitory and occasional remedy for excessive suffering. It is not by any means a remedy that cures; it is a sedative, an anæsthetic which may momentarily suppress acute pain; but it puts the patient asleep as well as the pain.

The other drawback to the practice of the doctrine of Solidarity is that it implies a previous consent on the part of society, the famous social contract which M. Bourgeois sighs for.

On the contrary, the substitution of individual exertion for collective exertion places public salvation in the hands of each individual, in the same way that religion places in the hands of each individual his eternal salvation. Indeed, social salvation is, like eternal salvation, an individual, not a collective, matter. It is the business of each man to solve for himself the problem of life, and by education to place his children in the best possible conditions for doing likewise.

When men are convinced that social progress is an individual task, each man acquires a feeling that he ought to count on himself alone, and a disposition to exercise more thoroughly his personal energy, will, and activity.

Would we then extol Selfishness as a social virtue?

The word is out, the word that frightens so many people. But the subject should be made clear, so as to show on which side the defenders of selfishness really are.

I have stated that solidarity is an illusion; I will add, although there may be loud protestations, that it is a form of selfishness: solidarity is unconfessed selfishness. I had been tempted to entitle this chapter "The Selfishness of Altruism." You shall see that this is not a mere verbal paradox.

There are two sides to Solidarity: there is the assistance we give others; but there is also the assistance we expect from others.

Now, I ask you—which is the fascinating side of the doctrine? What is it that draws adherents to it? Is it the idea of helping others, or that of being helped by others?

Any one who wishes to help others is free to do so at any time. Indeed, people have been doing so since the beginning of the world, without making a social doctrine of it, without trumpeting the fact. It is, therefore, not the idea of assisting others that accounts for the popularity of the new solidarist theory.

It is to be accounted for by the wish to be assisted, patronized, pensioned in some way by the State, the social collectivity. *There* is the fascination; *that* is what appeals to the crowd, and at once reveals the Selfishness latent under the garb of Solidarity.

The citizen who feeds the Budget, and the citizen who is fed by it are both exercising solidarity, but in two very different ways, and it is clear that there is more satisfaction in the part which the second citizen takes in the performance. A man is more pleased in his *rôle* as a functionary or official than in his *rôle* as a taxpayer: any man is bound to consider solidarity from two points of view, and to prefer the one.

In truth, man is more naturally inclined to exploit his fellow man than to help him, in spite of M. Bourgeois's allegations. Here are two recent illustrations, borrowed from our processes of colonization.

The first is given by a professor of philosophy, M. Lapie, who describes in the *Revue de Métaphysique* the exploiting of the natives by the European in our colonies. "A most arbitrary despotism flourishes from the top to the bottom of the scale, under the most revolting forms. A real feudalism is forming again in the colonies, the European being the lord, and the native the vassal. The lord renders justice, that is to say, confiscates any cattle astray on his land, and fixes himself the fine due to him. The servants imitate their masters. Every European servant left alone with native servants, throws down his working implements and begins to order the others about. The soldier gives the example to the civilian. Conclusion: colonial life produces but a low moral standard."

The second testimony is given by a man of a very different mind, a naturalist, the late Governor of Tonkin, M. de Lanessan, who spent a good part of his life in the colo-

nies. He speaks of the connections between Europeans and natives in his new work, "Principes de Colonisation." He says that the most highly civilized man in the colonies becomes "like a child with a domestic animal." He treats the natives like so many drudges, and shows no consideration whatever for their religion, families, social organization, no respect for their persons, their property, or even their lives. The colonization of latter days "is not much less barbarous than that for the most ancient periods!" And the author quotes facts in abundance to back this judgment. It is everywhere the same, in Indo-China, at Madagascar, on the African Coast. M. de Lanessan concludes that we ought to "give up such proceedings, if we would avoid our colonial policy being instrumental in its own ruin."

And such is our opinion, too—that we ought to give up such abominable proceedings, which come to dividing humanity into two classes:

1. The men who exercise solidarity for their own profit.
2. And those who would fain do so.

The former oppress the latter; but for both categories the ideal is to live on the community, on the collectivity, on society.

But how are we to give up all this?

Certainly not by preaching solidarity, for even the least interested of men have a tendency to turn solidarity to their own advantage, and the more cunning take advantage of it for exploiting their fellow-men, and employing them to their own ends until they can bear it no more.

Social progress, therefore, consists in not leaning on one's neighbour; refraining from exploiting our neighbour is the best expression of solidarity.

It is obvious that such a progress will be best realized by relying on one's own support and self-sufficiency, through

personal exertion and initiative. Which is the same as saying that it is more important to reform individual than social action.

We have seen that the mere fact of accustoming the minds to counting on social action resulted in enervating virility; on the other hand, the mere fact of training men to rely on themselves results in increasing virility. That is a well-known example of the influence of surroundings. The good workers thus become excellent workers, the indifferent workers become good, the poor workers become passable, and the very worst become only indifferent. The progress is general.

This is no gratuitous hypothesis, but an abbreviated expression of established facts, easy to verify.

My excellent friend and collaborator, M. Paul de Rousiers, who has just finished another journey in America,\* wrote me last month from Cincinnati. "What a mine of observations America is! The constant immigration from all countries brings to light the question of the adaptability and non-adaptability of the different races to the special conditions of American life. The question is interesting in the highest degree. All that are actually capable of rising in their new surroundings are transformed and rise accordingly. Irishmen no longer sweep the streets; they are no longer the common, ignorant, and incapable labourers of former days. This *rôle* is now that of Poles, Italians, etc."

This is a most interesting fact, and sheds considerable light on the subject under study. Compare it with the very different information furnished by M. de Lanessan, reported above, and you will prove the very bottom of the social question.

\* M. de Rousiers had been entrusted with a mission on behalf of *Le Musée Social*, founded by Count de Chambrun.



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In both cases we are in presence of men who are settling abroad—but with what different results!

The first went to establish themselves among populations of a Communistic formation, where man, untrained to individual initiative, is accustomed to rely on the community more than on himself. Under the influence of such surroundings, natives and Europeans are likewise depressed: the former by the oppression which he is made to suffer, and the latter by that which he inflicts.

The others, on the contrary, went to establish themselves among populations of a Particularistic formation, where the individual energetically maintains his independence towards the collectivity, where he is accustomed to rise through his own exertions, where, in short, individual action is uppermost.

Under the influence of these eminently virile surroundings, the European immigrant receives a sort of electric impulse, which transforms him and makes of him another man, capable of rising by himself. That is because there is no facility there for leaning on others, or exploiting others, and appealing to a vague and lying solidarity. *There* men are in the country of Self-Help, where every echo repeats: "Help thyself!"

And then, by a marvel the significance of which will be apparent to all who have in any way studied social science, the very Irishman is transformed and enabled to rise. This man, whom centuries of life in a Communistic form had made opposed to strong and constant exertion, for whom the *solidarity of the clan was the very foundation of social organization*, and whose race has been brought by solidarity to the low political status and social impotence seen in Europe, this man rises from the commonest callings to which the solidarist doctrine condemned him. No longer is he a mere street sweeper or a common labourer: he becomes capable of

rising by himself. This man is on his way to social salvation.

The Polish and Italian immigrants, who have only recently come into contact with the Anglo-Saxon surroundings, are still enslaved within the influences of their original formation, and have not yet been through their evolution. But the progress accomplished by the Irishmen in their new surroundings shows us the goal they are to reach gradually. They, too, in the same surroundings, and thanks to them, will find their way to social salvation.

And these men do not progress in a body, but individually, as we stated before: the most capable, the hardest workers rise first, and the others rise in their turns—each according to his work.

Thus, societies of a Particularistic formation are really more favourable to the development of solidarity than societies of a Communistic formation.

Those among my readers who are fond of following an argument to the bitter end, may be disposed to ask now what becomes of those individuals who are constitutionally incapable of rising by themselves even in an atmosphere of Self-Help, and in spite of the surrounding emulation.

To begin with, such social surroundings have the advantage of reducing to a minimum the number of the incapables which solidarist doctrines on the contrary multiply indefinitely and progressively. The example of the Irishmen in the United States is a sufficient proof of this. This is something; but it is not all.

By discouraging self-reliance, and training men to rely on others, the solidarist doctrine not only does *not* raise the incapables, but also gradually and pitilessly lowers the capables, diminishes their producing power, as economists say, and impoverishes them; thus making them less and less able to help others—even if they were inclined to do so. And

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as social wealth is diminished from the same causes, the incapables no longer find assistance either at the hands of individuals, or at those of the State.

The first condition of the assistance of the incapables, the weak, the unfortunate, is the existence of a numerous class in a position to consecrate to "good works" the surplus of their revenues. The social type which is most likely to develop private fortunes is, therefore, also the best fitted for public or private assistance. Compare the sums expended for that double purpose by the English and Americans with the ever decreasing sums expended in France, for instance, and you will feel reassured.

So this social type has the advantage not only of assisting the incapables, but also of promoting their gradual progress. It thus leads humanity towards the solution of the social question, and in particular of what goes by the name of the labour question.

It tends to solve the labour question—simply through the gradual disappearance of the labourer. That is what the world is coming to.

This statement may sound like a paradox, because we are in the habit of judging of the future from the past, and our minds are slow to get rid of the forms which are tending to disappear and to become familiar with the new forms which are beginning to crop up here and there.

And yet this evolution is already clearly defined among the more advanced and progressive societies.

In England and in the United States especially, the phenomenon is quite perceptible. Even now, in these countries the lower callings are only exercised by foreign individuals, or freshly landed immigrants who have not yet been assimilated. As for the superior handicrafts, they are more and more executed by machinery; man tends to rise from the status of a workman to that of an overseer. The

peasant, the agricultural labourer, such as we see at work in our old countries, is also disappearing; in many parts of the United States this type is becoming so rare as to present the character of an archæological specimen. In order to execute the work of the plough, the weeding, harvesting, and mowing, the man is conveniently seated on a box, whence he calmly drives his team; it is almost a genteel occupation; indeed the man is almost dressed as a gentleman—and soon will have the manners and notions of one. His mind is open to all the progress in agriculture, and he feels no hesitancy in availing himself of new methods.

The United States are now in the forefront of the movement of social progress, even as they are at the head in the matter of mechanical progress: these two phenomena are more intimately connected than is commonly believed; the second is the consequence of the first, and in its turn reacts upon it. Who could calculate exactly the social transformations which must be brought forth by the combination of these two forces?

We should, therefore, let the old social form drop, as is the case with the old hand-machines. All that belongs to a past which is getting more and more distant and will never return.

And whilst the world is thus on its triumphant way towards new destinies, a man like M. Bourgeois—who is, moreover, not an unknown man, and calls himself the chief of the French progressive party—comes and proposes to us, as a new discovery, the most decrepit, worn-out, false, and oppressive of social theories! This is really too bad.

## CHAPTER V.

## WHAT SOCIAL STATE IS MOST CONDUCTIVE TO HAPPINESS?

SIR JOHN LUBBOCK, who has published a volume under the title, "The Pleasures of Life," has brought out another on the same subject. An idea of the extraordinary success of this book in England can be formed from the fact that the French translation was made from the twentieth and seventy-seventh editions of the first and second volumes respectively.

You will think that the author has found the secret of happiness, and retails the information to his contemporaries at a few shillings apiece. If that is the case, we must recognize that the English are not hard to please, these two volumes being in part a medley of sententious quotations culled from well-known writers. By means of this compilation, the author attempts to prove that man ought to consider himself very happy to be alive.

To demonstrate this thesis, Sir John reviews all the reasons for happiness that surround man: the satisfaction of accomplished duty, the pleasure of reading all the masterpieces of the human mind, the pleasures of friendship, the pleasures of travel, the pleasures of Home, those offered by Science, Love, Art, Poetry, Music, the beauties of Nature, etc.

His optimism is throughout so candid that we can bear him no grudge: "I have heard much," he said, "about the ingratitude and selfishness of the world. It may have been my good fortune, but I have never experienced either of these unfeeling conditions." \* Surely this is a most extraor-

\* "Mr. Nasmyth's Autobiography," quoted by Sir John Lubbock.

dinary life's experience—or that of a very innocent man! What follows answers the same qualifications: "We are really richer than we think. We often hear of Earth hunger. People envy a great landlord, and fancy how delighted it must be to possess a large estate. But too often, as Emerson says, 'if you own land, the land owns you.' Moreover, have we not all, in a better sense—have we not all thousands of acres of our own? The commons, the roads, and foot-paths, and the sea-shore, our grand and varied coast—these are all ours! The sea-coast has, moreover, two great advantages. In the first place, it is for the most part but little interfered with by man, and in the second it exhibits most instructively the forces of Nature. We are, indeed, all great landed proprietors, if we only knew it! What we lack is not land, but the power to enjoy it. This great inheritance has the additional advantage that it entails no labour, requires no management. The landlord has the trouble, but the landscape belongs to every one who has eyes to see it. Thus Kingsley called the heaths round Eversley his 'winter garden,' not because they were his in the eyes of the law, but in that higher sense in which ten thousand persons may own the same thing."

The whole book is pervaded with the same robust optimism, and is supported by arguments about as powerful as the foregoing. Evidently, it is not such weak, commonplace argumentation that fascinated the Anglo-Saxon readers and made the success of the book. On the other hand, why has the book met with such scanty success on this (the French) side of the Channel? Why does the whole work, with its mass of quotations, make us smile?

It is interesting to account for this. But to do so, we must go further and more deeply than Sir John Lubbock has gone into the pregnant and everlasting question of Happiness.



## I.

Let us first define the word.

We shall understand, if you please, by the word "happiness," the state of satisfaction engendered by success in surmounting the material and moral difficulties of life.

By introducing into the definition the words "material and moral," we imply the satisfaction of the two great needs of humanity—those of the body and of the soul, and that is the whole man.

We must first reduce to their just value certain elements which many persons consider as the exclusive sources of happiness, such as temperament, health, wealth, and religion.

A *good temper* disposes us to see the bright side of everything—which is one way of finding illusion, for things have not a bright side only. But every illusion, however tenacious, is bound to come to an end; at any rate it cannot change the cruel reality of things. When the reality becomes too obtrusive, disillusionment is but the more cruel. To deceive one's self concerning an evil is not triumphing over it.

Good health spares us many physical tribulations; it makes men fit for the work necessary to secure a livelihood; yet it only gives them a power—and that power may remain unemployed. A man may be in rude health and yet in a state of utter destitution; this is no condition for happiness.

*Wealth* is considered by many as the essential element of happiness. Indeed it makes a man sure of his daily bread; it enables him to surmount *immediately* most of the *material* difficulties of life, which is a great point. But it avails him absolutely nothing in surmounting the moral difficulties; for wealth tends to enervate his courage, will, and energy. Besides, one of the chief sources of happiness lies in the

expectation or hope of the desired things. The desired object, when once attained, loses most of its charm. Now wealth does away with that hope and expectancy: by permitting immediate satisfaction, it also brings satiety. Hence the painful and constant craving of rich people for fresh and ever-renewed distractions. Wealth makes everything pall on us; a *blasé* cannot relish the pleasures of life, for him the bloom is off everything. Our mistake is to consider wealth from the standpoint of poverty, or mediocrity; we ought to isolate it from all points of comparison; we should then be able to judge its exact worth and actually find that it falls short of all our expectation.

Indeed, we should not be long in finding that wealth hardly solves all material difficulties, extraordinary though this may sound. The expenditure incidental to a life of pleasure and luxury often goes beyond a revenue which cannot be added to by work. A habit of spending without counting is soon acquired, and the habit of working soon lost—and there is no compensation. Such is the gap through which, in all times, the greatest fortunes have flowed away. A family's ruin may be the work of one or several generations; in any case, ruin from such a cause is inevitable. The habit of work and exertion, when once dropped, is not easily resumed. Our nobility and wealthy *bourgeoisie* are examples to the point. It is the old, old story.

Upon the whole, in surmounting the material and moral difficulties of life, poverty is a more powerful lever than wealth, being at least a stimulant to exertion.

*Religion*, according to some, is sufficient for ensuring happiness. No doubt it does lend a powerful help against the *moral* difficulties of life. But if a man has not in him natural abilities which he may develop, religion can offer him only resignation: "God's will be done!" Such resignation is but an implicit acknowledgment of misery. Reli-

gion, in such a case, has no other view of life: A trial which we must go through with equanimity—Life's a vale of tears!—Happiness is not of this world—Religion's goal indeed is not happiness in this mortal life, but in our future life; it does not deal with time, but with Eternity. That the latter may be infinitely preferable, is not the question here; the actual question is—what ensures happiness here below? We are not writing on theology, but on Social Science.

That is not all. We are bound to acknowledge that some pious people apply wrongly the principle of resignation. They make it a pretext for indolence. Life, they say, is not worth so much trouble! And they rely too much on Providence, which they expect will not forsake the faithful. They forget the precept: "Help thyself, and Heaven will help thee;" they find it an easier course to let Heaven do the whole work.

In this state of mind, man is weak in presence of the material and moral difficulties of life. So religion, if ill understood, instead of being a help and contributing to happiness, may become a detriment. The religious mind will find consolation in such adages: "God tries His own people;" "The children of darkness are wiser than the children of light"—a convenient way of leaving to the Deity the responsibility of our own faults and errors.

We are, therefore, justified in saying that the different elements mentioned do not suffice for ensuring happiness, but only contribute to it in a certain measure. The truth is their action is more or less efficacious according to the social conditions to which they are applied. Our task now is to find out what social state is most conducive to happiness, that is to say, to that state of satisfaction which is the lot of people who have been really successful in surmounting the material and moral difficulties of life.

If we consider the various societies from this point of

view, we find that they promote happiness—and the reverse of happiness—in very different ways, which may be represented by three quite distinct groups or cases:—

1. Happiness promoted by the facilities of life;
2. Happiness hindered by the difficulties of life;
3. Happiness promoted in spite of the difficulties of life.

Let us examine what is hidden under these somewhat hieroglyphical formulæ.

## II.

You know the proverb: “Happy nations have no history.” This proverb is scientifically true.

What nations have no history?—Mostly those that live by the simple use of spontaneous productions, such, for instance, as the nomad pastors of steppes and prairies. Thanks to the inexhaustible abundance of the grass, they need not subject themselves to any lucrative work. This is the type of which the Mongolians and Tartars are the most characteristic examples. I leave aside the pastors of desert steppes, such as the Arabs and Saharians, who are compelled to supply the inefficiency of the pastoral art by sundry kinds of manufacture and transport.

To the pastor pure and simple, the two classes of difficulties—material and moral—are made singularly easy.

The difficulties met with in procuring food, clothing, and lodging, are for them reduced to almost nothing. The flock or herd provides for all, and man has no need for any exertion to provide the sustenance of his animals.

Truly, nowhere on the surface of the globe is man compelled to work less, and nowhere are his means of existence less precarious. He is free from the daily task and worry which are our lot in the mere pursuit of our means of existence. The uncultivated grass, which belongs to all, re-

quires no mowing, turning over for haymaking or stacking, but is all-sufficient and solves the whole question. Man thus escapes the climax of unhappiness and misery—pauperism. There is no labour question, for the good reason that there is no paid labour.

Man, thus ensured by Nature against material difficulties, is equally insured against moral difficulties.

We should not judge him from ourselves: we have desires, needs, aspirations, which were developed by a wholly different social evolution—and which he lacks; and we are unhappy whenever we cannot satisfy those needs, made imperious by our social surroundings.

And when we have succeeded in satisfying them, other aspirations and desires and needs, more and more complicated, less and less attainable, torment our souls.

Hence the sayings: "Happiness consists in limiting our wants," "We ought to be content with mediocrity" (*Aurea mediocritas*). That is all very well, but our social state inclines us for the very contrary, and unceasingly conspires against such wisdom—which is only considered wisdom because of its rarity.

The best proof that the pastor is *contented with his lot* (for *that* indeed is being happy), is the difficulty always experienced in getting him to change his way of living. Certainly the most laborious evolution ever gone through was that from a nomadic to a sedentary life, from pastoral art to agriculture and other labour by which we earn a living. "Civilized" peoples whose frontiers are inhabited by pastoral populations know this: they never could bring about such changes—in the few cases attempted—but through excessive, even violent constraint. To put the Slavs, for instance, through that evolution, took several centuries of constraint at the hands of the Tzars, whose rule is anything but gentle. As yet the transition is but partial: the Slav



is a most primitive agriculturist; he still lives by his cattle as much as possible. He still estimates his prosperity—not from the area under cultivation—but from the number of his heads of sheep and cattle.

The ancients appreciated the blissful state of these pastoral populations. Homer, and after him Ephorus, calls them “the most just of men.” The Nomads, “those just and virtuous men,” says Choerilus. “They lead most frugal lives, and have no care of gathering riches,” says Strabo. Modern travellers give us the same impression: “These good Mongolians,” says Father Huc, who lived two years among them, “have essentially religious temperaments: future life occupies their thoughts continuously; things of this world are as nothing for them. They don’t seem to be a living part of this world.” \*

Here, indeed, are men who know how to limit their wants, and who find happiness in a mediocrity which is far from golden. The foundation of such happiness is found in favourable physical surroundings and easily satisfied needs.

Life is even made easier to them by the necessity of living in communities composed of large families, each family often comprising as many as a hundred persons, as in those of the Biblical patriarchs. †

Among them man is never alone.

They lean on each other, and are thus in a measure ensured against all risks. The weak, the incapable, the improvident are not left to themselves and exposed to the lamentable situations so frequent in our civilization.

In this first group of populations, man is therefore doubly supported by the inexhaustible abundance of the spontane-

\* “Voyage en Tartarie,” t. I., p. 48.

† *La Science Sociale* has abundantly explained why the Family Community is a necessity of nomadic pastoral life or life in the steppes.



ous products of the soil, and by the family community. Leaning on these two supports, he is ensured, in a great measure, against misfortune, against the difficulties of life. He feels happy, since he does not wish to change his way of living.

Outside the region of the steppes, there are other numerous populations, which have at their disposal, although in a smaller way, the resources offered by spontaneous natural products and communal family support. They are thus preserved from the difficulties of existence and consequent perils. These populations form a decreasing series which start from the type just described and gradually disappear in our second group.

### III.

In this second group, the two resources of spontaneous natural products and family support are absent, and therefore cannot help man in confronting the difficulties of life. But instead of confronting them, his principal care is to avoid them, and all his efforts are directed to that end.

Whence comes this dominant desire to escape the difficulties of life, instead of confronting and surmounting them? We might answer that it is in human nature to shun exertion. The answer would be partly correct, but it would remain for us to explain why education and necessity have not succeeded in modifying this natural tendency.

As social science demonstrates the populations belonging to this group, which implies the greater part of the globe and part of Western Europe, are of communistic origin; their ancestors can be traced to a time when they still had at their disposal a more or less considerable abundance of spontaneous natural products. Upon the whole, this type is the same as the preceding, but bereft of its advantages,

and placed on a soil which can no longer satisfy man's wants without labour.

Represent to yourselves a man accustomed to rely for all things either on the generosity of Nature, or on a helpful community, and now imagine him compelled to renounce these two providences and fall back on hard work in order to earn a living. Necessity says: "Work hard, be energetic, rely on yourself alone; 'tis the only way of successfully coping with the difficulties of existence, the only way of finding happiness." On the other hand, his social origin says: "Labour, exertion, energy are powerful necessities; far more pleasant to avoid them. Indeed in such avoidance happiness lies." And nine times out of ten, the voice of the social origin is the louder of the two, and the more likely to be heeded, because it touches and causes to vibrate one of the most sensitive chords in the human heart—that of habit, and a gratifying habit, to boot.

But the way to circumvent these ever present and unpleasant necessities of life? Quite naturally, the first way that occurs is the traditional process of leaning on others, trying to live on others, exploiting others, looking for help and succour from the community.

That is the well-known process of the drone towards the worker-bee.

This young man, twenty years old, full of health and vigour, who relies entirely on the money he gets from his family to keep him—is a drone.

A drone too, this young man, twenty-five to thirty years old, who seeks in marriage only a dowry—that is to say, a convenient way of being kept by his wife.

A drone is this young man who disdains an independent profession and considers as honourable none but those administrative careers which make individual exertion unnecessary; the Budget will keep this one.

A drone—this *bourgeois*, or this workman, who, finding himself face to face with the difficulties of modern life, thinks of nothing better than having recourse to the community—whether State or Municipal—and claiming therefrom help and protection, with the view of being kept by the Budget.

A drone is this politician who works on human folly and acquires popularity by promising anything that his foolish constituents may ask for, with the same end of being kept by the community which he does his best to deceive and ruin.

With such surroundings, how easy for Socialism to make its appearance—for does it not bring the fascinating promise of a social state wherein every one shall be a drone? Unfortunately—for the success of that fascinating prospect—no drones are possible unless there are worker-bees also; and, moreover, if the number of the drones is to be augmented, the working power of the other bees should necessarily be increased too. It is a pity—for it is assuredly most pleasant to be able to live on the community.

Some one may tell me that such a social state is in no way disagreeable. The whole question is for each to try and be put on the list of drones. To be a drone—that is precisely happiness. Three cheers for the drones!

Unfortunately, this social state—judging by facts—does not seem likely to develop a very great sum of happiness. The problem to be solved is too difficult—Find happiness, with as little work as possible, in a society which requires, if it would live, a large quota of work. The problem presents a situation analogous to that of a man whose task might be every day of his life to row against the tide—everything is against him. This is no image of happiness, and not reassuring even for the man who has been successful in getting one of those administrative berths which guar-

antee him in a measure against the uncertainties of existence. Most men who are thus placed have but a narrow life of it, obliged as they are to live and bring up their families on a mere pittance. It means shabby-genteel poverty—the hardest to bear! It means insufficient resources, and the cruel suffering entailed by the inability to keep up one's "rank;" moreover, it is a subordinate existence, without lofty hopes, without broad horizons.

As for the others—those who are not successful in getting into the administrative sinecures—existence is even harder for them. They feel the more bitterly the compulsion of personal work and its uncertainty, because they were not in the least prepared for it by their education, because work is for them but a last resource, and represents the most cruel disappointment in their aspiration for sinecures.

For them, in short, life is an all-too-heavy load, under which they groan. Their Communistic origin leads them to consider their own property as family property, and inclines them as parents to rob themselves of a large proportion of their worldly goods, wherewith to endow their children, even in their own lifetime. They are thus obliged to make as many separate fortunes as they have children to get married, and this when it is hard enough to acquire a personal fortune of one's own. Indeed, that is a performance so difficult or impossible of achievement that we cannot actually find anything for it but to restrict the number of our children. We only give to our children what we steal from our race, which is thus forbidden expansion. In spite of this, our load is still too heavy, and condemns us to a continuous series of privations and petty saving, which saddens life and paralyzes our faculty of happiness.

This state of general embarrassment is outwardly expressed by different but significant manifestations. I will only touch on four of these, which correspond with four

phases of the evolution of Communistic societies, and which I will purposely choose on different points of the globe.

The first is the form of disenchantment peculiar to the populations of India, and embodied in the doctrine of the *Nirvâna*. It spread among the group of Eastern populations, whose formation still clings to its patriarchal origin, although they are now deprived of its original boons. *Nirvâna* is deliverance, salvation—happiness, in short, proposed to humanity by the founder of Buddhism. In what does this happiness consist? It consists in escaping the disagreeable prospect of a second existence similar to the first, in avoiding transmigration, by entering a state of impersonality and unconsciousness. One of the means of attaining that negative state is indefinite contemplation, or rather a habit of passiveness as absolute as possible, a negation of activity, which is only next to the absence of life—the negation of happiness. Man decidedly despairs of ever finding happiness, and takes a refuge in nothingness. So he does not even attempt to struggle against the difficulties of existence; he capitulates purely and simply.

The second of these manifestations is *Nihilism*. That is one of the forms of disappointment among the Northern Slavs, that is to say, those populations of Eastern Europe which had to give up the boons of patriarchal life. In their new surroundings they were met by the stern law of work. They did all they could to avoid it; but being powerless in doing so, they took a refuge in denying everything and in the idea of pan-destruction. Those people would not seem to have found happiness in this life.

The third of these manifestations is *Socialism*. This is the actual form of the disenchantment felt by the more or less Communistic populations of the West of Europe. Their origin alone sufficiently explains, as I have said, the appearance of this doctrine, which invites men to find hap-



piness in this community, that is to say, in the suppression of personal exertion and initiative.\* At any rate, the doctrine, like the preceding, is highly expressive of people who cannot find happiness in life such as they have it.

Lastly (for I must limit myself), I will state as another manifestation the doctrine of *Pessimism*, which is the form of disenchantment among the educated classes of Western Europe. I classify under this head a whole gathering of more or less philosophical, more or less maudlin doctrines, which predominate among German or Celtic groups, and are in a way representative of their conception of existence. I am aware that the Greeks and Italians take life less tragically, and boast a more cheerful philosophy; but it is a remarkable fact—which confirms our law—that those two peoples inhabit countries where the tree and bush vegetation serve them in the same way as the grass does the pastors, with hardly any cultivation. A goodly part of the population live by the mere gathering of the fruit, and with a very small amount of work. “*Deus nobis hæc otia fecit.*” The lazzarone is the accentuated type of this group of populations. Indeed, the people of the Mediterranean are among those who find most happiness in existence.

\* On this subject, read the violent diatribe of M. Paul Lafargue against work. It is entitled, “*Le Droit à la Paresse*” (“The Right to Idleness”). This is the beginning of it: “A strange madness possesses the working classes in countries where the capitalistic civilization reigns. This madness drags in its trail the personal and social miseries which for the last two centuries have been torturing pitiable humanity. *This madness is the love of work.* . . . In capitalistic Society, work is the cause of all intellectual degeneration and all organic deformation.” The author quotes the Spanish proverb, *Descanzar es salud* (Rest is Health).



## IV.

It is in the third case that the problem of happiness seems most to be despaired of, and yet it is there that it is most triumphantly solved. Up to now, we have seen man seeking happiness in rest, or at least in as little work as possible. In the first case man finds happiness—but a stagnant and low kind of happiness; in the second case he does not find it. In the third, he seeks happiness in individual and intense exertion; he no longer tries to escape the difficulties of existence, but looks upon them deliberately, takes their exact measure, and boldly attacks them.

On the first consideration, the idea that happiness could be found in exertion and from difficulties overcome, savours of a somewhat bitter irony, and sounds much like a challenge. No doubt, if I were to judge the question from my own feelings, I might think so, being naturally more disposed to rest than hard work; indeed I might perhaps find no great difficulty in accepting the life of the pastor and feeling happy therein. But that is not the question; what we have to do now is to find out facts, and express them as exactly as possible.

However extraordinary it may appear, the fact is easily realized after a few seconds' reflection. Why should we seek happiness in the avoidance of the difficulties of existence? Evidently because the necessary exertion seems too much for us. If I were asked to ride a hundred kilometers on my bicycle (this example will do as well as another), I would hasten to decline the proposal, because I do not feel equal to it. But this same proposal would be joyfully welcomed by a great many people, simply because they feel they are trained up to it. So, what to me would be an insurmountable difficulty, and a most disagreeable enterprise,

is to others but sport and keen pleasure. It is so with the difficulties of existence. To the untrained, they are insurmountable indeed; but it is possible that they may be, by well-trained men, viewed as pleasurable sport. If it be so, it follows that existence must present to such fine fellows a singularly more pleasant aspect than it does to us, and that *Nirvāna*, Nihilism, Socialism, or Pessimism have no fascination whatever for them. They view existence from the other side of the spy-glass, and consequently have a totally different view of it; they see life beautiful; they are optimists.

The whole question is—Are there such people?

Those readers who have read through the preceding pages know perfectly well that there are such people; but I should wish to show them, and *that* is new, that the social formation which wins superiority in the world, is also that which makes possible for him the greater sum of earthly happiness—everything being equal on all sides, as mathematicians say.

I have described (Book I., Chapter III.) a type of English school which tends especially to train young men capable of taking care of themselves in life. Above all qualities they train their boys' energy, will, and perseverance; the bodies are trained as well as the minds. M. de Rousiers and M. Bureau have described, in *La Science Sociale*, the same process of formation, whether in England or in the United States. The young men are thus trained by their families, in their schools, and indeed by all their social surroundings, with the idea that a man "ought always to fall on his feet, like a cat." They are not brought up for rest, and *dolce far niente*, but for the *Struggle for existence*, for *Self-help*; in short, they are taught to march forward and go ahead.\* These terms do not frighten them, because they

\* These terms are printed in English in the French edition.—

know exactly what they mean. They are not "afraid of work." They know that their training has fitted them to surmount the difficulties of existence.

And, indeed, that redoubtable Anglo-Saxon race has already ousted us from most of the advance-posts which we occupied in the world. Not much more than one century ago we were still predominant in Asia, in Africa, and in America; on all points we have retreated before those Anglo-Saxons; they are our hereditary rivals, the rivals whose progress ought to be our model. By repeating this, we do not only speak in the name of science, but also as shrewd patriots.

My aim, for the present, is simply to show that such a conception of existence actually brings the greatest lot of happiness attainable, owing to the consciousness of superiority, and to the pregnant idea that it is easy for any man to surmount all the difficulties of existence.

Here is an example as piquant as it is original, which I cull from *Le Temps* newspaper, under the signature of M. de Varigny:—

"Towards the end of last January, a number of young men of the best *families* were sitting together at a joyful supper in one of the fashionable restaurants of Boston. They were young graduates newly-ground from Harvard University, where all had distinguished themselves, both in their classical examinations and by their prowess at all kinds of sport. One of them expressed the opinion that *only men who have no faith in themselves ever were or remained poor in the United States*. He added that he himself, were he to lose the fortune left him by his father, would find it easy—even if he were to begin without a single dollar, and as naked as the babe just born—to pay his way round the world on a journey of one year, and return home at the end of this period rich up to \$5,000 (£1000). The wager was taken up at ten thousand dollars a side, and it was settled that, on February 22nd, Paul Jones should repair to the Turkish Baths of the Athletic Association, should there divest himself of all clothing, and at a stated hour should start on his adventurous career round the world.

"The great difficulty was the start. Naked as a worm, Paul Jones couldn't start. He must find the means of earning some clothing, however cheap. Philosophically, and as a man who had never done anything else in his life, he forthwith began cleaning the boots of members of the club, and the humble compensation allowed by the club for this kind of service permitted him to get his food first, and then to procure the indispensable clothing. This took him a fortnight—which was much, considering that he had only a twelvemonth before him. Once outside the premises, he had to live and put aside enough money to pay for the first expenses of his long journey. His plan was made: reach London, and thence start for India. He set up as an itinerant newsvendor, a porter, a translator (for he knew French, German, and Italian). As an interpreter, he obtained a free passage on an American steamer, and landed in London with fifty dollars in his pocket. He was now launched and destined to go on without stoppage. To his little capital he added the proceeds of some lectures, which he delivered in London, and found it thus increased tenfold. He made with some of the London newspapers an arrangement which resulted in his making good all expenses incidental to his passage to India—one of which was the purchase of a judiciously chosen pack of goods, of which he advantageously disposed in Calcutta. This latter venture set him comfortably afloat. At the present time he is well on his way, and from the letters he writes to his friends and the reports he sends to the Press, it appears that he now regrets not having doubled the amount of his wager, even if he must also have doubled the amount which he is to bring back."

It seems that the laurels of this American *self-made man* disturbed the slumbers of the English, for *Le Petit Journal* informs us that two young Englishmen, wishing to show that John Bull is not inferior to cousin Jonathan in the matter of energy and the art of taking care of self, have just crossed France, as a consequence of a similar wager.

We have defined happiness, "the state of satisfaction engendered by success in surmounting the material and moral difficulties of life." Hence, and in accordance with this definition, the social form which produces in the highest degree men capable of daring and surmounting these difficulties,

as in sport, is singularly favourable to promoting happiness. I do not know whether the three young men above alluded to will succeed in winning their bets; that is not the interesting question for us. What is characteristic is the state of mind and personal power revealed by their acts. They show us a conception of life utterly different from that exhibited in the two preceding groups of populations. In these two groups, man surrenders to the harshness of existence; he is made unhappy by the consciousness of his inferiority. In the last case, on the contrary, man is conscious of actual superiority to all difficulties, and such a feeling of consciousness is enough to impart to him the smiling certainty of ultimate victory.

Such a man holds—as far as that is possible here below—happiness in his hand.

The drone is but the exception here. \*

Those men are no drones who from twenty years of age expect no subsidies from their families, who marry dowerless girls, who disdain administrative posts, and prefer to embrace the commoner and more independent professions, and who in all things rely on private enterprise more than on any aid or protection on the part of the State.

We should be penetrated with the firm belief that these men, thus left to their own strength and devices, are really happier than the men who at the least obstacle seek a support outside themselves. We may find in this feeling the secret of the prodigious and (to us) inexplicable success of

\* The drone type is mostly represented, in the Anglo-Saxon world, by the numerous elements of Communistic origin mixed with the populations, whether original elements, as in Great Britain, or elements imported by immigration, as in the United States. It is known that in the latter country the class of politicians is recruited mostly among the Irish. Moreover, we may note that those Communistic elements include the most turbulent persons, and the least satisfied.



such a book as Sir John Lubbock's. To be satisfied with the mild arguments of the author in favour of the Pleasures of Life, it is necessary that one should contain within one's self a tremendous dose of contentment; it is necessary that one should view life under such gay colours as *we* can hardly imagine. The fact is, that this is a book written by an Englishman for Englishmen.

The translator seems to have realized as much: "In this book," says he, "are condensed the very best qualities of the English mind." The book is essentially English in its *cheerful and candid* optimism. And the author, who loves to call his country by its old appellation of "Merry England," writes: "We must look to the East for real melancholy. What can be sadder than the lines with which Omar Khayyam opens his quatrains: \*

"We sojourn here for one short day or two,  
And all the gain we get is grief and woe;  
And then, leaving life's problems all unsolved  
And harassed by regrets, we have to go;"

or the Devas' song to Prince Siddârtha, in Sir Edwin Arnold's beautiful version:

"We are the voices of the wandering wind,  
Which moan for rest, and rest can never find;  
Lo! as the wind is, so is mortal life—  
A moan, a sigh, a sob, a storm, a strife?"

And meeting with us on common ground, Sir John adds: "If indeed this be true, if mortal life be so sad and full of suffering, no wonder that Nirvâna—the cessation of sorrow—should be welcomed even at the sacrifice of consciousness."

Such is, indeed (as we ourselves had found) the gloomy Eastern philosophy and poetry; such is also the melancholy character of so many Germanic and Celtic works of litera-

\* Quoted from Whinfield's translation.



ture, the inspiration of people untrained to work out their social salvation.

In his turn, Sir John Lubbock affirms that the Anglo-Saxon has no repugnance for labour, exertion, or struggle, and confirms the statement in a most characteristic manner. Read the commencement of Chapter X., entitled, "Labour and Rest:" "Among the troubles of life I do not, of course, reckon the necessity of labour." I cannot well imagine such a phrase from the pen of a writer of a Communistic origin: the latter would have counted labour as one of the chief troubles of existence. Sir John, on the contrary, suppresses this difficulty with admirable candour. "Of course," says he, "my readers will not find it such a matter of course, neither do I, indeed; for I am all along censuring myself, as well as my readers."

Sir John insists: "Work indeed, and hard work too, if only it be in moderation, is in itself a rich source of happiness. We all know how quickly time passes when we are well employed, while the moments hang heavily on the hands of the idle. Occupation drives away care and all the small troubles of life. The busy man has no time to brood or to fret. . . . If we Englishmen have succeeded as a race, it has been due in no small measure to the fact that we have worked hard. . . ."

So do our moralists descant on the love of work; in our schools, children are taught it. But we praise and recommend work as a duty and a necessity, for applying ourselves to which we are to do violence to our instincts. The tone is different here; work is considered as an incontestable "source of happiness," not as a "trouble."

I had occasion to submit the question to an English young lady. She agreed with Sir John Lubbock that the pleasures of labour were many, that there is much satisfaction to be found in exertion, in the struggle, in conquered difficulties.

We all think so, she said. And as I pretended not to understand, she added that, even when he is not working, an Englishman must needs exert himself; he must row a boat, or play cricket, or kick a football; he will accomplish a hard and perilous feat of mountaineering, *for the mere pleasure of conquering a difficulty*. Surely it wants a fine training to get a man to consider labour in this amiable fashion.

Sir John Lubbock tells of an Eastern visitor to England, who, being a spectator at a game of cricket, marvelled at hearing that several of the players were rich men, and inquired why they did not hire some poor fellows to do the work for them.

That is just the idea of labour imparted by the Communitistic formation. You know the Turkish proverb: " 'Tis better to be seated than standing, lying down than seated, dead than lying down." Such an ideal is certainly not very fascinating. No wonder the populations whose ideal it is are more unhappy, and consequently gloomier, than the others.

Men whose maxim is rather that it is better to be standing up than lying down are bound to be happier, since success in life requires as little sitting down as possible.

But it takes a long day to get accustomed to such an ideal of unabated energy. It is not sufficient to teach and repeat in our schools and universities that happiness is to be found in work. Thus formulated, the assertion is false, and the very men who utter it hardly believe in it, and often do not practise it. If it were true, men would all be indefatigable workers, for all men desire to be happy. The truth is, the mass of mankind do *not* find happiness in work.

Happiness is not in work, but in *fitness* for work, which is very different. How many people think, "Would that I could be fond of work!" and yet cannot love work, and

never will, notwithstanding all the counsels of the most wholesome morals and philosophy, notwithstanding the commands of religion! To acquire such fitness, which is the key to happiness in this world, demands the whole length and depth of a social formation, implying an unending series of combined and accumulated phenomena.

To obtain this rare product, we want—

Parents fully convinced that they owe their children nothing but education, though a manly education;

Next, young men fully convinced that they will have to shift for themselves in life;

Young men fully determined to seek in marriage a help-mate, not a dowry;

A Government that will reduce to a minimum its own prerogatives, and the number of its functionaries and officials—a measure the effect of which would be to attract young men to the independent callings, which demand exertion, private initiative and personal labour;

In fine, and as a consequence, a social state in which the politician, and the idle man, shall reap less consideration than the agriculturist, the manufacturer, and the trader.

All this, you see, is no easy performance. But such a combination of reforms alone can ensure for humanity the greatest possible sum of happiness in this world of ours; this alone can instil into our sons first the taste and then the love of work and exertion.

And there is no other fundamental solution to the social question.

## CHAPTER VI.

### INSUFFICIENCY OF MORAL ACTION AND SYMPTOMS OF SOCIAL REGENERATION.

#### I.

THERE is now living a group of men who seek social regeneration through moral action pure and simple, and who—as they themselves express it—seek “to pacify the conscience by the leading of a better life.”

To bring each man to this point, they mean to develop the spirit of sacrifice and the love of one’s neighbour. In their opinion the social question is *not* social; nor is it a political question, but one of morals and religion. Hence, the most efficient means of solving it is to change ourselves first of all and be “born anew,” as they quote from St. John. They add: “The initial charitable act, or rather the only charitable act, is that by which we renounce Selfishness and undertake to obey the rule.”\*

To solve the social question, they would raise up “really good and spiritual men—saints.” There are some such men among us, they say; “but those special sources are lost one by one in the barren sands. Unheedful society lets them pass by, and the public spirit gains no visible profit from them.”† Their aim is to take hold of such sources of good and to increase them by the flow of other streams.

However, they deny the wish to propound another religion or to add one more sect to the many. “The question

\* *Notre Esprit, Union pour l’action morale*, Nov. 1, 1894.

† *Ibid.*, p. 12.

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is not to dig another haven for souls, but only to bring the tide into the existing havens. Then communication will be established between them."

Indeed they cannot be suspected of bringing forth a new religion, for they affirm no dogma; it is only a religious state of mind, a religious tendency that they oppose to materialism and scepticism. They appeal to the members of all churches, and to those men who are outside all churches and yet feel the need of some support against their passions. "Although we look upon the Faithful of all churches, who are so in heart, as our beloved collaborators, the isolated ones are our Benjamins—they are so forsaken!"\*

In fact their call is sounded for all who suffer, morally or materially, from the harshness of life; and their goal is the foundation, for them and through them of a new society, a renewed society, whose basis is to be the spirit of sacrifice, the immolation of self and of one's passions and will, and the love of one's neighbour.

They consistently declare that "we cannot act on others unless we have courageously adopted the life of the spirit."†

Now, can the spirit of sacrifice, the immolation of self, the love of one's neighbour, in short, the moral action—to borrow the formula of their Association, can it produce, as they contend, the regeneration of society, the social reform?

That is the question, the whole question.

I shall probably scandalize them and a good many other people; but I have no hesitation in replying: No! Moral action, however useful it may be for the regeneration of the individual, is not sufficient to produce complete social regeneration.

And mark that I am no sceptic, but a believer, attached to a positive form of religion, with its dogmas, and to a Church. My judgment is therefore not influenced by any

\* *Notre Esprit*, p. 25.

† *Ibid.*, p. 8.

feeling of hostility. My considerations are of a purely scientific order, and if you are willing to follow me, we will examine them forthwith.

## II.

There is a very easy and at the same time very positive way of clinching the matter at once. Certain privileged epochs have produced pleiads of saints, that is to say, of men who are rightly considered to have attained the highest moral development and given the greatest proofs of the spirit of sacrifice, of self-immolation, and of the love of one's neighbour. Some persons might be quite satisfied as to the ultimate regeneration of our social state, if such a special and abundant "source of good" could be again set flowing.

Let us now see what moral action has produced in the past.

That source has flowed abundantly—indeed there was a perfect flood of it—during the first centuries of Christianity. The very blood of thousands of martyrs flowed as freely as the source of "moral action" itself; never was there a more magnificent efflorescence of saints, never perhaps did man rise higher, from a moral point of view, or in the matter of self-sacrifice.

And yet, never was society more debased: it is the time of the Cæsars, that is to say, of one of the most abominable *régimes* that ever were imposed on humanity. Never was the art of oppression carried to such a pitch. Seldom were human miseries and public or private vice more intense. "Where else than among the Romans," exclaims a contemporary, the priest Salvian; "where shall we find such evils? The Franks are not so greedy, the Huns not so atrocious in their deeds, neither are the Vandals nor the Goths. Even the Romans who live amongst the Barbarians do not



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suffer such calamities: their dearest wish is to find themselves never again under the domination of the Empire. Our very brothers desert our provinces to take refuge with the Barbarians. Those who cannot transport their poor cottages and families take the only course that is left open for them: they give themselves to the rich—who, instead of protecting them, only make them more unhappy.”

These were no fresh evils. Lactantius had already described them. “The fields,” he writes, “are measured even to the last bit of turf; the trees and vine-plants are counted; animals of all kinds are inscribed; every man’s head is registered. The poor in their thousands are penned-up in the cities, and the country is filled with innumerable herds of slaves. Torture and the whip prevail everywhere. Men are taxed for goods they do not own; the sick, the infirm, the very dead are inscribed as tax-payers.”

Against these numberless evils hundreds and thousands of bishops, monks, and saints, raised their voices in protestation and preached with their examples. They, too, were teachers of the moral action and of the purest morals. And yet the social decadence was going apace, and none of these protestations or examples delayed for a moment the final collapse.

And the Barbarians came. And the miracle which so many virtuous men, so many saints had been powerless to accomplish, the Barbarians accomplished with extraordinary facility; unconsciously, and in spite of all their brutality, their vices and their crimes, from them issued the modern societies, so different from the ancient, and so superior to them morally and socially.\*

\* It may be objected that the social success of the Barbarians was due to their infusing into Roman society a simpler life, that they were less corrupt, and therefore more accessible to moral predication. This argument collapses before the fact that the social regen-

No one will do me the injustice to think that I attribute this miracle to Barbarian brutality, vices, and crimes. I will explain presently the cause of that social transformation. For the present, I only state that they did what the others had not been able to do, and I infer that they must have brought in their trail something more powerful and more irresistible socially than mere moral action.

Another striking example of the failure of moral action, when otherwise unaided, is furnished by Ireland. You know that this island was called, in the sixth century, the "Isle of Saints." The country was teeming with monasteries. Indeed most of the proselytes who converted Germany started from Ireland. The members of the *Union for moral action* might have recruited there—had they then been in existence—a great number of adherents: for the great desire of a better life "swayed all minds, and the island was a very hotbed of really good and spiritual men—of saints!"

And their faith was no mere flash, but lasting indeed, for Ireland is still the classic land of religious ardour.

This intensely moral life ought to have ensured Ireland a long and conspicuous social prosperity. Alas! the only thing conspicuous in Ireland has been her lack of prosperity.

Here, again, be it understood, I do not attribute this lack of prosperity to the religious or moral action. This would be committing the very mistake I am trying to expose, which consists in confounding moral with social phenomena. I must explain myself on this point, for that is the very knot of the question under examination.

Italy, too, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was  
 eration coincided, not with the arrival of all Barbarians, but with that of a certain class of Barbarians, who indeed were not the simplest or the poorest. *Vide* M. de Tourville's "Histoire de la formation Particulariste," now being published in *La Science Sociale*.

an intense focus of moral and religious life—with such saints as Francis of Assise, St. Claire, St. Anthony of Padua, the blessed Joachim de Flora, John of Parma, Fra Salimbue, Jacopone da Todi, St. Celestine, St. Catherine of Sienna, etc. Then came the Franciscan and Clarissian Orders, who were to astound the world with their obedience and self-imposed poverty—two qualities which the adepts of moral action hold in great honour. Do they not declare that no social regeneration is possible “unless men are absolutely detached from everything that is not strictly indispensable?” They say: “Some drive in their own carriages to the very place where they will preach to the people the vanity of carriages. Their own display of luxury spreads envy around them: they are living proofs of those social differences which they deny. . . . If we sincerely pity the sufferings of the people, we are logically led to renounce for ourselves everything that makes our own lives happier or more brilliant. We cannot escape this consequence—however hard the sacrifice! To lower what we had placed on high, and to raise what we had despised—that is the question. Our conversion is to be complete. . . . If we are not resolved to go the whole length of it, shall we then limit ourselves to moaning over human evils as impotently as a child over any mishap?” St. Francis of Assise would certainly have signed such a declaration with both hands.

*He*, too, wished “men to detach themselves from everything that is not strictly indispensable.” “Go!” he said, “take no gold, no silver, nor any money. You want but *one* raiment, no bag and no shoes, no staff. . . .” We know what an enthusiastic rush of disciples answered his appeal: nine years only after the foundation of his Orders as many as 5000 representatives of it attended the general chapter held at Assise; there were 7000 monasteries of the Order—and his monks totalled the stupendous number of

115,000! I am leaving out the women's convents and the enormous number of laymen affiliated to the Third Order.

If *their* appeal were heeded by such multitudes, no doubt the adepts of moral action pure and simple would feel assured of the social regeneration of France.

However, facts have demonstrated that this splendid moral and religious revival had no more effect on mediæval Italy, from a social point of view, than the previous greater efflorescence had had on the Roman Empire, or the sixth century's fit of proselytism on poor Ireland. The decline of Italy went on lamentably, amidst such political anarchy and moral disorder as almost outstripped the decline of pagan Rome. The renaissance, which gave to [the world artistic and literary masterpieces worthy of antiquity, also revived the effeminacy and vices of imperial Rome. The action, influence and example of mystic Italy did not prevent the ruin of social and political Italy. Her ruin is even now completing itself.

I will not multiply examples. History teems with them. I will venture one last example, however.

It is fashionable to profess great admiration for the Buddhist ethics. Buddhism is, indeed, full of kindliness and pity towards the weak, the humble, and the oppressed. But that is not the question. Has Buddhism solved the problem of social regeneration in India and in the countries where its influence is felt? The social inferiority of those countries needs no demonstration; we need only open our eyes to see it. The Buddhistic ethics have not raised them any higher.

That the moral action is insufficient to raise the standard of social life, is made plain by the very utterances of its most impassioned adepts. Here is a passage from the manifesto of the *Union pour l'action morale*, "Children are taught at home and at school to be good as well as to be honour-

able; abnegation is made a point of honour. But it does not follow that such teaching is practised; if it were, the conversion of the people *en masse* would be a very simple affair. There are plenty of the churches, temples, or synagogues, where every child is welcomed as a catechumen, and every adult as one of the faithful. Thousands of devoted ministers of religion are constantly occupied in preaching a better life, or exhorting to it through symbolic services. And although the teaching of the great modern philosophers tends to the same goal, yet the gospel is not practised. Our consciences clearly make out and acknowledge a moral ideal, but we by no means live up to it.” \*

This is well said. But how could the writer, even as he wrote it, fail to perceive the weak point of unaided action? He acknowledges that thousands of ministers of all religions and denominations—supported by the great philosophers—are constantly occupied in their attempts to further the moral regeneration of society, and that all fail in their endeavours. “We by no means live up to our moral ideal.”

Yet, these people’s plan is to employ the same methods over again. They, who are not backed by the stupendous power of religion, hope to be successful where church, temple, and synagogue have failed! How did they not perceive that if so much effort, devotion, abnegation, charity, so much spirit of sacrifice, self-immolation, and love of one’s neighbour met with failure, surely there must be something wrong with the method—and no one could succeed with it alone? This natural conclusion, which would have occurred to any unsuccessful experimentalist, ought to have occurred to them. Moral action is insufficient to ensure a nation’s lasting prosperity and social greatness; there is something else wanting, the absence of which forbids the expected result.

What, then, is wanting? I will tell you.

\* *Notre Esprit*, p. 11.



## III.

I must be allowed the use of a parable from Holy Scripture. The defenders of moral action, at least, will not refuse me the permission.

Moral action may be compared to a seed, which bringeth forth fruit if it fall into good ground, but withers away if it fall by the wayside or upon a stony place. The quality of the ground is all-important.

I do not pretend to be expressing any novelty. The parable reported in the Gospels has been applied thousands of times by preachers, moralists, and theologians of all creeds and schools, until we find it almost commonplace.

Unfortunately, an error was grafted on to this most obvious truth which spoils its application; those people assume that the good quality of the seed is sufficient, independently of the quality of the ground, to bring forth fruit. They say: "There are no bad soils, there are only bad seeds." This was next to ignoring the ground altogether; and indeed they write (I quote textually): "Whether the present epoch is worse than preceding epochs is of no import; the fact cannot be ascertained. It is, therefore, idle to trouble about it." That is the same as saying: The nature of the ground is insignificant.

Whereupon, they go forth tranquilly to sow their seeds by the wayside, and upon stony places, and greatly do they wonder that the seeds take no root but wither away, unless indeed they swallow their wonder, and put off the germinating time of their seeds until the Greek Kalends—if I may so say. "The work is so immense that we need not even expect to see the beginning of its realization. This does not alter our duty, however. Success is not our affair." \*

\* *Notre Esprit*, p. 26.



But success is our affair; it is the whole business, and we have no other business than success. Why, do you indeed pursue the splendid and meritorious aim of your country's moral and social regeneration, and yet declare that its success is no business of yours? Are you then dealing in art for art's sake, in morals for morals' sake?

Failure (to which you make up your minds so tranquilly), the failure ever met with by all partisans of unaided moral action, is precisely due to the fact that no heed is taken of the nature of the ground where the seeds fall, and that it is considered "idle" to trouble about it.

The nature of the social ground is, on the contrary, one of the exterior conditions which exercise most influence on the success or failure of moral action.

On this point the promoter of the *Union pour l'action morale*, M. Paul Desjardins, will allow me to draw an example from his own experience. M. Desjardins and myself met in Edinburgh, where we both lectured—he on the moral action, I on social science. He then confided to me how struck he was with the extraordinary facilities he found in Great Britain for the furtherance of his ideas: "What excellent ground!" he once exclaimed. Indeed, he had met with an attentive, serious, earnest public; he had found among them that state of mind which is most favourable to receive and further moral action.

He was struck by the difference between this state of mind and that which he mostly meets in France. Even among his own followers, many merely yield to a sort of fashion, of vogue, of infatuation which is just now felt among the French for moral action. It is *select*, well-worn, it is the last cry of fashion (*cri*)—if I may use for once the lingo of these people; in short, it is an affectation. But let the wind of fashion change, and the people will turn to something else, as easily as a woman will change a tight-

fitting skirt for a crinoline. As for the great mass of the public, they treat the whole movement as a huge joke—as indeed we do with everything in France.

The seed cannot bear fruit in such shallow ground, where there is no “deepness of earth.” Our actual social formation is an obstacle to the development of the moral action, as it was for the Roman society, for Ireland, Italy, and the East, where it never brought forth the expected results.

We must, therefore, first alter the social formation if we are to obtain any depth of result. We must begin at the beginning.

But how is our social formation to be modified?

#### IV.

What, then, is wanting in our social state to fit it for the reception and fecundation of the moral seeds which it is contemplated to sow among us?

How do we prepare our children? What do we teach them?

We teach them that the ideal, the supreme wisdom in life, is to avoid as much as possible all its difficulties and uncertainties. We tell them, “My dear child, first of all rely upon us. You see how we save money in order to be able, at the time of your marriage, to give you as large a portion as possible. We are too fond of you not to do our utmost to ease for you the difficulties of existence. Next, rely on our relations and friends, who will exert their influence to find you some cosy berth. You must rely on the Government, too, which dispose of an innumerable quantity of comfortable posts, perfectly safe—and salary paid regularly at the end of each month; advancement automatic, through the mechanism of retirements and deaths. So that you shall be able to know in advance what your emoluments

are to be at such and such an age. At such another age, too, you will retire and be entitled to a pension—a good little pension. So, after doing very little work during your administrative career you will be enabled to do nothing at all at a time of life when a man is still capable of activity. But, my dear child, as these situations imply but indifferent pay (for we cannot get everything), you must reckon on what your wife may bring you. A moneyed wife must therefore be found; but do not be uneasy about this, we'll find you one. Such is, my boy, the advice which our love dictates.”

The young man who hears such language daily at home, in society, in the very street, not unnaturally gets accustomed to the idea of relying on others more than on self; he is consequently disposed to shun all careers requiring continuous exertion and mental activity; he would never dream of braving the uncertainties of agriculture, industry, or commerce—and simply prepares for a tranquil existence.

Such a conception of life results in paralyzing a man's energy and will-power; it makes him a very coward who deliberately turns his back on the difficulties which he ought to overcome; he only seeks pleasure, is thoroughly incapable of dealing with the serious side of life, and becomes, in fine, the very worst instrument for that moral action of which the power of exertion and triumph over self are the principal points.

Such is the obstacle in the way of moral action, an evil which a purely moral remedy can do nothing to remove, because all our social surroundings are opposed to it. “Man must be resolved to do what is not pleasant;” our whole social life protests against this verdict—and the protest is so unanimous that it drowns the voices of the reformers.

These surroundings are to be modified; that is the first

thing to be done. They must be changed in the sense of the development of individual initiative; and that is the same as saying that our young men must be made to take life more earnestly.

A long order! I shall be told. Well, the only short path is that which leads to the goal—and moral action does *not* lead there, as even the apostles of the movement confess.

But is that path so long as some may apprehend? No. We shall see presently that the natural tendency of things leads us to it irresistibly, fatally. Our whole energy should be spent, therefore, in recognizing, in furthering, and hastening this movement, instead of denying or resisting and delaying it—as we do, with the best intentions in the world, I am sure.

What, then, are the manifestations of this movement?

The movement is made manifest by a number of symptoms, which I will try to note down briefly.

*1st Symptom.*—*The contact and competition with the Anglo-Saxon race.* We cannot avoid these. We encounter that enterprising and encroaching race on all grounds where our social activity is exercised. In Europe, they are at our very gates: abroad, they are everywhere; wherever we go, in whatever part of the world we may be attempting to found a colony, or a mere establishment, there do we find them. Both in Europe and out of it, we have to cope with the competition of their agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants—and you know what redoubtable competition that is, how energetic and tenacious, how full of practical sense and self-reliance!

Now, this contact and this competition afford us the advantages of a stimulus; men who find themselves in danger of being ousted are bound to exert themselves to keep their positions; moreover, they cannot help being influenced and profiting by the example of their adversaries.

It is in order to subject our young men to that wholesome example, that we advise the students who attend our Social Science Lectures to cross the Channel and to study in Great Britain the causes of her superiority.

This symptom alone would hardly suffice to show the bend of the social evolution. There are others which are directly manifested within the nation itself.

*2nd Symptom.*—*The unanimously recognized failure of our system of education.* This failure is now evident to all. The critics of our educational system are becoming daily more numerous, more exacting; the University itself furnishes a contingent of critics, some of them being even ex-ministers of the *Instruction Publique*, all parties being agreed to find fault with the system. It is at present almost a common-place to say that the school has not kept its promises. The standard of studies is going down steadily. Our schools form graduates, functionaries, officials, bureaucrats; they do not form men capable of taking care of themselves.

M. Lavissee is at the head of a group of University professors who pursue the reform of education with a view to attaining individual worth. "I remember," he said, in the course of a lecture on the subject, "a young Englishman telling me once: 'Do not believe me to be a learned man; in our English schools, we do not learn very much beyond how to behave in life.' What splendid English pride in this modest declaration! I do not think my visitor would have bartered his knowledge of how to behave in life for all our scholastic learning. He would have declined with thanks any such exchange, and told me that England has need of men accustomed to self-reliance, men of a bold and independent spirit, for her commerce, her industry, and her policy."

It is much to be thankful for that we do recognize that

our educational system ought to be reformed, that we are aware that French education does not impart the "knowledge of how to behave in life," or the habit of "self-reliance." The acknowledgment of a mistake is the first step towards its rectification.

*3rd Symptom.*—*The development of physical exercises in youth.* How we did despise physical education! The very words were strange to us. Enough has been said of our hateful college, with its too lengthy classes and preparations, its short recreations, devoid of real games, the monotonous promenading between the high, gloomy walls, then, on Thursdays and Sundays, out of doors, the slow walking two by two—exercise more fit for old men than for boys.

How could virility, energy, the healthy feelings of activity and independence be developed under a *régime* that stunts the body and mortifies it more than the roughest usage? A man with good and well-trained physical organs has more self-confidence, and is more fit to confront the difficulties of life; he is naturally more inclined to lead an active life than to embrace any of the sedentary and subordinate careers of administration; he feels more of a man, and of course he is a better man than the weakling.

Well, physical exercises have of late years attained some development among us. The words *sport*, *match*, *record*, *record-man*, etc., all of English origin, are making inroads into our language. All our newspapers have had to open new columns for sports of all kinds, and a large number of sporting sheets have appeared, some of which now boast circulations of over 10,000 copies. On some special days as many as twenty thousand spectators gather into one or another *vélodrome*, and part of the eager public has to be refused admittance. Young men thus trained are evidently ready for an active life and capable of some initiative: they have learned to triumph over their bodies, the best prepa-



ration for triumphing over life itself. These young men are the hope of the country.

*4th Symptom.*—*The increasing overcrowding of the administrative and liberal professions.* There is a general weeping and gnashing of teeth. There are twenty, fifty, a hundred candidates for every vacant post; everybody wants one. The candidates wait; they crowd the administrative antechambers; they canvass for influence; their lamentations fill the air.

Meanwhile, a new opinion is gradually spreading. We are at length finding out that the uncertainty entailed by the candidature for offices is not worth all the trouble taken. There is a tendency to turn to the more independent professions, which are at the same time more lucrative. It is as yet but a hesitating tendency, but it is bound to assert itself; it is already doing so amongst the shrewdest and most capable of our youth.

*5th Symptom.*—*The fall in the rate of interest on money.* From 5 per cent. it fell to 4 per cent., and now we can only get 3 per cent. The best paper even bears less interest. Henceforth, each man must reckon less on the return of his investments, or his wife's. It is becoming more and more of a hardship to be content with the feeble salaries of administrative posts, more and more difficult especially to live as an idle *rentier*. This circumstance is certainly a stronger incitement to activity and self-help than all the reasoning in the world. Inertia will not do in such a case. When we can stretch economy no further, we must needs take to action.

*6th Symptom.*—*The extreme tension caused by the amount of taxes to be paid.* The French are the most heavily taxed nation in Europe. They bear the burden more through economy than by dint of hard work or of any great producing power. Indeed, agriculture, industry and commerce

were too long eschewed by all rising families, by those very people whose intellectual qualities and wealth would have made the most of them. Thus the three only sources of public prosperity have diminished year after year, until the national resources furnished by taxation are getting less and less assured, unless private citizens make up their minds to turn individually their activity and capitals toward Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce—the only producers that feed the parasitical professions inscribed against the Budget.

*7th Symptom.*—*The tendency to return to rural life and the independent professions.* This tendency is the result of the overcrowding of the administrative functions, of the fall in the rate of interest on money, and of the insufficiency of the Budget. We are beginning to look with less disdain upon those professions from which we had been estranged by caste and other prejudice, and by a repugnance for everything demanding initiative or responsibility. We shall be compelled to turn to these professions again through the sheer force of circumstances.

The return to agriculture is the most conspicuous. This is made imperative for a number of land-owners who have had to suffer from the agricultural crisis, whose incomes have also come down through the fall of interest on money, or again owing to the relative scarcity of government berths. Most of them would fain continue to live in town, but the irresistible circumstances send them back to the country: they end by admitting the necessity of busying themselves with the working of their farms—abandoned or mismanaged by their agents. Their next step is to make up their minds to reside on their estates during part of the year; then they gradually stay for longer periods, until for reasons of economy they settle in the country altogether.

The return to agriculture is made evident by the develop-

ment of the agricultural Press, and that of the agricultural societies and syndicates. You know how hundreds of these syndicates sprang into existence on all points of our territory through the initiative of the great land-owners. Many of them only saw then in such syndicates a means of political influence; but they are gradually getting influenced themselves by their new surroundings and occupations: the syndicates are becoming agricultural in reality.

On the other hand, some shrewd capitalists are taking advantage of the fall in the value of land and purchasing rural estates—for the diminutions in the incomes drawn from rural property have followed the same ratio as the fall in Stock Exchange property.

*8th Symptom.—Encouragement to Colonization.* The colonizing power of a nation is the surest sign of its social power. It betokens the spirit of initiative of its inhabitants, and their forces of expansion in the world. The Anglo-Saxon race is most remarkable in this.

We cannot consider France as having as yet displayed any real colonizing power; our colonizing is mostly administrative: we still export more soldiers and officials than colonists. However, there is at least a tendency to encourage colonization and to extol its advantages. In this aim a certain number of societies and periodical publications have been started; some exploring missions have been organized; the portion of the French public interested in geographical matters is certainly increasing. It seems as though Frenchmen, hitherto such stay-at-homes, are becoming aware that there are, outside France, countries where a man may settle and live.

All this, I grant you, is very platonic and half-hearted as yet; but we should not forget that the symptoms first stated also develop further the disposition to colonization.

*9th Symptom.—The growing discredit in which politics*

*and politicians are falling.* If the capacity for colonization is a sign of social power, readiness to trust too much to politics and politicians is as sure a sign of inferiority—as proving that the citizens rely more on the action and intervention of the State than on their own activity, and are more inclined to seek a livelihood in administrative situations and public functions than in the independent professions. What partisans relish most in politics is the distribution of the spoils that follows a victory, that is to say—the places; the spoils for the victors. This state of things entices men away from the independent professions—the country's vital force—and paralyzes private activity.

There are sure signs that the French are shaking off this delusion. We are beginning to understand that politics have not given us all that we expected; we have been bamboozled on almost all points: liberty, equality, fraternity, inexpensive government, government of the people by the people, diminution of taxes, toleration of all political or religious opinions, etc. Our disappointment has been manifested in numerous changes of Government, and in even more numerous alterations in the Constitution. By this time, we have tried almost everything—and can fairly well see through politics.

A most significant fact is the decreasing interest displayed on the part of the public in exclusively political newspapers. At the epoch of the *Restauration*, during the period that followed the Revolution of 1830, or even during the Second Empire, the Political Press was a respected and much-heeded power; a journalist then wielded enormous influence. The most conspicuous statesmen of those days were or had been journalists. *Le National*, *Le Globe*, *Le Constitutionnel*, *Le Journal des Débats*, handled opinion with the greatest ease, and were even able to make a revolution in a few months. There were hardly any newspapers besides the political

journals, every one of which represented a distinct fraction of public opinion.

*Quantum mutata tempora!* Nowadays, the purely political newspapers have lost most of their readers and nearly all their authority. Success is for "Boulevard" newspapers, where politics are confined to a most limited space—and even then considered much in the way, or for those journals which profess to give *News*, simple telegraphic information, unflavoured with any expression of opinion; or again for technical publications treating of business, trade, or local interests—a kind of newspaper absolutely unknown forty or fifty years ago.

Another sign of this discredit is to be found in the diminished consideration granted to political officials. A functionary's brow is no longer surrounded with the same halo as of yore. Whither has passed the type of the *préfet* of the Empire—a man whom no one could approach without awe? Where is our old French magistracy of forty years ago—those "unappealable" magistrates, invested with an almost sacerdotal dignity? Besides, official situations have been found to be less safe than people imagined; they suppress a man's independence, and are not so well paid either! I say nothing of the effect of such incidents as the Panama affair, which should make the least fastidious turn from politics with disgust. Consequently the halo that surrounded the State, its ministers and officials, has become very dim; and the fact is not to be deplored, for whatever is lost to the State forms a corresponding gain for the individual, for private and for local life—and social power resides in these, not in the State. So, in this direction, too, there is progress.

*10th Symptom.*—*The practical reaction of opinion against militarism.* The development of militarism is a great obstacle to social reform; not only does it ruin the nation, but



by sending the young men to the special schools, it keeps them away from the useful crafts and professions. Even unsuccessful candidates for the army are unfitted (owing to their special education) for any independent calling requiring individual energy and initiative.

But the decline of militarism is even now apparent. None of the nations at present subjected to it can bear its enormous charges much longer. In the present state of things, the maintenance of peace is as ruinous as the most disastrous war. Italy has been ruined by this beautiful *régime*, and is now compelled to restrict her armaments. Germany and France already find it hard to bear, and cannot continue long under it without danger to their vitality. This argument, which rests entirely on a financial base, answers all the reasonings of the militarists.

But even the latter join their practical testimony to the impeachments. Their acts belie their speeches. They know perfectly well that the young men's careers are broken, or at least made very difficult, by the prolonged sojourn in barracks. Their greatest anxiety is to prevent their own sons going there. They all vie with each other in their endeavours to escape the consequences of a *régime*, the necessity and advantages of which they extol in public. Thus it is that since the passing of the last military service law, the schools which save for their pupils two years out of the three are besieged with candidates: the crush at the doors is fearful. Surely there could not be a more eloquent nor a more spontaneous protest. In the upper classes, all fathers and mothers scheme for this end—how our boys may escape military service—which is yet our most beautiful institution! The lower classes submit to it reluctantly, and with not unfounded jealousy at their more fortunate betters. An institution thus deserted even by its most eloquent defenders is in a very bad way indeed. Can this



militarism *à outrance* last even as long as ourselves? I do not think so. The financial situation and public interest will settle the matter, if common sense does not.

Militarism is not necessary to enable a great country to play her rôle in the world. Great Britain demonstrates the fact by its example.

*11th Symptom.*—*The diminution in the prestige of "works," of assistance.* The aim pursued by the different charities and the so-called institutions of "public good," is no doubt a very lofty aim; but the danger with them is that people are wont to imagine that such means are sufficient to solve the social question. They are palliatives, not remedies; like morphia, they soothe but do not *cure*. The real way to help the helpless is to put them in a state to help themselves. Seeking an exclusive remedy in such "works" is, therefore, a dangerous mistake.

Now, there is no doubt whatever that our infatuation for such processes and our faith in the apostles who preach them are waning fast. Their failures have been too many and too constant. Confidence, like Credit, is dead. We have found out the puerility of those collective attempts, so effective in appearance, but in reality perfectly powerless. The public are beginning to realize that a manufacturer, a rural land-owner, or any employer of labour who feels a genuine interest in their men can do considerably better and more useful work than fifty charitable persons could with people on whom they have no hold whatever—with whom they have no proper or positive connection—whom often they do not even know.

*12th Symptom.*—*The breaking out of the socialistic doctrines.* The different symptoms just enumerated show a direction quite contrary to that of Socialism, since they tend to develop individual activity and to restrict the action of the community. The social group which is at present in advance

of all the others, the Anglo-Saxon group, owes that advance to the development of individual activity. Socialism is, therefore, in contradiction with the actual march of progress.

How, then, can we explain the breaking-out of the socialistic doctrines and recognize in it a symptom of social regeneration?

The genesis of the phenomenon is easily explained.

An evolution such as that of which we have just stated the symptoms, cannot be accomplished without some considerable friction and pain. Men were accustomed to rely on the protection of their relatives, of their friends, of their respective political parties, of the State; they lived in a society based on stability more than on progress, in which competition was limited by the difficulties in the means of transport—facts which all tended to promote the reign of tradition and fixity in the means of subsistence. The sudden development of transports and of larger manufactures, due to the discoveries of coal, made away with all protective barriers, and shattered the old framework that used to uphold the individual. Each agriculturist, manufacturer, merchant, and tradesman found himself suddenly exposed to the competition of all the agriculturists, manufacturers, merchants, and tradesmen in the whole world.

What happened then? Those men who were most gifted with personal energy and individual initiative found in these new and unavoidable conditions a magnificent scene for the display of their qualities: they succeeded in attaining a degree of wealth and power hitherto unknown. This was the case with the Anglo-Saxon race, which was in advance of other nations in the matter of individual activity. From that time we may date the first encroachments of that race and her splendid achievements; from that time the Anglo-Saxons became a standing menace to the rest of the world.

On the other hand, those men who had not been trained

to personal initiative were surprised and bewildered by the new state of things. Instead of gathering their strength for the inevitable struggle, they found it easier to moan over the painful necessity, and then to call to their help the old frame-work above alluded to—relatives, friends, the State, collectivity, according to the worn-out communistic process. The host of stragglers, incapables, and impotents gathered round the formula of Socialism, which is but a warmed-up modification of that Communism which has condemned to impotence all the nations of the East.

Thus, in the last century, the old trades' corporations, before receiving their death-blow from the first development of the larger manufactures, united their efforts in one last attempt at resistance: they multiplied the restrictive regulations which assured them monopolies and protected them against competition. Their action was of no avail, however, and the sheer force of circumstances removed for ever those obsolete institutions.

The weak point in Socialism is that it is an anachronism, and that it goes against the grain of circumstances, against the forward motion of the world. All socialistic efforts only point towards that irresistible force, and are nothing more than a last but powerless protestation similar to that raised by the old corporations.

The only positive result of Socialism will be to weaken still more and finally bring down irretrievably the blind ones who still await some chimerical saviour.

Socialism is not a thing with a future before it, but rather a thing approaching its end.

So, whatever interpretation we place upon facts, they all point to this conclusion—that the world (ourselves included) is progressing towards the greater development of individual initiative. Such is, now more than ever, the only means of triumph.

And I now ask, Does our present duty solely consist in vaguely preaching the "moral action"? Is it not rather to try and realize what social conditions alone can lead us to prosperity, since moral action has been proved inadequate? Is it not our duty, moreover, to defend and propagate the social truths which show the way to emancipation?

Some persons may be apprehensive lest the moral action be thus sacrificed, and smothered under the brutal touch of Self-Help. They may be disposed to fear that man will be thus morally lowered to a standard of pure selfishness; they may dread the loss of the ideal, of the spirit of sacrifice and charity—or what not. . . .

I should like, as I end, to reassure the Reader on this point.

It is a very remarkable, although a very natural, circumstance that individualistic societies form the most favourable centres for a moral life full of energy, intensity and resistance. This is easily explained. Moral action consists in conquering self. Now, there is no better training possible for self-conquest than the social formation which obliges all individuals to rely on themselves alone; there is no training better fitted than this for a "serious life," none where the spirit of "sacrifice" becomes more natural, more habitual, and more generally applicable.

It is written: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." This sentence is not only the foundation of social power, but also that of moral power. Nations which, by all sorts of convenient combinations, manage to escape that law of intense personal labour, are bound to moral depression and inferiority. Thus the Red-skin, compared with the European; thus the Oriental, compared with the same European; thus the Latin and German races, compared with the Anglo-Saxons.



## FRENCH PUBLISHERS' APPENDIX.

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### FIRST OPINIONS OF THE FRENCH PRESS.

THESE ought to be recorded here, as they explain and justify the extraordinary success of this book, which in two months attained its Fifth Edition.

The following extracts embrace only the period immediately subsequent to its first publication (April 20th to June 30th, 1897).

#### I.—ARTICLES BY M. GEORGES RODENBACH.

Many persons who formerly had taken an interest in the work of Le Play, and who had not followed its development by his successors in *La Science Sociale*, might have wondered what had become of it; for a good many people confound noise and tumult with good work and progress.

Under the title, "A Book," M. G. Rodenbach, who signs a leading article once a week in *Le Figaro*, made himself an interpreter of this feeling in *Le Patriote* of Brussels:—

"People talk a good deal about a book which has lately caused much sensation in France. It is entitled, 'A quoi tient la Supériorité des Anglo-Saxons,' and its author is M. Demolins, who finds himself suddenly a most conspicuous person. We knew the man long ago, as a quiet but indefatigable worker. We met him at the house of Le Play, the great economist, the head of *La Réforme Sociale*, in that salon of the Place St. Sulpice, where the master gath-



ered round him every Monday night a company of choice spirits. . . .

"M. Demolins, the author of the sensational book of the day, was the most assiduous and militant of these guests. Ever on the alert, the master's favourite disciple would now and again rouse the flagging conversation, reawaken the slumbering hopes; he believed in the cause, in its future, in the doctrine, in Le Play's methods such as displayed in his researches on the condition of European workmen. We can remember his sanguine disposition, his evidently extensive knowledge, the ardour of his gesticulation, and his Southern accent somewhat restrained by the practice of science and familiarity with grave subjects.

"Since then he has been occupied in teaching his subject and expounding it in the relative obscurity of the special reviews. We often wondered what had become of Le Play's favourite pupil, and whether his superior qualities had met with failure. Now and then, however, we heard his name mentioned. Once we remember M. Alphonse Daudet alluding to a curious review article, entitled, 'The Southern Frenchman in Daudet's Novels.' The author of the article was named (it was M. Demolins), and nobody seemed to know him.

"And now, behold! M. Demolins finds himself famous suddenly, thanks to his book. This work is representative of the scientific methods of Le Play, which, applied to a large question of the day, assume striking *relief* and significance. It is like an examination of France's conscience. The times have been when boastfulness and self-infatuation were but too common French qualities; we have now some high-minded, watchful men at work, finding out the faults of the nation and seeking their remedies.

"M. Desjardins and his friends had already founded *La Ligue de l'action morale*, as a sequel to a celebrated pamphlet

(' Le Devoir présent '); but that was only a sort of cold Protestantism, of lay morals, insufficient for a Christian nation.

" In his book M. Demolins has registered facts and compared material situations. The work has nothing dogmatic about it; it is wholly documentary. Figures are made eloquent; statistics are made the pretext of reform. . . ." (The rest of the article deals with the analysis of the book.)

The above shows that if fame came suddenly, it had been long prepared, and that it is founded on a strong basis.

## II.—OPINIONS OF MM. DRUMONT AND DELAHAYE.

Immediately after publication, some journals printed a few cursory articles. *La Liberté* and *l' Univers* gave lengthy accounts of the book; *La Croix*, *La Paix*, and *La Souveraineté* published *résumés* of the book's conclusions.

All these articles were favourable—a good sign, for it had been apprehended that the definite affirmation of Anglo-Saxon superiority contained in the very title might rouse the wrath of the Chauvinists. It can never be foreseen how the Press may receive a book; and of course some forebodings may have been entertained as to the reception by the Press of a work that probed to the quick our social evils.

On April 28th, M. Edouard Drumont wrote in *La Libre Parole*:—

" Young men sometimes ask me what to read with profit. To-day I would answer them, ' Take up a first-class book, a work of profound social analysis: " A quoi tient la Supériorité des Anglo-Saxons." ' In this book M. Demolins studies the English temperament, seeks the secret of the formidable expansion of that energetic and powerful race, and shows the causes of the supremacy of a nation whose

fierceness we may condemn, but whose genius we are bound to admire.' . . . "

The next day the same paper, above the signature of M. Jules Delahaye, consecrated a leader to this book. This article, entitled, "Supériorité des Anglo-Saxons," deserves to be quoted.

"I have just read a book which I intend to re-read, because I found it full of interesting matter. But I would be loth to put it aside for the present without throwing to the April wind a few of the seeds contained in the book.

"Such is one of the duties of journalists, at a time when the public reads hardly anything but newspapers. We sometimes, for our own sake and that of our readers, take up and study the books of those authors who have preserved the wholesome habit of thinking before writing; and so it is our good fortune now and then to be able to introduce into the torrent of commonplace topics a few useful and pregnant ideas.

"There is somewhere in Paris a group of four or five young men as inquisitive as ferrets, as hard-working as Benedictines, who for the last ten years have provided us with more original ideas than the host of our senators and deputies. Their organ is a Review, the very name of which is unknown to the aforesaid host—with perhaps a few honorable exceptions—but which is none the less a mine of observations and of documents far more valuable than the whole collection of Parliamentary debates under the Third Republic.

"The book I am alluding to is but a selection of articles published in *La Science Sociale* by its director, M. Edmond Demolins; but these articles sum up the whole theory of Le Play's doctrine, most felicitously applied (with a good many extensions) to all the subjects which at the present time evoke our patriotism. . . .

"The originality of Demolins consists in common sense and good faith. His successful method is to free truth from the trammels of prejudice and traditional errors under which it is buried, so to say, and every effort on his part brings to light some forgotten evidence.

"Nothing more unexpected, for instance, although it is by no means beyond the comprehension of the average reader, than the conclusion with which he ends this very learned, strongly-thought-out and strongly-written book: 'Why is France in decadence? Because she brings up her children the wrong way, or rather because we go on bringing them up in the same way we did two hundred years ago, without taking into account the new difficulties of life.'

"The social question, at home and abroad, is above all a question of education. Such fathers, such sons; such children, such men; such men, such nations. These are almost truisms, as the English say.

"Demolins himself will not find fault with me for uttering them, his aim being to discover the foundations and the laws of the social evolution; for the most evident truths must needs be demonstrated and confirmed with the whole apparatus of facts which constitute science. That this is so is well proved by our author's skilful comparison of the two systems of education—French and English—and of their consequences in both countries on private and public life, and in their respective policies, whether at home or abroad. . . .

"Space forbids my alluding to all or even the principal deductions that can be drawn from the effects of what he calls the communistic formation—our own—and the particularistic formation of the Anglo-Saxons. The best pages in the book are perhaps to be found in the chapter, 'What Social State is most conducive to Happiness?' which I wish I had space to quote. Well, the social state conducive to

happiness is that of those countries where labour and exertion are made by education a pleasure and a pride, instead of a trouble and an opprobrium. The 'particularistic' formation of the Anglo-Saxon—such is the only cause of his superiority; such, too, is the future of nations. None but foolish Chauvins can now deny it; and Demolins rightly says, 'We should look upon the situation as men who *will* be great to it, as scientific men determined to analyze it with equal exactness, so as to discover its real factors.'

"JULES DELAHAYE."

The two above articles had an immediate and double effect; first, they introduced the book to a certain portion of the public, and then they inspired those provincial papers which follow the lines of *La Libre Parole*. Several of these papers, notably *L'Express* of Boulogne-sur-Mer, *L'Union Catholique* of Rodez, *Le Patriote* of Pau, etc., reproduced M. Delahaye's article. The last-named of these papers gave a special article from the pen of the editor, which said, "A deep, powerful, pitiless book—fit, however, to disarm even such as are most painfully concerned by its conclusions."

### III.—MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES.

Between May 1st and 14th we received more than thirty articles on the subject of this book. It is a remarkable fact that every article, whatever its political opinion, was favourable. We will give a few short quotations:—

*La République Française*.—"The gifted director of *La Science Sociale* clearly defines one of the most alarming questions of the present time: the extraordinary expansive power of the Anglo-Saxon race. . . . This special superiority is no novelty to us, but M. Demolins gives it a correct and really scientific explanation."

*La Cocarde* ended a long article thus: "We recommend all true patriots to read and inwardly digest this volume. . . . We must thank M. Demolins for having written it."

*Le Petit Parisien*, whose article was reproduced by several provincial papers, insisted on the necessity of educational reform, and analyzed more particularly the first book. M. Jean Frollo, the writer of the article, concluded: "These are correct ideas, fully adapted to the necessities of the times."

*Le Peuple Français* expressed its warmly sympathetic approval of "this serious, if sensational, and attractive, if rigid, volume."

*La Paix, Le Pays, La Souveraineté Nationale, Le Libéral, Le Constitutionnel, L'Etendard* published simultaneously a long notice by M. G. Barbézieux on "this interesting book, full of documents, which may lead us to assimilate the qualities of the Anglo-Saxon race."

*L'Intransigeant, La Vérité, Le National, Le Journal* agreed in their praise of the book and in recommending it to their readers.

Thanks to this welcome of the Press, the first edition was sold out in about a fortnight, when appeared in the first columns of *Le Figaro* a first, and a week later a second article by M. Jules Lemaître.

#### IV.—OPINION OF M. JULES LEMAÎTRE.

M. Lemaître's talent, his rare qualities as a critic, his influence on his public, and the enormous circulation of *Le Figaro*, lend peculiar importance to his views. This is the first article (May 14th):

"An infinitely painful book is that of M. Demolins; but we must swallow the bitter cup to the dregs. The book ought to be read.



"We knew—or, at least, we suspected—the things which M. Demolins tells us. But he makes them precise and clear; he puts these things together, and the effect of his work is to convince us of the social, political, commercial, industrial, financial, and moral superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, and of our own weakness, our misery and inferiority. For the superiority of our cooks and comic playwrights is not calculated to save us, and it is just possible that our artistic superiority is but a somewhat useless luxury.

"And our plight is no temporary one; we are fatally condemned. We are a nation 'of a communistic formation,' viz. we all lean on each other; whereas the Anglo-Saxons are a nation of a 'particularistic formation,' that is to say, one where all individuals rely on self alone. And verily, the consequences of this are terrible for us.

"How the French educational system forms functionaries, and how the English system forms men.

"How our mode of education reduces births in France, through the necessity of providing for the establishment of each son, and portioning each daughter; how systematic sterility places temporarily on the market a great deal of money, which is withdrawn from commerce and industry, to be transformed into Stock Exchange property. Whereas the Anglo-Saxons educate their young men for the struggle of existence, cultivate in them the taste for agricultural, commercial, and industrial enterprise, and consequently have no apprehension of a large number of children, added to which, the English *home* life, liberal and comfortable even among the country people and workmen, promotes individual dignity and moral worth.

"How owing to our low propensity for officialism and our estrangement from agriculture, industry, and commerce, our *Chambre des Députés* includes about 100 ex-officials, and

about 300 journalists, barristers, solicitors, attorneys, physicians (surely not the pick of their professions). Whereas in the English House of Commons the overwhelming majority of 360 is composed of representatives of agriculture, industry, and commerce.

"How, finally, the English are fortunate in being almost wholly inimical to Socialism, which threatens us, and which is the very oldest of exploded doctrines, and the most disastrous for individual activity and dignity.

"All this, strongly made out, will you find in M. Demolins' book, with a good many other things quite as true or likely, and quite as saddening.

"And that is why the Anglo-Saxon is bound to find himself master of the world before long. That is why the Anglo-Saxon has supplanted us in North America, in India, in Mauritius, in Egypt; . . . why he is predominant in Europe and the whole world through his trade, industry, and policy; why, although we do not know *how* he will profit by the last Eastern war, yet we do not doubt that he will profit most by it; why, in short, on the map which heads Demolins' book, the Anglo-Saxon red tends to stain the whole planet.

"What are we to do? Nothing easier; we have to acquire the virtues we lack: will-power, self-reliance, spirit of initiative, energy.

"What do we want?

"Parents fully convinced that they owe their children only education, and that a manly education.

"Next, young men well aware that they will have to take care of themselves.

"Young men determined to seek in marriage a helpmate, not a dowry.

"A Government that will reduce to a minimum its own functions and the number of its functionaries, and thus

cause the young men to turn to the independent professions.

"Lastly, and as a consequence, a social state where the politician and the sluggard shall be less considered than the votary of agriculture, commerce, or industry. . . .

"To be more precise, we might add that we ought to suppress altogether the study of dead languages; perhaps we ought to suppress the *Université*, the *École Polytechnique*, and in general all the schools of the State; we ought to suppress universal suffrage as well, suppress at least three-quarters of our officials; in short, undo the administrative work of the Revolution and of the Empire.

"Personally I have no objection to any of these suppressions, although there certainly are a *few* difficulties in the way of their accomplishment.

"But wait; that would not be enough. Let us suppress the budget of war, which is ruining us; suppress military service, which spoils our young men. We ought to be content, like England, with 100,000 men, or even with only 26,000, like the United States. Let us suppress the material necessity of defensive measures and the moral necessity of '*la Revanche*.' Let us suppress our defeat, which left us weak and made us timid.

"And even that would not be enough; our soul, our national soul, must be changed. Can any one 'oblige' with a good way of transforming a poor devil of a Latin or a Celt into a fine Anglo-Saxon ogre?

"What then. May we not at least seek some consolation? Is it not just possible that the author of this cruel book may have overdrawn it a little? His parallel of the Saxon and of the French reminds us of the good boy and of the bad boy in children's story books: the Saxon is simply perfection; *we* have nothing to recommend us. This rouses our suspicion. Is there really no good in us? Are there,

for instance, no good points in the over-protective tenderness of French parents towards their children, in our deep attachment to the native soil, in our notion of a fatherly State, in our dream of social justice through the efforts of the community, represented by the State? May we not preserve some of our poor virtues for softening in us the stern virtues of the Anglo-Saxon—when we have got them?

“As we are of a ‘communistic formation,’ is it not possible to ennoble and make useful this need that is in us of leaning on the community? And, since it is granted we possess some generosity and a sincere love of justice, might we not make up our minds to exert these qualities in giving the community a little more than we receive, instead of being content to reckon on advantages which we neither earn nor deserve, since we give in exchange the smallest possible effort? In short, is there no way to rise up to Anglo-Saxon worth *through ways of our own*?

“If such hopes were granted us, we might feel some comfort in the idea. Another source of comfort, easier and more dangerous, would be in the consideration of what our rivals do lack. What of that psychological paradox of the Anglo-Saxon race whose individual virtues are great and strong, but whose public hypocrisy is abominable, and whose national selfishness is next to villainy? If, perchance, we acquired the individual strength and ‘virtues’ of our Northern neighbours, could we then desire to play the same *rôle* of a nation of prey which England is playing in the world? Meanwhile, if we no longer can be, as hitherto, the knights-errant of justice and humanity, . . .

“Yet another source of comfort lies in the fact that Germany, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, is not in much better condition than we are. The wealth which she derives from us, the self-confidence engendered by victory, make Germany appear smart enough for a time; but

M. Demolins assures us that she, too, is doomed to an early death at the hands of militarism, functionarism, and Socialism. I am afraid, however, that death will not be so very early. If Germany were willing (and she knows on what condition), one good means of salvation for her and ourselves, and for others, too, would be a defensive alliance, without hatred, of the whole of Latin, Germanic, and Slavonic Europe against the decidedly too voracious virtue of the Anglo-Saxon. But the time has not come yet.

"Our hopes and consolations are but scanty. There remains the necessity to look out for remedies; and there are some. Opinion can react on manners, and opinion can be influenced. And if opinion itself be moribund, it can be resuscitated, re-educated. Iteration and reiteration can do a good deal towards this end. We may live to see such ideas *fashionable*—when half the battle will be won. But more of this in another article.

"JULES LEMAÎTRE."

M. Lemaître had shown courage in praising such a book in such a newspaper as *Le Figaro*. He showed real audacity by returning to the rescue a week later. His second article was published under this title: "Opinions that ought to spread."\*

"If I judge from the number of letters I have received *re* my last article, I must have been expressing the engrossing thoughts of a great many earnest and clear-sighted people. Several of my correspondents mention that they have treated the subject in speeches, articles, or pamphlets; but I cannot quote them all, nor make a choice. I took for my text M. Demolins' book, because it seemed to me that it sums up with remarkable strength and continuity many

\* A third article appeared in *Le Figaro*, entitled, "More Opinions that ought to spread."



things which I have found scattered elsewhere. I wish, however, to name the substantial and well-informed book of M. Max Leclerc, 'L'Education et la Société en Angleterre,' another piece of cruel and useful reading.

"Some of my correspondents propose such remedies as changing our very souls, temperaments, soil, history, and geographical position. We cannot make France an island; we cannot turn France into a Protestant country (nor do I wish it were); we cannot impart Anglo-Saxon muscles to all Frenchmen; we cannot ignore our defeat of 1870. I had mentioned these Utopian measures, and also that I did not know how to infuse sudden health and energy into a whole people.

"Legislative reforms are inadequate, besides being impracticable, unless demanded by public opinion. Public opinion, therefore, is what is to be worked upon. Nothing is lost as yet.

"It seems to me that French decadence differs from other historic decadences, insomuch that it is a perfectly conscious decadence. I mean that we are under no delusion about it. I am struck by the great number of excellent spirits who discover the full extent of our moral and material affliction. A nation's consciousness of its evils—even the most latent—is the first sign of approaching cure.

"M. Demolins writes to me: 'The French mind is clearer and more methodical than the Anglo-Saxon mind; and these qualities are essential in our work as leaders and pilots of the belated nations of the West. Our confidence ought to be increased by the fact that the French are, from all appearances, the people that most closely resemble the Anglo-Saxons—more, at any rate, than the Spaniards or Italians—and, notwithstanding appearances, more than the Germans, who are still blessed with their Louis XIV.' Would that I could believe such a comforting assertion!



"Well, there is yet something that can be done; and we all should be doing something. After reflection, it seems to me that there is one thing I can do, and that is to present to my countrymen as 'distinguished' (presenting them as merely right would be of no avail) certain ways of thinking, and acting, . . .

"I now submit a few of these suggestions, just as they occur to me.

"No doubt the study of dead languages and ancient literatures has the effect of elevating the mind; but this effect is not produced on more than about a tenth of the students. It is obviously absurd to give to *all* a training that can be of benefit only to a small minority. Nine times out of ten, a *Bachelier ès Lettres* is an empty-headed and superficial person—a ninny. We are told that when a man has translated, however badly, a number of fragments from Latin and Greek authors, something of it 'always sticks to him.' This is not true. Nothing at all sticks to him—and we know it. He would have profited much more by being taught anything else, such as a manual trade, for instance. The modern side of tuition, which has only been shyly introduced among us, would soon form much better men for the good fight of life, if we choose teachers as clever as those we choose for the classical side.

"But the common Bachelor of Arts, who has spent eight years of his life in failing to learn what was beautiful at a very remote period of past history, is an absurdly constituted being, a ridiculous personage. The silly prestige of the *B.-ès-L.* ought to be dispelled from the minds of French families.

"It is high time, too, that the status of officials should be lowered in the public estimation. There really is nothing very brilliant in officialdom, if we except the department of Education, for the object of such functions digni-

fies the conditions in which they are carried out. . . . But fancy choosing to be a subaltern clerk in a *Ministère* or an *Administration*! And yet this poor destiny is that selected for their sons by innumerable French families.

"To be content with expecting a paltry salary from the community in return for the smallest amount of work possible, and that work more automatic and less personal than that of any peasant or workman, through sheer apprehension of hard work and of the uncertainties of life, is perhaps not criminal, but it is sinful and mean. Of course, the life of a farmer or artisan is more honourable; and, indeed, I prefer to the Civil Service clerk even the mere counter-jumper or small shopkeeper—both are really more active and more independent.

"Functionaries of a higher grade, having more responsibility and initiative, deserve more consideration. I know this; but the multiplicity of half-idle officials makes the profession a not very honourable *ensemble* of selfish parasites.

"The remedy is obvious; reduce their number to one-third, and give more pay, more work, and more responsibility to each. But it is equally obvious that we cannot think of doing so as long as public functions are the coin with which our abominable deputies pay their clients.

"The least we can do is to create a prejudice against functionarism. We *can* do our best to spread the opinion that official posts are often the refuge of weaklings in mind and body, of young men poorly gifted in courage and careless of their dignity and independence.

"Somebody prompts me: It might not be bad, either, to attack the prestige of the *École Polytechnique*. Strange school, that—all the pupils entering with the aim of becoming engineers, and three-quarters leaving as soldiers!

"Moreover, I am not aware that even those who come

out engineers do build better bridges or dykes than the Anglo-Saxon engineers, whose training is wholly practical. The *École Polytechnique* is undoubtedly a school that we ought to honour, but without any superstitious excess. It gives us too many vocationless artillerymen. We all know some young men whom their two years of over-cramming have 'brain-emptied' for the rest of their natural lives. Its purely theoretical teaching, fit for making good professors, forms but punctual, intolerant, and sterile officials out of men who might have otherwise displayed bold and inventive qualities.

"We cannot change this. *But* when next a father says in your presence, 'Here is a boy whom I destine to the *Polytechnique*,' and you see the *maman* quite excited at the elegant prospect of the sword and three-cornered hat, at least you may forbear the expected indulgent smile.

"Further, we ought to get rid of the superstition attached to the so-called 'liberal' professions. Why is not agriculture as liberal a profession as that of an attorney? A liberal profession is just worth what its actual votary is worth. An indifferent physician, an average barrister, a third-rate *littérateur*, are singularly less interesting beings, and of much less social value than—not only an intelligent manufacturer, but even a good farmer, a clever and honourable tradesman, or a skilful workman, whether mechanic, carpenter, or mason. This, again, is a truism; yet few people recognize it.

"Likewise, it were good to divulge the opinion that art and literature are not professions that confer honour on any people who choose to call themselves artists or *littérateurs*—half of whom are actuated by mere vanity in their choice of a profession. Moreover, no undue consideration should be granted to unsuccessful applicants for literary honours, for their name is Legion. Let us not scruple in

discouraging young aspirants; those whose talent is a fact are sure to succeed in the end—or else may utilize that talent under another form in whatever profession they embrace. . . .

“There are a good many more opinions that ought to spread; these will do for to-day.

“JULES LEMAÎTRE.”

The effect of these two articles on the public was as great as might be expected: the first edition was almost immediately exhausted, and another had to be hastily issued. For some days the publishers could not satisfy the demand of the public, who bought hundreds of copies every day. But the effect of the articles was as much felt in the rest of the Press as among the public, and an extraordinary stream of publicity set in. There was first the reproduction by a certain number of provincial papers of the M. Lemaître's article. Among these were: *La Dépêche*, *La Vraie France*, and *Le Novelliste*, of Lille; *L'Express*, of Boulogne-sur-Mer; *Le Vernolien*, of Verneuil; *Le Journal de Bruxelles*, *Le Soir*, and *Le Petit Belge*, of Brussels, etc.

Then another flow of original articles. In *La Petite République*, where M. A. Goulle signed an article entitled “Changeons notre âme” (Let us change our souls!). One article, in *L'Estafette*, was entitled “Sursum Corda!” The editor of *Le Journal de Rennes*, M. B. Pocquet, signed an article entitled, “Français et Anglo-Saxons.” It concluded: “M. Demolins treats his subject with his usual clearness and sagacity. This very remarkable book makes us think: it does even better than this, it provokes a manful resolution of giving a better direction to our lives. It should be read by all who wish to improve the future of our children and of our country.” *Le Patriote de Normandie* began: “This book should be in the hands of all who

care for our future. . . ." The *Gazette des Campagnes* contributed an article entitled, "Notre Décadence." "The fiercest light is shed by M. Demolins on the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons. Its causes and effects are exposed by the author with lucidity. . . . A book so suggestive of serious reflection should not be ignored. We shall return to the subject more than once."

V.—OPINIONS OF MM. L. DESCAVES, FRANCISQUE SARCEY  
AND CORNELY.

In *L'Echo de Paris*, May 23rd, M. Lucien Descaves wrote, under the title "Un livre d'Alarme:"—

"Truly a terrible and admirable book: terrible, because of its lamentable statements founded on carefully verified documents; admirable, because of its conclusions, which, if intelligently heeded, can only lead us to improvement. I should like to see M. Demolins' book in the hands of all heads of families, of all educators of our youth, if not in those of the men who govern our country, for the author has sufficiently demonstrated that the interest of *these* is solely to keep whole as long as possible the crust of the now rancid cheese in which they live.

"'The Present Duty'—such a book deserves the title a good deal better than M. Desjardins' poor advice, or the lame objurgation of the members of the League for Moral Action. I warn the reader that this book is indeed a change from the rank nonsense talked round some favourite bock of beer in a *café*, or the high falutin' lucubrations indulged in by the *Ligue des Patriotes* round a picture by Détaille. Indeed, M. Demolins shows us from the very cover of his book that our most redoubtable foe is not *coiffé* with the Prussian helmet. As he himself says, 'Whilst we pass reviews of our troops, and celebrate anniversaries



of bygone victories, one adversary whom we ignore because he is not armed to the teeth as we are, is furrowing the seas undisturbed with his innumerable ships, and gradually invading the world with his innumerable colonists.'

"The book's cover is but an illustration of this fact. . . .

"M. Francisque Sarcey mentioned in these columns the comparative tables drawn by M. Demolins of the different elements of the French Chamber, and of the English House of Commons. That is an excellent lesson, and the book includes a good many other object-lessons; for the author, besides pointing out the evil of such a national representation as ours, has shown us that this was but a result of our system of education. . . . M. Jules Lemaître was quite right in telling us, the other day, that we ought to begin by 'shedding our old soul;' and M. Demolins is quite right, too, in helping us to do it by preaching the predominance of the individual over the group, etc., such as observed in England and America, instead of the intermittent and hypocritical solidarity preached by interested politicians and men of party.

"I know that many people consider the substitution of individual action for that state as a form of selfishness for which its advantages are no apology. But Demolins rightly remarks that there are two sides to solidarity: the assistance given to our fellow-man, and the assistance which we receive from our fellow-man. So that real selfishness seems to be with the solidarists, as they cannot be more anxious to secure the first satisfaction than the second.

"Neither, of course, is it impossible to reconcile the most thorough-going altruism with absolute self-reliance.

"A book in which such all-important questions are treated deserves to have attention called to it. It is good to know the causes of Anglo-Saxon superiority, and we should turn our knowledge to profit unless we want to see realized



Proudhon's prophecy to the effect that 'Europe is pregnant with a social revolution; but she may die before being delivered.'

"LUCIEN DESCAVES."

In *L'Echo de Paris*, M. Francisque Sarcey wrote, under the title "Anglo-Saxons and Latins:—

"Our friend, Jules Lemaître, has written a most brilliant article, in which he endeavours to give us some idea of the book just published by M. Edmond Demolins, S.S.D. (Social Science Doctor). I had just been reading the work, and was preparing to review it. . . .

"The book is interesting, and rich in new ideas, or rather in *renewed* ideas. The author is a philosopher, and gives advice worth digesting."

The same writer says in *Le Rappel*:—

"I have Demolins' book on the brain. . . . M. Demolins, after exposing the lack of energy and enterprise of our younger generation, puts it down to our system of education. . . . He draws, between the English system and our own, a parallel which is most favourable to the former. . . ." M. Sarcey winds up by asking M. Demolins how it is that the very same system formed in the past the most energetic of men. M. Demolins answered with a letter which he published in the June number of his review, *Le Science Sociale*, and which there is no occasion to reprint here.

M. Sarcey's article was quoted and commented on in many journals: *Le XIX<sup>ème</sup> Siècle*, *Le Pays*, *La Paix*. A review, *La Réforme Economique*, produced an article signed by "Un député," and entitled "Discouraging Books."

"Economists and thinkers at large are much concerned just now with M. Demolins' book. The author is a man of talent, who has his subject at his fingers' ends, and is,

moreover, possessed of a good, forcible style. With such qualities, it is no wonder that the book has caught the attention of the public. But the merit of the author and the good qualities displayed in his work are only more reasons for speaking about both. M. Demolins has made a mistake, and the publication of his book is to be lamented. It belongs to the category—unduly increasing of late—of works fit to sow discouragement in the minds of the nation. . . .”

However, the writer confesses that “the present superiority of the English and Germans is caused by their greater activity and energy of enterprise. So far we agree with M. Demolins.”

Then, we do not see how this article is less discouraging than the book itself. The writer adds: “We no longer agree with M. Demolins when he traces the cause of our lack of energy and enterprise to our system of education.” The writer here quotes M. Sarcey’s article, an extract of which is printed above. We therefore only need refer the reader to the answer published in *La Science Sociale*.

But in his quality of “député,” the writer of the article is naturally inclined to attach undue importance to politics. He says: “The real cause of the evil lies in our politics, not in our system of education.” This is taking the effect for the cause, as clearly demonstrated in M. Demolins’ chapter, “*The Political Personnel in France and in England*.”

M. Cornely committed no such mistake; he has clearly seen the social importance of education. His article was published in a journal with an enormous circulation, and in which he can appeal specially to mothers, *La Mode Illustrée*.

“For a long time, all those among us who think and who observe, have been deploring the system of education in

which young Frenchmen are trained. Our friend and colleague, M. Edmond Demolins, has once more exposed its dangers. Demolins rightly insists that their national methods of education are the cause of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. . . ."

#### VI.—MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES.

It is impossible to quote all the articles with which the Press welcomed this book.

In *L' Univers*, M. Tavernier republished two long articles entitled, "Anglo-Saxons and Français." He began thus: "A book by Edmond Demolins is provoking much serious reflection. It seems we are beginning to analyze ourselves in earnest. If M. Demolins succeeds in bringing to a practical conclusion the many desultory or ironical meditations which have been in fashion of late years, he will have accomplished a useful piece of work. . . . M. Demolins has put together, after the method of Le Play, a quantity of facts and details which explain the enormous development of the English Empire. . . ."

M. Marcaggi's article in *L' Evènement* bears the title, "Nécessité d'une âme dirigeante." "M. Demolins' book has roused opinion. . . . Every one is now busy trying to invent some powerful tonic to react against the ailment that goes by the name of French decadence. . . ."

*Le Courier du Soir* consecrates two articles to the book. Both articles are signed "P. de B." "M. Demolins' book makes infinitely sad reading; it is the more impressive because it makes clear that our evils are bound to increase daily, unless we discontinue the practices that produce them. . . . M. Demolins ought to be thanked for his effort. . . ."

*Le Jour* fully agrees with our conclusions: "M. Demolins

is raising a most important question. . . . This book courageously points out real dangers. . . ."

*Le National, Le Voltaire, Le Paris, La Petite Presse, L'Etoile, Le Rapide, Le Public, La Nation, La Cocarde, Le Petit National*, published simultaneously an article from which we extract the following characteristic paragraphs: "M. Demolins' book is causing a sensation because it comes at the right moment. . . . The French people seem at the present time to have realized the soft ideal of living tied to a mother's apron-strings. We should change this, if we would preserve the colonial empire which we have conquered. Such is the unpalatable but useful lesson contained in M. Demolins' book."

In the provinces the newspapers still follow the example of their Parisian contemporaries. *La Bourgogne*: "The peril caused by Anglo-Saxon progress is exposed by M. Demolins with startling lucidity. . . ." Same tone in *L'Echo* of Chaumont, *Le Patriote* of Pau, the Nîmes *Petit Republicain*, *Le Tourangeau*, *L'Echo Tunisien*, etc. We cannot name all. From this moment the book is the topic of the day.

VII.—M. CAMILLE PELLETAN'S OPINION, AND PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

In *La Dépêche*, M. C. Pelletan contributes, under the title, "A propos d'un livre récent," one of his weekly articles, the spirit and tone of which may be realized from the following extract: "The principal merit of this book is that it raises some interesting questions. M. Demolins is a pupil of Le Play; and with him, as with his master, social science is but the dream of a learned reactionary, who would, under the pretext of individual initiative, organize the domination of the great landowners and of the

industrial capitalists." (Where has M. Pelletan seen this?) "M. Demolins has a horror of Socialism and of all (!) intervention on the part of the State. Nevertheless, the author raises ideas of serious interest. . . . His comparative table of the French and English Parliaments is a curious piece of work. . . ."

M. Pelletan further upbraids M. Demolins for not taking into account the actual commercial expansion of the Germans. The Preface to the Second Edition ("On the Alleged Superiority of the Germans") is the author's answer to this criticism.

#### VIII.—THE PARISIAN PRESS (June 1st to 15th).

In *Le Parisien*, "P. de B." signs another article whose sanguine spirit is shown by this conclusion: "The crisis we are going through is therefore temporary. It is within our power to put an end to our premature decadence. Saddening as M. Demolins' study of the past is, his view of the future is comforting, for it shows us that the regeneration of the country is in the hands of all Frenchmen. We ought to be thankful to M. Demolins for a book which has caused a great stir in the Press, and hope that it may rouse a real echo among the public."

M. de Kérouhant, in *Le Soleil*, strikes an excellent note—

"Our system of education, the excess of functionism, and compulsory military service deaden in us the spirit of enterprise. As for our capital, those of us who are timid invest it in safe stock or consols, whilst the venturesome risk it on the Bourse.

"M. Demolins shows in his book that the Anglo-Saxons are making the conquest of the world through individual enterprise alone, unaided by private associations or by the greater association, the State.

"We are neither reactionaries nor revolutionaries; we



want the French to rely a little less on the State and a good deal more on themselves. . . . Private enterprise alone is fruitful. . . ."

*L'Éclair* prints a leader entitled, "We want Energy," by the Abbé Victor Charbonnel:—

"In his very keen and conclusive book, M. Demolins has just told us to be like bold, enterprising, energetic Anglo-Saxons. M. Demolins is the sociologist of energy, as M. Barrès is the novelist of energy. I have come to think that, after so much religious, moral, and political preaching, M. Demolins' sermon is the best of all. . . ." The abbé concludes thus: "What we want is energy and enterprise, and liberty to exercise both. We, whose ideal is religious, moral, patriotic, and humane, realize that personal energy can do it all: moral action, patriotism, and solidarity. Let us, therefore, be energetic."

In *Le Matin*, M. Bousquet says: "Our manners should be reformed—and in this the example of England is useful. In fact, we ought to organize the cult of personal activity and liberty, such as prevails in England. Let us study how a young Englishman is brought up, under what methods, and what discipline, etc. . . ."

From *La Croix*: ". . . You should read carefully and without any bias M. Demolins' masterful study. The reader will see there why the Germans, despite their excellent qualities, are inferior in the work of colonization. . . ."

*Le Voltaire* and *La Nation*, in an article published simultaneously, under the title "L'Éducation et La Vie," take the authority of the book to demand the reformation of our system of education. "In his book, M. Demolins has raised an alarming problem of social pedagogy. Much discussion has thus been created, and we are glad of it. His conclusions are unimpeachable; indeed, they are identical with our own utterances for the last ten years. . . ."



*La Radical* takes the same point of view: ". . . The book has caused a great stir. . . . M. Demolins tells us some disagreeable truths."

M. Jules Lemaître, as we stated before, published in *Le Figaro* a third article, where, in his usual acute and original style, he reviews some of the conclusions of the book.

IX.—OPINIONS OF MM. PAUL BOURGET, MARCEL PRÉVOST, AND FRANÇOIS COPPÉE.

In *La Figaro*, M. Paul Bourget, noting his impression of the Jubilee of Queen Victoria, wrote:—

" . . . No excitement, no gossiping in that crowd. . . . For a Parisian, the most striking circumstance is that absence of *cafés*, which does not allow of any lingering in the open air. . . . The English street is just used for walking from one place of business to another, not as a sort of open club where people meet and talk. . . .

" 'Business as usual.' This notice was to be seen everywhere, and showed the constant care to waste no time. Such is their perpetual method—which goes far to explain the curious complexity of English ideas. Even in the midst of their enthusiasm, their practical spirit does not leave them, and allows them to profit by any advantage that may present itself. . . ."

After recalling the principal traits in the life of the Queen—"that Windsor widow who governs half the globe"—M. Bourget concludes: ". . . What may I add that has not been already felt by most of my countrymen, whether in assisting at, or in reading of, that impressive ceremony? I can only repeat: When we find that a rival people is very great indeed, we should not envy them—that would be unworthy of us; we should not deny their greatness—that would be of no avail; we should not copy them—that would

be servile; we should endeavour to find out what laws of a political nature they have observed in order to achieve such development, and when we have done so, we should try to practise those laws according to our own traditions and temperament. I cannot end better than by advising all good Frenchmen to read, and get others to read, that book of M. Demolins, which Jules Lemaître has twice recommended in these columns. In the light of the present *fêtes*, the pages of that free and sincere study will assume even more lucidity, and we shall see clearly many of the things which we may with advantage borrow from the English, and which may enable us to cope successfully with their rivalry. One thing that we may learn from them is answerable for much of their strength, and that is Civic Duty."

M. Marcel Prévost's article in *Le Journal* is entitled "Notre Pays."

" . . . Are we to end this century hand in hand with the Anglo-Saxons? And since such voluminous, well-written books as M. Demolins' demonstrate for us the superiority of that race over ours, are we in the end to accept our *rôle* as an inferior race by availing ourselves of their examples, and imitating their educational system? . . . It is no easy task to establish any dispassionate comparison between our own country and another. Even a rigid economist like M. Demolins, or an extreme intellectualist such as Jules Lemaître may adjust as best they can—the former the gold spectacles of the *savant*, the latter the eyeglass of the humorist; neither can help, as soon as their country is concerned, looking at things with the eyes of the patriot. . . ."

M. Prévost acknowledges that the spirit of enterprise is paralyzed at home, although the exterior situation is better. He adds: " . . . Contrarily to the Rose of Sharon's, the blackness of France is all inward. The evil with us is in-

ward. Our warners are not mistaken, and all men of common sense will agree with them; but their means of regeneration are really too oddly interpreted. We cannot go one step without coming across a man who, hypnotized by Demolins' book, declares that we must be placed under the Anglo-Saxon regimen or die. . . ."

What, then, is to be done? M. Prévost concludes that our manners ought to be altered; and especially our institutions, first of all our system of succession and our ruinous administrative organization.

In the same paper, a few days later, M. François Coppée wrote anent the Jubilee: ". . . After these *fêtes*, in which the national strength of our neighbours was so strikingly manifested, we cannot help thinking of the interior struggles which exhaust our vitality and the exterior dangers that threaten us—and I shuddered whilst wondering whether in my own Latin veins there does not flow the poison of decadence."

#### X.—ANOTHER ARTICLE BY M. EDOUARD DRUMONT.

In *La Libre Parole*, M. Edouard Drumont has returned several times to the subject. He now (June 21st) devotes to it another article, again in praise of the book and its author, but concludes in an unforeseen manner. He chooses the title, "Are the English Superior to us?"

". . . The brutal glory in which England is now flourishing inspires psychological and social studies, and such first-class works of analysis as M. Demolins' book. . . .

"If the English trample us underfoot, that is not because they are English, but because we are no longer ourselves. . . . England is governed by statesmen, *we* are really governed by the Jews and cosmopolitans, of whom our statesmen are but the flunkys.

"Such is the truth, which men of incontestable merit, like M. Demolins, will not see, and especially will not say. To say so, indeed, would be *schoking* (*sic*), and contrary to all the traditions of the institutes. (M. Drumont forgets that M. Demolins has not precisely flattered either public opinion or the institutes, and that if he deserves any reproach, it is not that of having lacked courage.)

". . . M. Demolins will grant me that a country which, like ours, has so often given proofs of elasticity, may yet have another awakening; there may come out of the bosom of the nation . . . some Anti-Semites, some representatives of traditional ideas, who lawfully and after a regular trial, may bring about the execution of a few notable cosmopolitans, guilty of actual treason. . . .

"After reading the admirable book of M. Demolins, we cannot help agreeing with its author's views, as M. Jules Lemaître has done, with just a shade of his habitual irony, and we can but acknowledge that the 'particularistic formation' is much preferable to the 'communistic formation;' we must acknowledge, too, that the Anglo-Saxon educational system is better than our own—and we are thus gradually drawn to the conclusion that the Anglo-Saxons are superior to us. . . .

"The thesis would be more correct, however, if the Anglo-Saxon race had always enjoyed its present preponderance. Historically, such is not the case. . . ."

And M. Drumont concludes with the statement that France would yet be saved if we could get hold of "a great minister, such as we had so many of in the past."

#### XI.—THE PARISIAN PRESS (June 15th to 30th).

During this period it becomes impossible to follow the Press. We receive as many as fifteen articles daily.

The writers of some articles despair of the regeneration

of France. Thus, *Le Paris* ends: ". . . We often feel we know of no remedy, so that we, the descendants of the Fontenoy soldiers, are disposed to thus address Messieurs les Anglais: 'Morituri vos salutant.'" Such is the tone of *Le Rapide*, *L'Estafette*, *Le Petit National*, etc.

Other journals turn the matter into a joke, like *Le Tintamarre* (which devotes to the author a "tintamarresque" piece of poetry), *Le Grelot*, *Le Courier Français*, etc.

The colonial newspapers are naturally most favourable in their motives. *La Dépêche Coloniale* is quite representative.

"M. Edmond Demolins has just given his countrymen a lesson of a novel character. He has been courageous enough to recognize English superiority in certain points without, however, taking advantage of the occasion for calling them filibusters and brigands; on the contrary, he advises us to imitate them. Truly this kind of patriotism is refreshing. . . .

"M. Demolins has just worked out on a large scale a study which every one who has lived in our colonies has dreamt to accomplish locally: Why is England successful with her colonies, whilst we can get nothing out of ours?

"Indeed, it is a rule without exception: all our colonies are a source of expense to France; all the English colonies are a source of revenue to England. . . ."

*Le Petit Moniteur Universel*, in an article by M. Jean de Montalouët, reviews jointly M. Demolins' book and one by the latter's friend and collaborator, M. Paul de Rousiers, "*Le Trade-Unionisme en Angleterre*," which he justly praises.

". . . A cruel problem is offered by M. Demolins; . . . but the book comes at the right time. . . . Let us praise M. Demolins for his courage. . . . May he succeed in fixing public attention on the question of Education!"



## XII.—THE PROVINCIAL PRESS.

We must be brief here, for all the principal provincial papers have noticed the book favourably—some very warmly. A characteristic circumstance is that all political shades of opinion concur in their expressions of approval—a fact which seems to indicate that social science is neutral ground, broad enough to contain all men of good will.

*Le Radical* of Marseilles, the Orleans *Journal du Loiret*, the St. Briec *Démocrate*, the Arras *Avenir* published simultaneously the following: “. . . M. Demolins has raised an alarming problem of social pedagogy. Much discussion has been thus created, and we are glad of it. His conclusions are unimpeachable; indeed, they are identical with our own utterances for the last ten years. . . .”

*L'Avenir de la Vienne* of Poitiers, the Nantes *Populaire*, *Le Petit Méridional* of Montpellier, published an article by M. Arsène Alexandre: “. . . The new crusade has been inspired by M. Demolins' book. . . . Quite right of M. Demolins to wake us up by showing us the contrast of our own sloth and England's unceasing activity. . . .”

M. Jean de Vault signs an excellent article in both *L'Avenir de l'Orne* (Alençon) and *Le Journal de l'Aisne* (Laon).

Sympathy is also expressed in *La Tribune Républicaine* of Nevers, *La Chronique Picarde*, and *L'Espérance de Nancy*: “. . . M. Demolins' book should be perused by all earnest men who still resist the specious lies on which the majority of the country is fed.” This article, entitled, “Notre Décadence,” is reproduced by *Le Courrier des Alpes*. Let us also mention articles in *La Vigie de Dieppe*, *Toulouse Messenger*, *l'Ere Nouvelle* of Cognac, *Le Journal de Rennes*, and *Le Tourangeau*. The article in *Le Touran-*



*geau* is entitled, "Un livre à lire" (A book worth reading), and is signed by the editor, M. Louis Dubois.

The Paris *Patriote* prints the letter of M. Demolins to M. Sarcey, and reports a lecture at Pau on the subject of the book.

More articles come to hand from Havre, Dunkerque, Lyons (*La France Libre* and *Lyon Républicain*), *Le Patriote de Normandie*, *Le Progrès* of Nantes, etc. The book is doing its *tour de France*.

### XIII.—THE FOREIGN PRESS.

It seems also in the way of doing its *tour du monde*.

Among foreign newspapers printed in French, *Le Lorrain* of Metz says: ". . . M. Demolins sounds the alarm with terrible clearness.

". . . A book so suggestive of serious thought should not be ignored."

*Le Bien Public* of Gand reproduces the Preface and Contents, and expresses unreserved approval. *Le Patriote* of Brussels favourably reviews the book. *La Tribune de Genève* and *La Gazette de Lausanne* publish the same article, and review at length "the teachings of this remarkable book." The Geneva *Semaine Littéraire* insists on the desirability of diminishing functionarism in France.

The *Italia* of Rome publishes a long and elaborate article on the book "of that profound observer who shows the effects of strongly established causes." The *Osservatore Cattolico* also approves of "*un bel libro del Demolins*." Also the Madrid *Imparcial*, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the *Egyptian Gazette* of Alexandria; the latter reviews in great detail "this most remarkable book." *Le Journal Egyptien* of Cairo has a long favourable article entitled "M. Demolins' Book." The *Budapesti Hirlap*, etc.

## XIV.—THE REVIEWS.

The notices of the reviews necessarily appear much later than those of the newspapers. However, a score of them came to hand in the course of June. We will only report the most interesting articles.

*La Revue Bleue* cannot be said to have no opinion of the book; indeed, the same number of this review expresses *two* distinct views in two articles separated by only a few pages.

The first, by M. Jacques Porcher, is entitled "La Famille bourgeoise; les pères et les fils." The writer, who is in complete community of ideas with M. Demolins, deplores the effects of our system of education, and concludes: ". . . We must develop the will-power and spirit of enterprise in our children. We should allow them a larger share of independence. . . . Let us be deceived no longer by our superstitious regard for the administrative careers. . . . The character must be trained," etc. In support of his contentions, the writer quotes extracts from "the interesting and documentary book of M. Demolins."

The second article is M. Maurice Spronck's "Français et Anglais d'après un livre récent."

". . . We were talking about the book just published by M. Demolins. Somebody said, 'I was much interested in reading this book, and I do not deny its merits; but upon the whole there is no science less precise or more empiric than political economy or sociology. And there are no *savants* more dogmatic or more religiously fond of intangible axioms than your economists or sociologists. . . .'"

M. Spronck ends thus: "Although we may profit by many of the ingenious views of M. Demolins, yet we shall do wisely in taking the whole book *cum grano salis*." Well,

the public shall judge—or, rather, the public has delivered its judgment, *not* in the sense indicated by M. Spronck.

*La Revue des Revues* goes with public opinion. “. . . This book is attracting a great deal of attention, and this is but just. The author's text is the acknowledged fact of Anglo-Saxon superiority, the causes of which he has undertaken to discover; and he has an almost absolute right to say that he has succeeded in doing so. At any rate, he has actually shown us the principal causes; and his deductions are so perfectly logical that any refutation of them appears at present to be singularly difficult. . . . M. Demolins' thesis gives us little comfort, but alas! it is likely enough to be the truth. It is for us to see whether we are capable of the energy necessary for regeneration.”

*La Nouvelle Revue*: “. . . This thesis is most carefully developed, and supported by numerous arguments. . . .”

*L'Illustration* also approves: “. . . Very clear, very frank, and at times very interesting. . . . M. Demolins demonstrates his thesis with much skill and sincerity, and especially with a warmth of patriotism which alone places his book above the Anglo-maniac professions of faith of official economists. . . . No one but will endorse his wish to see those methods imported into France which may instil more energy and more healthy activity into our youth.”

From M. Henri Mazel, in *La Critique*: “. . . All Frenchmen, even *littérateurs*—and especially *littérateurs*—ought to read it. Of course, the superiority in question is purely material and geographical; but a politico-social superiority is not without moment for men of art and science, considering that there is a strange but certain connection between a country's temporal and spiritual greatness. . . .” After a rapid review of the work, M. Mazel expresses his regret that M. Demolins should not have thought fit to develop the psychological side of Anglo-Saxon superiority.

"Les Annales politiques et littéraires" of M. Adolphe Brisson reproduce *in extenso* the chapter, "How are we to bring up our Children?" preceding with this: "This work is creating a great stir. We offer a suggestion for the consideration of our readers." In the same number M. Brisson reviews the whole work. The following passage will furnish the note of this excellent article:—

"The public is taking a lively interest just now in the problems tackled by 'modern science.' M. Demolins' substantial book, which has caused much discussion in scientific circles, would probably have been ignored by the public had not M. Jules Lemaître thought fit to point out its merits. This time the public were greatly moved. It was thought that the question must be a very serious one which exercised the minds of so many distinguished people—and so the agitation spread. For the last month it has been the fashion in Paris to extol the practical genius of the English and Americans. . . .

"It is desirable that the younger generation may be free from our miserable prejudices. Our duty is to show the way—and this duty is brilliantly accomplished by such books as those of M. Demolins and M. Hugues Le Roux. . . .

"Of course, there is a shade of *parti-pris* in M. Demolins' book. But if the author was not impassioned for his thesis, he would not be so powerful in his treatment of it. . . ."

*La France Extérieure*, organ of the Duplex Committee, contains this mention from the pen of its editor, M. Arthur Maillet:—

". . . I felt absolute delight in reading M. Demolins' book. Our system of education is attacked with equal energy and justice. The author eloquently exposes our deepest sore—that is to say, the curse of functionarism, which

ruins both our Budget and our characters. In a forthcoming article I intend to review the book—certainly the most useful piece of work that has been attempted for many a long day. . . . It marks an epoch in our social history.”

*Les Études*, organ of the Jesuits, in an article from the pen of the Right Rev. Father Prelate on the Jubilee: “. . . You have not only gazed on the cover, you have also turned the pages of M. Demolins’ instructive book; a ‘painful book,’ M. Jules Lemaître called it—ay! as painful to us as it must be gratifying for our neighbours. It comes just in time for the Royal Jubilee, without having been ordered for the event, and will only be the better appreciated. You know the thesis. . . .”

*Le Correspondant*: “This book is well worth studying; it defines one of the most interesting questions of the present time. . . .”

We should quote extracts from *La Vie Contemporaine*, *L’Echo de la Semaine* (which printed two articles), from *L’Enseignement Secondaire*, etc. But this Appendix is already too long. The extracts furnished will suffice to impart a correct idea of the opinions expressed on this book, which, up to the present, has provoked more than three hundred articles.

P.S.—Whilst this Appendix was in the press, there appeared fifty or more articles, which testify to the increasing interest created by this book at home and abroad.

In *L’Éclair*, M. Emile Bergerat calls M. Demolins “a shrewd sociologist;” *La République Française* says, “This book ought to be read and pondered over.”

We ought to make special mention of an altogether remarkable article in *Le Journal de Genève*, by its director, M. Marc Debrit: “This is a beautiful and a good book, wholesome and manly, and one that makes us think—also full of courage. . . . A work of research directed to find-

ing the secret of Anglo-Saxon strength . . . written by a learned economist, pupil of Le Play, perfectly well-informed, and gifted enough to know how to rise above national prejudices and the ready-made opinions which are the fashion of the day. . . ."

This article was reproduced by *Le Journal de St. Pétersbourg*.

Lastly, in *Le Temps*, the eminent literary critic, M. Gaston Deschamps, devotes his weekly feuilleton to M. Demolins, "whose intellectual evolution," he says, "is worth telling." At the same time he notes the progress of M. Demolins' Review, *La Science Sociale*.

We will only give a short extract, as representative of the article: "M. Demolins, whose name has been filling the newspapers for the last few weeks, has been in no hurry for the wind to fan into flame the interior fire that animated him. For years and years he worked in comparative obscurity. His ideas have been patiently incubated. And now he is emerging from his *chiaroscuro* with a book that is apparently an ardent torch, for a large number of his contemporaries are lighting their own candles at it, and even burning their fingers in doing so. . . ."

"What I like in Demolins is that his ideas have taken possession of his life. . . ."

"His severe scolding can only end in public good. It is a pleasure to hear that gruff voice suddenly interrupting our gossiping, and calling our attention away from the burlesque amusements—'so Parisian, you know!'—which we have raised to such an absurd cult. Indeed, we must make up our minds to heed the 'killjoys,' if we don't want to have to do—and that very soon—with the Official Receiver."











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